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Great Punctuations: Prediction, Randomness, and the Evolution of Comparative Political Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2006

MARK BLYTH
MARK BLYTH
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University
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Abstract

I argue that comparative politics has been shaped by two “Great Punctuations” that, on each occasion, transformed our conceptions of what the subfield is and what we do. Just before a punctuation occurs, the subfield seems especially coherent, united by a set of common assumptions, methods, theories, and so on, which are then punctuated by a series of events that destroys faith in them. The subfield then reconstitutes itself around new assumptions, until, just as coherence is achieved, the next punctuation occurs. To demonstrate why the sub-field has evolved in this way, I draw on probability theory to argue that the desire to be a predictive science causes us to imagine the world to be far more predictable than it actually is. This results in the development of theories that are surprised by events; hence the peculiar trajectory of the subfield.

Type
“THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE” ESSAYS
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 100 , Issue 4 , November 2006 , pp. 493 - 498
Copyright
© 2006 by the American Political Science Association

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