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The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

M. Nelson McGeary
M. Nelson McGeary*
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State College
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Extract

The veto power is well known as one of the primary sources of the strength of a governor. Especially in the 38 states which give their chief executives the right to reject items in appropriation bills, the governors have been able to mold legislation to their liking. In a few states, including Pennsylvania, the power to veto items has been expanded to include the authority to reduce any item. Probably in no state in the union has the veto been a more effective club in the hands of the governor than in Pennsylvania. A study of the veto record in Pennsylvania over the past eight years reveals the extent to which the governor's will has prevailed.

The constitutional provisions concerning the veto in Pennsylvania are not unlike those in a number of other states. The governor may, within ten days after the passage of a bill by the General Assembly, disapprove it. If he fails to act within that period, the bill, unless approved by the legislature just before adjournment, becomes law without his signature. In addition, he is given the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills. The legislature may override any veto by a two-thirds vote of all the elected members of each house. A bill which is passed during the ten days before the close of the session becomes law unless vetoed by the governor within 30 days after the adjournment.

Type
American Government and Politics
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 41 , Issue 5 , October 1947 , pp. 941 - 946
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1947

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References

1 The expansion of the item veto to include the power to reduce items was approved by the state supreme court in Commonwealth v. Barnet, 199 Pa. 161 (1901).

2 H. R. 124 of the 1941 session.

3 See Wells, Roger H., “The Item Veto and State Budget Reform,” in this Review, Nov., 1924, pp. 782–791 Google Scholar.

4 The Joint State Government Commission.

5 The governor, who holds office for four years and cannot succeed himself, should have no real difficulty in meeting a deadline during the regular legislative session at the beginning of his third year in office. Thus, Governor Martin was able to submit his budget early in 1945.

6 Appropriation Acts of the General Assembly, 1941, p. 47 Google Scholar. The House felt the sting of the governor's veto after it voted to appropriate to the department of commerce an amount 17 per cent less than the governor had recommended in his budget. Governor James retaliated by reducing the appropriations for both the department of the auditor-general and the treasury department to points 17 per cent below his budget suggestions; these were the only two departments headed by Democrats.

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