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Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2006

ROBERT PEKKANEN ,
BENJAMIN NYBLADE  and
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
ROBERT PEKKANEN
Affiliation:
University of Washington
BENJAMIN NYBLADE
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Abstract

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 100 , Issue 2 , May 2006 , pp. 183 - 193
Copyright
© 2006 by the American Political Science Association

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