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Direct Democracy in France

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Henry W. Ehrmann
Henry W. Ehrmann*
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College
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Extract

When during the debate on a motion of censure in October 1962 Paul Reynaud challenged the government from the rostrum of the National Assembly with a scornful: “Here and nowhere else is France!”, the issue was well joined. To Reynaud, perennial deputy during three republican regimes, General de Gaulle's projected referendum appeared as a two-fold attack upon French republican traditions. If adopted, the proposal to elect the President of the Republic by popular suffrage would divest the Assembly of its role as the sole bearer of national sovereignty. Moreover, to seek approval for such a change of the constitution of 1958 without a prior vote of parliament deprived both houses of any participation in the amending process.

In 1958, as President of the Consultative Constitutional Committee, Reynaud had insisted that the possibilities of any direct appeal to the electorate be carefully circumscribed and hedged by parliamentary controls. He had obtained official assurances that the referendum would never be used by the executive as a means of arousing popular opinion against the elected assemblies. The final text of the constitution had incorporated proposals by the Consultative Committee which strengthened the position of parliament whenever either a referendum or presidential emergency powers might create a plebiscitarian situation.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , December 1963 , pp. 883 - 901
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1963

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References

1 “Pour nous, républicans, la France est ici et non ailleurs.” Journal Officiel. Débats Parlemen-laires, Assemblée Nationale. 10 5, 1962, p. 3209Google Scholar.

2 See Travaux Preparatoires de la Constitution, Avis el Débats du Comité Consultalif Constitution-nel (Paris, 1960), pp. 203 ffGoogle Scholar.

3 See Kirchheimer, Otto, “France from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic,” Social Research, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter 1958), p. 382Google Scholar.

4 This article of the Declaration and especially the words italicised in the text were used in the referendum campaign of 1962 to justify the direct appeal to the electorate on a question of constitutional revision.

5 As early as September 1789, Sieyès had argued that citizens “without alienating their rights can commit their exercise” to those best qualified to represent them. The ablest analysis of the debates on the problems of representation is still Redslob, Robert, Die Staatstheorien der französi-schen Nalionalversammlung (Leipzig, 1912)Google Scholar. See also Loewenstein, Karl, Volk und Parlament nach der Slaatstheorie der französischen National-versammlung von 1789. Studien zur Dogmenge-schichte der unmittelbaren Volksgesetzgebung. (München, 1922Google Scholar.)

6 In such words Kant condemned what he called “democracy” as an Unform in contrast to the representative republic which he praised. See Zum Ewigen Frieden (Königsberg, 1795), pp. 26 f.Google Scholar, and especially Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechlslehre, in Sämlliche Werke, vol. VII (Leipzig, 1868), p. 159Google Scholar. Kant's implied criticism of Rousseau's notion of direct popular rule is identical with that voiced by the majority in the National Assembly, even though Kant's often quoted Antwortschreiben … an den Abt Sieyès in Paris is now recognized as a forgery.

7 This is Robespierre's term; see, also for the following, Talmon, J. L., The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy (Boston, 1952), p. 98Google Scholar and passim. For the constitution of 1793, Thompson, J. M., The French Revolution (New York, 1945), pp. 393–97Google Scholar, gives a more balanced account than Talmon.

8 Sarraut, Albert, Le Gouvernement Direct (Paris, 1899)Google Scholar—an interesting doctoral thesis by the radical-socialist leader—makes the point (pp. 175 ff, 214) that Robespierre's passion for direct democracy was not unconditional. More circumspect than the constitution-makers of 1848, he rejected the idea of a popularly elected executive. Dreading the emotions of an uneducated populace, he also warned against using a referendum to decide the fate of Louis XVI.

9 So the Minister of Justice Ernoul during the constitutional debates of 1873, see ibid. p. 342. The brilliant analysis of the plebiscitarian ideology of bonapartism in Michels, Robert, Political Parlies (New York, 1962), pp. 212–19Google Scholar, remains extremely valuable. New insights into the phenomenon of democratic cesarism are provided by Gollwitzer, H., “Der Casarismus Napoleons III. im Widerhall der Oeffentlichen Meinung Deutsch-lands,” Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 173, No. 1 (02 1952), pp. 23 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 The constitution of May 21, 1870 was largely inspired by the monarchist and former enemy of the Empire, Prévost-Paradol, who throughout the Third Republic was considered by many as the foremost theoretician of representative government. By its division of the amending power between the head of state and the people, the text of 1870 resembled the constitutional situation which General de Gaulle created in 1962.

11 Priouret, Roger, La République des Députés(Paris, 1959)Google Scholar, gives a fascinating historical account of the representative tradition in France.

12 Alain, , Eléments de la Doctrine Radicate (Paris, 1925), p. 42Google Scholar. The classical picture of the relationship between the citizen and his deputy, was painted by Siegfried, André, Tableau des Partis en France (Paris, 1930)Google Scholar, shortly before the decline of the representative system began. But even during the censure bebate of 1962, a conservative deputy, M. Motte, still assessed his own role in similar terms. He too was not reelected.

13 On this point see Fraenkel, Ernst, Die Repräsenlalive und die Plebiszitäre Komponente im Demokralischen Verfassungsstaat (Tübingen, 1958), esp. pp. 6–11Google Scholar.

14 Leibholz, Gerhard, “The Nature and Various Forms of Democracy,” Social Research, Vol. 5, No. 1 (02 1938), p. 99Google Scholar. With more details on the role of the modern party as a manifestation of direct democracy, see the same author's “Der Strukturwandel der Modernen Demokratie,” in Slrukturprobleme der Modernen Demokratie (Karlsruhe, 1958), pp. 78–129Google Scholar.

15 Foreign, and occasionally even the best French, observers have been overimpressed by the apparent increase in party discipline in the Fourth Republic. It is significant that the organisational structure of both the SFIO and the MRP, especially in regard to the relationship between party and parliamentary group, differed rather markedly from that of other socialist and Christian-democratic parties in Europe.

16 The last elections in the Fourth Republic (1956) offer an excellent example of total confusion, giving the deputies free rein how to interpret the “popular verdict;” for details see the remarkable essay by Duverger, Maurice, “Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Représentation Politique,” in Evolution du Droit Public. Etudes en l'honneur d'Achille Mestre (Paris, 1956), esp. pp. 217 ffGoogle Scholar. In an opinion poll held before the elections of 1956, 14% believed that their vote would have a “great” influence on future political developments, 26% hoped for some influence, 33% were convinced it would have none. Only 2% designated the future Premier M. Mollet as their choice for that post; see Sondages, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1955), pp. 11, 18Google Scholar. But two years later, a majority of voters still showed little inclination for a modern political party system: only 18% (hence far less than the number of communist and socialist voters) believed that a deputy should vote with his party; 50% wished to see him reach is own individual decision; for 21% the answer would vary according to the question to be voted upon. See id., Vol. 22, No. 4 (1960), p. 49.

17 Grodzins, Morton, “American Political Parties and the American System,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (12 1960), p. 997Google Scholar.

18 See Kirchheimer, Otto, “Parteistruktur und Massendemokratie in Europa,” Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts, Vol. 79 (1954), p. 314Google Scholar. Using a somewhat different terminology (contrasting direct democracy and démocratie médiatisée), Maurice Duverger has reached similar conclusions. See especially his La VI0 République el le Régime Présidentiel (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar. For a recent analysis of the relationship between parties, elections and the executive in various Western democracies, see Lowenthal, Richard, ed., Die Demokratie im Wandel der Gesellschaft (Berlin, 1963)Google Scholar.

19 François Goguel in his essay “Six Authors in Search of a National Character,” in In Search of France (Cambridge, 1963), p. 395Google Scholar, speaks about “the political class” as a narrow group of “not more than fifteen or twenty thousand persons at most.” The term is widely used in the columns of Le Monde or a liberal magazine such as Esprit, but was denounced as anti-republican by a socialist deputy in the censure debate of October 1962.

20 In present-day Europe, confused anti-party propaganda in which various strands of mostly conservative thought are merged, is not confined to France; see Leibholz, Struklurprobleme, op. cit., pp. 122–23. After the demise of the Fourth Republic, an opinion poll found that most voters considered the frequent change of governments and the multiplicity of parties the main reasons for its failure. Far fewer believed that its weakness resulted from parliament having too much or the executive too little power. On the last points there was, however, a definite division of opinion according to party preferences, MRP voters siding with the Right, radical voters with the Left. See Sondages, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1956), p. 6Google Scholar.

21 Cf. the excellent remarks by Stanley Hoffmann, “Paradoxes of the French Political Community,” in In Search … op. cit., p. 16.

22 Duguit, Léon, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, vol. 2 (Paris, 1923), pp. 481 ffGoogle Scholar.

23 See, e.g., Tardieu, André, L'Heure de la Décision (Paris, 1934)Google Scholar.

24 “Considérations théoriques (sic!) sur la question de la combinaison du référendum avec le parlementarisme,” Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, Vol. 48 (1931), pp. 225–244Google Scholar. Interestingly enough, the author refused at the end of his article to take a stand on the question as to whether or not the referendum should be adopted. Rigorous analyst of the representative system that he had been in the writings of a lifetime, Carré de Malberg was obviously aware of the incongruity of the referendum within a strictly representative system.

25 For the events in 1945, see Wright, Gordon, The Reshaping of French Democracy (New York, 1948), pp. 78 ffGoogle Scholar, and for a fascinating, broad historical view of de Gaulle's position, Blum, Léon in L'Oeuvre de Léon Blum, vol. 6 (Paris, 1958), esp. pp. 31–34Google Scholar.

26 See Gaulle, Charles de, Mémoires de Guerre. Vol. III, Le Salut (Paris, 1959), p. 270Google Scholar. Capitant, René, Cours de Principe du Droit Public (Paris, 1952–1953), pp. 235 ff.Google Scholar, argues quite convincingly that the majority which voted “yes” in answer to both questions asked in the referendum of October 1945 expressed twice its preference for “popular sovereignty” over the representative regime: they rejected the ultra-representative constitution of 1875 and accepted the proposal to submit the text of the Constituent Assembly to a referendum.

27 The sole revision of the constitution, in 1954, avoided the referendum procedure. The discussions of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 reveal that art. 90 was the outcome of intense political bargaining; see Assemblée Nationale Constituante, élue le 2 juin 1946, Scéances de la Commission de la Constitution (Paris, 1946), esp. pp. 750–51Google Scholar. Substantial parts of the provision were transferred unchanged to the constitution of the Fifth Republic, only to become the focus of the constitutional crisis of 1962.

28 See, e.g., Capitant, René, Le Changement de Régime (Rassemblement du Peuple Français. Assises Nationales de Paris, 9–11 Novembre 1952), p. 11Google Scholar. While in opposition, the Gaullist movement was unable to reconcile various strands of constitutional thinking. This explains in part the astonishing fact that there existed no definite project of constitutional reform at the moment of de Gaulle's return to power.

29 Historical antecedents and the circumstances of constitution-making in 1958 are excellently analyzed by Stanley H. Hoffmann, “The French Constitution of 1958: I. The Final Draft and its Prospects,” this Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (June, 1959) pp. 332–357; and by Nicholas Wahl, “II. The Initial Draft and its Origins,” ibid., pp. 35882. Professor Capitant, whose constitutional thinking had been ignored temporarily, described the text as keeping within the liberal traditions of the last century. See his “Préface” to Hamon, Léon, De Gaulle dans lá, République (Paris, 1958) p. xviiiGoogle Scholar.

30 Debré's address before the Council of State is indispensable for an understanding of the concepts underlying the text of 1958; it was reprinted in Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 9, No. 1 (03, 1959), pp. 7–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an analysis of the neo-liberalism which M. Debré's thinking reflects, see Carl J. Friedrich, “The Political Thought of Neo-liberalism,” this Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (June, 1955), pp. 509–525.

31 In his pre-1958 writings, M. Debriré had criticized the single-member district system with runoffs as disastrous. The fact that General de Gaulle decided to adopt it might have been indicative of an early divergence of views between him and Debré on the role of parliament in the new republic. Also in regard to the electoral system Gaullist doctrine had wavered.

32 See, e.g., his first speech before the National Assembly, L'Année Politique (quoted hereafter as A.P.) 1959 (Paris, 1960), pp. 603–611Google Scholar.

33 See among others Constant, Benjamin, Principes de politique, applicables à tous les gouvernements représenlalifs el particulièrement à la constitution actuelle de la France (Paris, 1815)Google Scholar; Lucien-Anatole, Prévost-Paradol, La France Nouvelle (Paris, 1868)Google Scholar; Benoît, Charles, La Réforme Parlemenlaire (Paris 1902)Google Scholar; and the monumental work by Malberg, Carré de, Contribution à la Théorie Générate de l'Elat (Paris, 1920, 1922)Google Scholar. In all of these writings, one discovers elements of what the constitution of 1958 tried to enact. Particularly interesting is Redslob, Robert, Die Parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten Form (Tübingen, 1918)Google Scholar because it has a marked influence on the Weimar Constitution. There are notable parallels between the Weimar constitution and that of the Fifth Republic, especially after its structure was modified in 1962.

34 In 1958, M. Debré exalted the “earthy” composition of the electoral college. Prelot, Marcel, Institutions Politiques et Droit Constitutional (Paris, 1961), p. 630Google Scholar, pointed out that the critics of the electoral college failed to understand how much it was in harmony with the spirit of a “senatorial” constitution. During the referendum campaign of 1962, de Gaulle destroyed such justifications rather cruelly when he declared that he had known “from the beginning” that the President would have to be elected by universal suffrage. See A.P. 1962 (Paris 1963), p. 678Google Scholar.

35 In the spring of 1961, when 71% of the voters were “highly” or “rather” satisfied with the President of the Republic, only 39% expressed similar feelings towards the Debré government. At the same time, 84% were confident that de Gaulle would be able to solve the Algerian problem. Among the voters of the MRP and of the SFIO parties that were to oppose de Gaulle in 1962, such confidence was expressed by 91% and 74% respectively. See Sondages, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1961), pp. 13–15, 29Google Scholar.

36 As examples see Premier Debré's declarations before the National Assembly, Journal Officiel, Dibats Parlementaries, Assemblée Nationale, 10 14, 1959, pp. 1734 ffGoogle Scholar. and Febr. 3, 1960, pp. 115 ff. President de Gaulle himself from the very beginning had interpreted his role without much concern for the wording of the constitution: “Guide of France and chief of the Republican state, I shall exercise the supreme power in all the breadth it now carries and according to the new spirit to which I owe it.” See A.P. 1958 (Paris, 1959), p. 567Google Scholar.

37 Constitutional and political developments during the first years of the Fifth Republic have been described among others by Wahl, Nicholas, “The French Political System” in Beer, Samuel H.et al., Patterns of Government (2nd ed., New York 1962), esp. pp. 397–466Google Scholar; by Ehrmann, Henry W., “Die Verfassungsentwicklung im Frank-reich der Fünften Republik,” Jahrbuch des Öffent-lichen Rechls der Gegenwart, Vol. 10 (1961), pp. 353–396Google Scholar; and with emphasis on the executive-parliament relationship, by Parodi, Jean-Luc, Les Rapports entre le Législatif et l'Exécutif sous la V0 République (Paris, 1962)Google Scholar.

38 See Sondages, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1959), p. 45Google Scholar; Vol. 22, No. 3 (1960) p. 67; No. 4 (1960), p. 49. Figures from more recent polls have been communicated to me by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique to which I express my gratitude. Some of the data are now published in Revue Française de Science Politique Vol. 13, No. 2 (06 1963), pp. 428–432CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 See Association Française de Science Politique, La Dépolilisation—Mythe ou Réalié? (Paris, 1962), esp. pp. 99–145Google Scholar.

40 Shortly before the referendum of October 1962, 47% of the voters believed that, if given a chance, the traditional political parties would return to a regime “of the type of the Fourth ReRepublic.” A few months earlier, only 25% thought that the existing constitution could survive de Gaulle.

41 See his statement before the Central Committee of the UNR, Le Monde, October 14–15, 1962. A comparison with an earlier speech in which M. Debré proposed a much more limited constitutional reform affords an interesting insight into the development of his thinking. See ibid., March 11, 1961. As before, he rejected a presidential regime which, in his opinion, results in “the complete effacement of parliament” (sic!).

42 Carré de Malberg, from whose writings M. Debré drew so much inspiration, had frequently criticised a rigorous separation of power as violating the unitary postulates of democratic government: “a duality [of power] without a crowning unity cannot exist for long,” La Loi, expression de la volonté générale. Etude sur le concept de la loi dans la Constitution de 1875 (Paris 1931), p. 201Google Scholar. In the name of that principle, the author praised the Weimar constitution for having combined the parliamentary system with a popularly elected president.

43 For an excellent survey see Parodi, Jean-Luc, “Quatre années de Controverses Constitution-nelles,” Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 12, No. 4 (12 1962), pp. 845–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 See Mémoires de Guerre, vol. II, l'Unité (Paris, 1956), p. 368Google Scholar; and vol. III, op. cit., p. 14.

45 For the role of presidential voyages, see Viansson-Ponté, Pierre, Les Gaullistes. Rituel et Annuaire (Paris, 1963), pp. 35 ffGoogle Scholar. The extra-parliamentary methods by which the leader in a plebiscitarian democracy wins confidence and commands faith have been classically described by Weber, Max, in Gesammelte Politische Schriften (München, 1921), p. 212Google Scholar.

46 Op. cit., vol. III, p. 240. The same passage speaks somewhat cryptically of the “popular designation of the Presidency” without any reference to an electoral college. While this volume of de Gaulle's memoirs was written, presumably, before his return to power, it appeared in print after the new constitution had already shown its weak points.

47 See Hoffmann, “The French Constitution …,” op. cit., p. 343; Capitant, Préface, op. cit., regretted (p. xix) the insignificant role of the referendum: “we are very far from popular sovereignty.” Only Friedrich, C. J., “The New French Constitution in Political and Historical Perspective,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 5 (03 1959), recognized, pp. 811 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, the potentialities for a plebiscitarian development. For an uncertain evaluation of the referendum see Loewenstein, Karl “The Constitution of the Fifth Republic. A Preliminary Report.” Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (05 1959) pp. 216–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 See Rousseau, J.-J., Du Conlrat Social (Amsterdam, 1762)Google Scholar, Bk. II, Ch. VI; also the comments by Talmon, op. cit., pp. 46–49 and, with reference to a similar statement by SaintJust, p. 117.

49 See the characterization of plebiscites by Kirchheimer, op. cit., p. 403. For the text of the bills submitted to popular vote see A.P. 1960 (Paris 1961), pp. 663–64Google Scholar; and id. 1962 (Paris 1963), p. 650.

50 The authoritative and complete account of the referendums, reproducing all of de Gaulle's campaign speeches, is to be found in the volumes published by the French Association of Political Science, Le Referendum de Septembre et les Elections de Novembre 1958 (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar; Le Referendum du 8 janvier 1961 (Paris, 1962)Google Scholar; Le Referendum du 8 avril 1962 (Paris, 1963)Google Scholar. The referendum and the elections of October-November 1962 will be treated in similar fashion in a forthcoming volume. For the time being see the summary analysis by Goguel, François, “Le Référendum du 28 octobre et les Elections des 18–25 Novembre 1962,” Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 13, No. 2 (06 1963), pp. 289–314CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 On the question of constitutionality, see Williams, Philip and Harrison, Martin, “The French Referendum of April 1962,” Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 15 (1962), pp. 294–306Google Scholar. Very critical also, Fauvet, Jacques, “Un Régime Nouveau,” Le Monde, 04 8/9, 1962Google Scholar.

52 For an (incomplete) list of constitutional violations, see Duverger, Maurice, Institutions Politiques et Droit Constitutionnel (Paris, 1962), pp. 491, 516 f, 591Google Scholar. Goguel, François, Les Institutions Politiques Françaises (Cours professé à l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de l'Université de Paris 1961–1962), Fsc. I, pp. 174–176Google Scholar, concludes that the President is entitled to an authoritative interpretation of the constitution, at least outside the rather narrow competences of the Constitutional Council. See also Berlia, Georges, “Les Pouvoirs du Président de la République comme Guardien de la Constitution,” Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, Vol. 75 (1959), pp. 565 ffGoogle Scholar.

53 An (unpublished) Mémoire by the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris concluded that the general press, and presumably its public, paid scant attention to questions of constitutionality.

54 For the 1961 figures see Sondages, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1961), p. 15Google Scholar.

55 Excellently on this point, Lavau, Georges, “Réflexions sur le Régime politique de la France,” Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 12, No. 4 (12 1962), p. 820CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hoffmann, “Paradoxes …,” op. cit., p. 101.

56 For a penetrating analysis of French concepts of authority, see Crozier, Michel, “La France, terre de commandement,” Esprit, Vol. 25, No. 256 (12 1957), pp. 193–211Google Scholar.

57 Since the Right was divided, it is difficult to give an exact figure. There is little doubt that in 1961 an even larger number of communist voters than in 1958 ignored party orders to vote “no.” See Le Referendum du 8 janvier …, op. cit., p. 203, and passim.

58 In 1958, Professor Capitant commented on the fact that the amending power was still reserved to parliament with the remark: “Napoleon would never have permitted such a provision” (“Preface,” op. cit., p. xxiv). Should one conclude that when this power was divested from parliament, President de Gaulle had found his way to bonapartism?

59 In November 1961, 52% of the voters favored the election of the President by popular suffrage, 17% were opposed, 31% were undecided or refused to answer; i.e., 3 out of every 4 voters who expressed an opinion approved of the reform when it was as yet unknown how it would be carried out.

60 On such a possibility see Goguel, Les institutions …, op. cit., pp. 700–12. Writing in the spring of 1962, the same author declared that the plans to revise the constitution by way of Art. 11 existed only in the “creative imagination of certain journalists.”

61 For many others, see Berlia, Georges, “Le Problème de la Constitutionalité du Référendum du 28 October 1962,” Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, Vol. 78 (1962), pp. 936–946Google Scholar; Georges Vedel (Dean of the Paris Law School), “De Gaulle peut-il modifier la Constitution”? France Observaleur, May 31, 1962, and Maurice Duverger, various articles in Le Monde, Sept. 4, Oct. 14 and 21/22, 1962. See also the remarkable (anonymous) article, “Le Respect de la Constitution,” ibid., Sept. 19, 1962; and Gaston Monner-ville (President of the Senate), “La Constitution ne peut pas être modifié sans l'accord du Sénat,” ibid., March 2, 1962. For a full and well balanced account of all sides to the controversy, see Quermonne, J.-L., “La révision constitutionnelle et la crise du régime,” La Croix, 10 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 1962Google Scholar. The text of the proposed bill on the popular election of the President is to be found in A.P. 1962 (Paris 1963), pp. 676–7Google Scholar.

62 Such arguments turned partly around the wording of Art. 11 speaking about “any government bill dealing with the organization of public authorities.” But even in what has been called “the worst written text” of French constitutional history, it is clear that constitutional revision is only dealt with in Art. 89. The sole constitutional expert to defend the government's stand was Professor Capitant; as examples of his numerous writings during the referendum campaign, see “Réfutation du ‘Non,’” Notre Ripublique, 10 4, 1962Google Scholar; “Oui quant au fond. Oui quant à la forme,”iotd., October 18, 1962; and “‘Oui’ pour confirmer la souveraineté populaire,” La Croix, 10 24, 1962Google Scholar. Premier Pompidou offered the most complete juridical defense of the government's position during the censure debate, op. cit., pp. 320–24. During the same debate, the speakers for the opposition, among them many lawyers, demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the procedure.

63 Of particular interest is Sieyès' “Recon-noissance et Exposition raisonnée … ”of July 20, 1789, before the constitutional committee, published in Procès-Verbal de l'Assemblée Na-tionale (Paris, 1789), f. II, B3, pp. 20–21Google Scholar. Rousseau himself contradicted his statement that the people could never bind itself (Du Control Social, Bk. I, ch. VII) by admitting in his Considérations sur le Gouvernemenl de Pologne (London, 1782), p. 94Google Scholar, that it may be useful to formalize the exercise of the amending power.

64 Cf. Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution (New York, 1963), p. 162Google Scholar.

65 So Esmein, Adhémar, Eléments du droit public (7th ed., Paris, 1921), vol. I, p. 570Google Scholar. Carré de Malberg's remarks in Contribution …, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 522 ff., read today like an explicit refutation of the main arguments used during the campaign by René Capitant (see above fn. 62). For a detailed discussion of the development of the constituent and of the amending power in France see Zweig, Egon, Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constiluant (Tubingen, 1909)Google Scholar.

66 In 1958, 40% of the voters declared that their vote was determined by the intrinsic value of the constitution; for 41% the personality of General de Gaulle was decisive. See Sondages, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1960), p. 44Google Scholar. After the referendum of 1962, 62% of those who had voted “yes” said their decision was motivated by their desire to see de Gaulle remain in power, and 20% had wished to prevent a return to the Fourth Republic; only 20% were primarily interested in the election of the President by popular suffrage. It is interesting to compare these results with those of a year before, as reported above, fn. 59.

67 Ten per cent viewed a possible future violation without concern, 14% gave no answer. Of those who had voted “no” in the referendum, 47% gave as their foremost reason the unconstitutionality of the procedure; 23% had so voted because they wished de Gaulle to resign; 23% because they were opposed to popular presidential elections.

68 M. Debré seemed to have justified the referendum merely by the “gravity of circumstances” (see the censure debate, op. cit., p. 3217). For André Malraux, speaking as a member of the government between referendum and elections, things were yet simpler: the constitution had to be in the service of France, not France in the service of the constitution, Pour la V0 République, No. 2, November 1962. For a sincere and highly sensitive discussion of the political and constitutional reasons for voting either “yes” or “no,” see Lavau, Georges and Thibaud, Paul, “Positions sur le Référendum,” Bulletin Intérieur of the journal Esprit, 10 1962Google Scholar.

69 Forty-four per cent of the workers, but 61% of the farmers, favored the “yes” (64% and 76% respectively of those expressing an opinion); only 17% of the women expected to vote “no” as against 33% of the men. In the larger cities the proportion of those voting “yes” was 1.5:1, in towns between 2,000 and 5,000 population almost 3:1. The opinion polls from which these data are drawn were held 5 days prior to the referendum and predicted the actual outcome with great accuracy.

70 The 46% “yes” votes in 1962 are compared here with the sum of the 31% “no” and of the 31% abstentions in 1946. About 15% of “structural” abstentionism must be subtracted in order to arrive at an estimate of those who heeded de Gaulle's warnings against the new constitution. For a detailed analysis of earlier elections and of the October 1946 referendum, see Goguel, François, Géographie des Elections Françaises de 1870 a 1951 (Paris, 1951), pp. 102–05Google Scholar, and “Géographie du Référendum du 13 octobere et des Elections du 10 novembre 1946,” Esprit, Vol. 15, No. 130 (02 1947), pp. 237–64Google Scholar. For a comparison of the “no” votes in 1946 and the “yes” in 1962 see the maps, ibid., p. 232, and Le Monde, October 30, 1962.

71 See, e.g., the remarks by Faure, Edgar (a radical-socialist senator) in his “Preface” to A.P. 1962 (Paris 1963), pp. vii–xviGoogle Scholar. Prior to the crisis F. Goguel had demonstrated why a “trap” set by Arts. 11 and 49 of the constitution made it most inadvisable to ever censure a government when the latter proposed a referendum; see Les institutions …, op. cit., vol. II, p. 196.

72 During the referendum campaign, the fluctuations in de Gaulle's popularity were no greater than in preceding years: at the lowest point 30% of the voters were discontented and 60% satisfied with his conduct. At about the same time, 54% of the voters believed that the parties were opposing the constitutional amendment “to defend their own interests,” only 25% believed that the parties were acting out of “a concern for the orderly functioning of the institutions.”

73 If the majority of “no” votes in the South can be attributed to anything else but stubborn republican traditions, it is assumed that the energetic campaign for the “no” which the major regional newspapers had conducted had a far greater impact than the views of notables and parties. For a general evaluation of the election results, see the analysis by Viansson-Ponté, Pierre and Jacques Fauvet in Le Monde, 10 30, 1962Google Scholar.

74 While spokesmen for the opposition were given radio and television time, it is true that governmental influence was constantly felt in the presentation of news and features. The careful analysis by Rémond, René and Neuschwanger, Claude, “Télévision et comportement politique,” Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 13, No. 2 (06 1963), pp. 325–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, concludes that television had far less influence on voting behavior than is sometimes assumed.

75 See “La Source du Pouvoir,” Bulletin Mensuel d'Information du Bureau Politique de Mgr. le Comte de Paris, 09 12, 1962Google Scholar. The role now attributed to the elected President had been described in earlier monarchist propaganda as that of the modern king; see Henri, , Comte de Paris, Faillite d'Un Régime. Essai sur le Gouvernement de Demain (Paris, 1936), esp. pp. 99 ffGoogle Scholar, and 235–37. It is often considered significant that the present constitution has omitted the customary republican reference declaring any member of families which have previously reigned over France ineligible for the presidency.

76 The best statements of this position are to be found in “Pour un vrai régime présidentiel,” Bulletin du Club Jean Moulin, No. 31 (June–July 1962) and in Duverger, Maurice, La VI0 République et le Régime Présidentiel (Paris 1961)Google Scholar. For a critical comment see Goguel, François, “Reflexions sur le Régime Présidentiel,” Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 12, No. 2 (06 1962), pp. 289 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 As an example of this position see the “Lettre à l'Express,” signed by a number of well-known liberal personalities in L'Express, October 18, 1962. In a similar vein and apparently typical of the numerous intellectuals who voted “yes” in spite of their criticism of form and content of the referendum, is Duverger, Maurice, “Une pièce en deux actes,” Le Monde, 10 21/22, 1962Google Scholar.

78 For this view on de Gaulle as a party and national leader, see Aron, Raymond, “La République Gaulliste continue,” Prevues, No. 143 (01 1963), pp. 3–11Google Scholar.

79 The UNR conducted its campaign with (nationally used) posters, such as: “You have said ‘yes’ to de Gaulle. Vote for this candidate.” “Defend your ‘Yes’: UNR.” “So that de Gaulle may continue, insure the victory of those who support him.” etc. After the elections, 56% of all voters believed that the main reason for the victory of the UNR had been a desire to vote for de Gaulle; 28% thought that the most important motive had been the wish to defeat the parties of the Fourth Republic.

80 In December 1962, at a time when 64% expressed satisfaction with General de Gaulle's policies, only 20% thought that they were better off than before 1958; 28% considered that their situation had worsened. These statements are all the more subjective since they reflect the traditional unwillingness, especially of farmers, to admit an improvement in one's economic situation.

81 Exceptions were mainly due to the fact that for a variety of reasons about 20 electoral districts had no gaullist candidate. For an overall evaluation of the election results see Fauvet, Jacques, “Le Gaullisme et l'Opposition,” Le Monde, 12 11, 1962Google Scholar.

82 The otherwise convincing article by Philip, André, “The Crisis of Democracy in France,” Social Research, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 34–35Google Scholar, lumps the MRP votes with those cast for Socialists and Radicals, in order to prove that on the first ballot the non-communist left outnumbered the UNR votes. His conclusion that this opens hopeful perspectives for a non-gaullist candidate at the next elections is all the more dubious since the referendums of 1946 and of 1962, and to an extent also the last elections, have shown that the MRP meets disaster whenever it tries to oppose a position identified with de Gaulle or too closely allied with the left.

83 In January 1963, 46% of the voting population considered the UNR as a party of the Right, 28% as one of the Center. For a brilliant comparison between bonapartism and gaullism, see Rémond, René, “L'Enigme de l'UNR,” Esprit, Vol. 31, No. 314 (02 1963), pp. 307–319 ffGoogle Scholar.

84 Particularly suggestive of the similarities is a comparison of present-day gaullist propaganda with the proclamation by the Prince-President Louis-Napoleon of January 14, 1854, reproduced in Duverger, Maurice, Constitutions et Documents Politiques (Paris, 1960), pp. 101–04Google Scholar. There is little evidence to substantiate the claim made by M. Chalandon (former Secretary General of the UNR) that the voters had found in “gaullism … The attractiveness of an ideology.” See Le Monde, January 23, 1963.

85 In his address to the newly elected Assembly; see A.P. 1962 (Paris, 1963), p. 693Google Scholar.

86 For the text of the terse decision by the Constitutional Council and the request to the Council by M. Monnerville to declare unconstitutional the law which had been adopted by referendum, see ibid., pp. 687 f.

87 For the text of the organic law which was adopted in the referendum, but does not form part of the constitution, see ibid., p. 677. Lists of candidates for the first ballot of presidential elections are to be established by the Constitutional Council on the basis of nominations by “at least a hundred citizens, members of parliament, of the Economic and Social Council, elected members of the departmental councils or mayors.” However, the names of those making nominations are to be kept secret.

88 Relevant to this point is Max Weber's discussion of the “transformation” of the charisma in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 758 ff.Google Scholar; see also Fraenkel, op. cit., esp. pp. 10–11.

89 See for many others, Club Moulin, Jean, L'Etat et le Citoyen (Paris, 1961), esp. pp. 164–181Google Scholar; Goguel, in In Search …, op. cit., pp. 401 f; Lavau, op. cit., pp. 837 ff. For the point of view of a leading member of the UNR, see Chalandon, Albin, “Comment peuton sauver la démocratie?”, La Nef, No. 6 (04–June 1961), pp. 74–80Google Scholar.

90 Seventy per cent and 64%, respectively, believed that parties had an important role to play in the representation of citizens and in controlling parliament; 17% and 21% considered the parties to be almost useless for such functions. Sixty-six per cent were highly, or rather, favorable to a twoor three-party system. Further questioning revealed great uncertainty about the forms and possibilities of any regrouping of existing parties.

91 See Le Monde, February 15, 1963.

92 For an analysis and criticism of such opinions see Ehrmann, Henry W., “Bureaucracy and Interest Groups in the Decision-Making Process of the Fifth Republic,” in Festschrift für Ernst Fraenkel (Berlin, 1963), esp. pp. 74–77Google Scholar. In present-day terminology the opposite to the “forces vives” are the “forces politiques.”

93 See Max Weber, “Parlament und Regierung im Neugeordneten Deutschland,” in … Schriften, op. cit., pp. 134–39.

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