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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The coup d'état, so-called, which, on January 6, 1929, brought into being a new form of government and established a new type of constitutional régime in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, marked the end of exactly a decade of experimentation with the traditional principles of parliamentary government. That this “critical period” had not been an unqualified success is admitted by statesmen, diplomats, and politicians alike; that it was abruptly ended by the personal intervention of King Alexander and the supercession of the Vidov-dan constitution is equally a matter of fact. From Zagreb to Belgrade the passing of the political order which had obtained in the triune kingdom since 1918 has brought general rejoicing; outside the country, however, the queries have been raised: Is the change indicative of the future fate of all democracies, and have not the doctrines of fascism, of military dictatorship, of camarilla government, simply been transplanted to the Yugoslav capital from Rome and Madrid respectively?
The situation is not to be understood merely by drawing hasty conclusions as to the prospective demise of democratic or parliamentary government everywhere, nor is it possible to speak, with any scientific accuracy, of the new régime in the Serb-Croat-Slovene state as a Balkan adaptation of the Italian and Iberian dictatorships. The occurrence of this constitutional change in the life of the Yugoslav people has its own distinctive raison d'être and does not flow from mere facile imitation of dictatorial practices in other countries.
1 Cf. the Zagreb, Obzor, May 8, 1928Google Scholar.
2 Rijech S.H.S., January 7, 1919.
3 Belgrade, Politika, April 17, 1921Google Scholar.
4 The Slovene program proposed the division of the country into six provinces, these to be subdivided into districts and communes, each with its deliberative assembly and executive committee. The scheme was not unlike that obtaining in Prussian, and, to a lesser extent, in the old Austrian, provincial administration. Cf. Sloveneč, February 13, 1924.
5 The Croat proposals, usually couched in a vague phraseology, were repeatedly put forth in varying forms. Perhaps the tersest statement of their point of view was made officially to Premier Pašič at Zagreb on April 13, 1923: “To modify the [existing] régime in the constitutional and legal sense and to transform the administration in the sense of autonomy.” Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Yougoslave, No. 43, May, 1923. A more elaborate statement is found in the manifesto of the Yugoslav Revisionist Bloc, made at Belgrade, March 22, 1925. Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Yougoslave, No. 59, May 20, 1925, citing Politika, March 23, 1925.
6 An elaborate and carefully developed program of decentralization amounting almost to federalization was put forth at the end of 1923 by M. V. Marinković, and adopted by the Democratie Central Committee. The project would have reserved to autonomous regional bodies, with independent taxing power, all matters other than those connected with diplomacy, the army, the courts, police, educational policy, worship, state finance, communications, posts, telegraphs, and telephones. This would have meant, of course, a marked reduction in national expenditure. Cf. Politika, December 27, 1923.
7 An excellent appraisal of the party situation after five years of unification is given by a British journalist. Writing of the Yugoslav Democratic party's unsuccessful attempt to become really national, he says: “Distinctly a Yugoslav, as opposed to a Serb party, the Democrats were most numerous in the provisional Skupshtina, but were too heterogeneous to hold together, and had a mistaken fundamental idea. As the believers in real national unity, they gained numerous adherents, but actual circumstances, such as local patriotism and tribal consciousness, renascent after the war, doomed their scheme to failure. …. Croat and Slovene particularism refused to merge in a new Yugoslavdom, more especially as the Serbs would have nothing to say to it. The result was that in Croatia increase of strength went to the party which agitated most strongly against Belgrade, and that in Slovenia the Autonomists, under Dr. Korošeč, gained almost every mandate. In short, the consequences of the Democrat point of view proved disastrous to the party. In Serbia it was ousted by the Radicals, in Croatia by M. Radić's adherents, and in Slovenia by the Clericals.” Letter from Zagreb, , The Near East, Vol. 26, pp. 448–450 (October 30, 1924)Google Scholar.
8 It is unnecessary to consider in detail the specific steps by which the monarch was brought to take these decisive measures. After the massacre of the Croat deputies by a fanatical Montenegrin in June, the Croats had withdrawn from Parliament and denied it legislative competency (cf. Narodni Val, June 22, 1928, cited by the Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Yougoslave, No. 81, September 11, 1928). Later, on the eve of Radič's death, the Croats suggested, once again, the dissolution of the incompetent parliament and the formation of a “neutral” ministry to function pending elections to a new constituent assembly (Narodni Val, August 2, 1928, citing the resolutions of August 1, taken by the party). On the very eve of the coup, they had suggested a non-parliamentary cabinet representative of all parts of the country, and the revision of the constitution in order to restore the historic units formerly comprising the country. As none of the Serbian or Moslem parties would assent voluntarily to such proposals, the monarch had no alternative except to impose the solution dictated to him by the circumstances (cf. Le Temps, January 7, 1929). The text of the last communiqué of the outgoing Koroseč government is significant in this connection: “On the occasion of the audiences accorded them on January 4th and 5th, MM. Maćek and Pribićević declared, in the name of the Peasant-Democrat coalition, that a complete revision of the constitution must take place, with a view to the restoration of the historic regions, with their legislatures and executives. To this end, a neutral government would be a form which would enjoy the confidence of the sovereign and which, by its composition, would guarantee that the aforesaid matters would be acted upon. In consequence the Skupshtina must be dissolved, and elections for a constituent assembly must be decreed.” Ibid., January 7, 1929.
9 For the text cf. L'Europe Nouvelle, 12th year, No. 570, pp. 49–50 (January 12, 1929)Google Scholar.
10 “By the unanimous decision of the nation,” ran the royal proclamation, “all the hitherto divided sections of our native land have joined together in a united kingdom. By the will of the people, …. I have, in agreement with the leaders of all parties in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, proceeded to the formation of our first state government, as the outward and visible sign of our …. complete brotherly solidarity. In this government there sit and work in agreement the foremost men of all three faiths and all three names, of all parties and all provinces of the kingdom. My government will work in full agreement with the representatives of the people and be responsible to them. …. As king of a free and democratic people, I shall at all times unswervingly uphold the principles of constitutional government, which shall be the cornerstone of our state, created by the free will of the people ….. A scheme will be introduced for a democratic constitution, conceived in the spirit of state unity and allowing for a wide administrative autonomy with guarantees for the widest political liberties and civic rights.” Here may be found, in clear and unequivocal terms, the determination of the young ruler, on ascending the throne, to establish a constitutional monarchy, a responsible parliamentary system, a decentralized state administration, and a régime of juridical equality, all postulated on the acceptance of democracy as the fundamental characteristic of the new state. To be a citizen king, possessing no title of nobility, ruling no subjects, and acknowledging the popular will as the sole source of all sovereign authority—such was Alexander's conception of his function in the life of the Yugoslav state. For the text of the proclamation, cf. Rijech S.H.S., January 7, 1919; for an English translation, cf. Graham, M. W., New Governments of Central Europe, pp. 639–641.Google Scholar
11 L'Europe Nouvelle, loc. cit.
12 Law on the Royal Power and the Supreme Administration of the State, January 6, 1929, L'Europe Nouvelle, loc. cit.
13 “I invite you, gentlemen, to aid me by your efforts and by the conscientious execution of your duties in this great task for the welfare and prosperity of our kingdom, for a better future for our people, and never to lose sight of the fact that the safety of the state is the supreme law, and to serve the people the most sacred of duties.” Elsewhere in the royal declaration emphasis was placed on the creation of “wholehearted confidence on the part of the people with regard to the authorities, the sentiment and the conviction that complete legality reigns in our state, and that absolute justice and equality are established in an enduring fashion.” L'Europe Nouvelle, loc. cit.
14 “The reorganization of the civil service,” says a Czech critic, “was perhaps the most essential step of all. Under the influence of party strife it had become corrupt, inefficient, and overstaffed. Now the number of employees is to be reduced, their qualifications are to be closely examined, and those educationally or morally unqualified who were found places by party friends are to be dismissed and the standard of service, hours of work, and general efficiency of the service are to be raised. Everyone admits that these measures are good and have been carried out with great fairness, determination, and dispatch.” “The Situation in Jugoslavia,” Central European Observer, vol. 7, p. 59 (February 1, 1929)Google Scholar.
15 Cf. Chastenet, Jacques, “Le coup d'état royal en Yougoslavie,” Revue Politique et Parlementaire, vol. 138, pp. 298–301 (February 10, 1929)Google Scholar.
16 Mousset, Albert, “Les événements de Belgrade: une nouvelle ère politique en Yougoslavie,” L'Europe Nouvelle, 12th Year, No. 570, pp. 47–49 (January 12, 1929).Google Scholar
17 Cf. The Near East and India, vol. 35, p. 129 (January 31, 1929)Google Scholar; Central European Observer, vol. 7, p. 62 (February 1, 1929)Google Scholar; and Le Temps, January 9, 11, 1929.
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