Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
Party leadership in Congress has been one focal point for the sustained attack on the structure and performance of the American party system that has gone on for a decade and a half. Academic critics and members of Congress, individually and in committees, supplemented by a wide array of interested citizens and groups, have laid out blueprints for institutional reorganization. While there is some variety in their prescriptions, it is not hard to construct a composite model of party leadership in legislation on which there has been a fairly wide consensus among the reformers.
The fount of party policy would be a reformed national convention, meeting biennially at the least. The obligation of the majority party in Congress, spurred by the president if he were of the same party, would be to carry out the platform put together by the convention. For this purpose frequent party conferences would be held in each house to consider specific measures. Some would be for the purpose of discussion and education, but on important party measures the members could be bound by a conference vote and penalized in committee assignments and other party perquisites for disregarding the will of the conference. Party strategy, legislative scheduling, and continuous leadership would be entrusted to a policy committee made up, in most schemes, of the elective officers of the house and the chairmen of the standing committees. Some have suggested a joint policy committee, made up of the policy committees of the respective houses, which might then meet with the president as a kind of legislative cabinet. The committee chairmen would not be exclusively, and perhaps not at all, the products of seniority.
The author is grateful to the Fund for the Advancement of Education for a Faculty Fellowship in 1953–54, which made possible the beginning of this study, and to then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson for the privilege of serving for part of that time as a member of his staff. Among the many people whose assistance is greatly appreciated are Senators Scott W. Lucas and Ernest W. McFarland, former Democratic Leaders; George B. Galloway, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; Pauline R. Moore, Chief Clerk, and Gerald M. Siegel and Roland Bibolet, formerly professional staff members, of the Democratic Policy Committee; Felton M. Johnston, Secretary of the Senate; Robert G. Baker, Secretaryfor the Majority; and Emery L. Frazier, Chief Clerk of the Senate. I am especially indebted to George E. Reedy, Jr., formerly Staff Director, Democratic Policy Committee and now a special assistant to the Vice President, whose friendship and counsel have been literally invaluable. No responsibility for any statement offact or opinion in this paper should attach to the Fund for Advancement of Education or any of the individuals named here.
This is a revised version of a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association at New York City on September 9, 1960.
1 Some representative selections from the voluminous literature are: Organization of Congress, Hearings, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st sesa., pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18 (1945), pp. 28, 77–8, 334, 801, 805, 822–23, 846, 851, 872, 931; Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 Hearings, Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948), pp. 38–9, 66, 118–19, 210–11; Organization and Operation of Congress, ibid., 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951), pp. 276–78, 287–90, 460; Committee on Congress, American Pol. Sci. Assn., The Reorganization of Congress (Wash., D. C., 1945), pp. 53–54 Google Scholar; Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System, Report of the Committee on Political Parties, Amer. Pol. Sci. Assn., 1950, pp. 50–65; Heller, R., Strengthenoing the Congress (Wash., D. C., 1945), pp. 6–9 Google Scholar; Galloway, George B., Congress at the Crossroads (New York, 1946), esp. ch. 4Google Scholar; Kefauver, Estes and Levin, Jack, A Twentieth Century Congress (New York, 1947), pp. 96–142 Google Scholar.
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3 Truman, David B., The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York, 1959), p. 95 Google Scholar. His chapters 4 and 8 are especially valuable for their analysis of Senate leadership.
4 Jennings, Ivor, Parliament, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 268–79, 355–80, 454–72Google Scholar; McKenzie, R. T., British Political Parties (London, 1955), pp. 241–53, 546–58Google Scholar; Epstein, Leon D., “British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 71 (03, 1956) pp. 97–125 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 An example is the House Committee on Banking and Currency which has only recently, with reluctance, established subcommittees and has tried, without much success, to avoid specialization by numbering (not naming) them after the British fashion.
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8 White, William S., Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate (New York, 1956), pp. 96–98 Google Scholar; Truman, op. cit., pp. 298–99.
9 Barkley, Alben W., That Reminds Me (Garden City, N. Y., 1954), ch. 12Google Scholar.
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11 Ibid., p. 88. Cf. Richard Neustadt's argument that the President's power, too, is essentially the power to persuade. Presidential Power (New York, 1960), ch. 3.
12 Truman, op. cit., p. 115. For the formal powers and relationships of the floor leader, see Riddick, Floyd M., The United States Congress: Organization and Procedure (Manassas, Va., 1949) pp. 86–100 Google Scholar; for historical accounts, Haynes, George H., The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice (Boston, 1938), pp. 480–483 Google Scholar; and Haines, Lynn, Law Making in America (Bethesda, Md., 1912), ch. 3Google Scholar; for a personal account, Barkley, Alben W., “The Majority Leader in the Legislative Process,” in Vandenbosch, Amry (ed.). The Process of Government (Lexington, Ky., 1949)Google Scholar.
13 See, as one example, the Senate debate on H.R. 5836, a postal rate bill, on February 28, 1958. Many of the “cues” have been edited from the Record, but enough remains to suggest Johnson's domination of an intricate parliamentary process. Congressional Record, Vol. 104, pp. 3105–3148 Google Scholar.
14 Alsop, Stewart, “Lyndon Johnson: How Does He Do It?” Saturday Evening Postt 01 24, 1959, p. 13 ff., 43 Google Scholar; White, W. S., “Two Texans Who Will Run Congress” New York Times Magazine, 12 30, 1956, p. 5 ffGoogle Scholar.
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19 S. Rept. 1440 (on S. 2888), 85th Cong., 2d sess., April 21, 1958.
20 S. Rept. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., March 24, 1958.
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22 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, P.L. 836.
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24 S. Rept. 1684 (on S. 3974), 85th Cong., 2d sess.
25 S. 3974, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1958. The debate is in Congressional Record, ibid., for June 12–14, 16–17. McClellan's statement ia at p. 11087.
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27 Haynes, op. cit., pp. 474–78.
28 For a detailed analysis of both party policy committees in the Senate, see Bone, Hugh A., Party Committees and National Politics (Seattle, Wash., 1958), pp. 116–96Google Scholar, and his “An Introduction to the Senate Policy Committees,” this Review, Vol. 50 (06 1956), pp. 339–59Google Scholar.
29 The Legislative Review Committee in the 86th Congress consisted of Senators E. L. Bartlett (Alaska), Clair Engle (California), and Philip A. Hart (Michigan). The function of the Legislative Review Committee is to keep up with the objections of Democratic members to bills on the calendar and to voice them on calendar call, so that the legislation will not pass “without objection.”
30 Congressional Record, Vol. 105, pp. 2814–20 (February 23), 3559–78 (March 9), 5956–59 (April 15)Google Scholar.
31 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 01 8, 1960, p. 43 Google Scholar.
32 Ibid., January 15, 1960, p. 91.
33 Ibid., February 12, 1960, p. 224.
34 Congressional Record, Vol. 105, p. 2817 (01 23, 1959)Google Scholar.
35 Ibid., p. 9260 (May 28, 1959).
36 Op. cit.
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