Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
It has been a common teaching among modern historians of the guiding ideas in the foundation of our government that the Constitution of the United States embodied a reaction against the democratic principles espoused in the Declaration of Independence. This view has largely been accepted by political scientists and has therefore had important consequences for the way American political development has been studied. I shall present here a contrary view of the political theory of the Framers and examine some of its consequences.
What is the relevance of the political thought of the Founding Fathers to an understanding of contemporary problems of liberty and justice? Four possible ways of looking at the Founding Fathers immediately suggest themselves. First, it may be that they possessed wisdom, a set of political principles still inherently adequate, and needing only to be supplemented by skill in their proper contemporary application. Second, it may be that, while the Founding Fathers' principles are still sound, they are applicable only to a part of our problems, but not to that part which is peculiarly modern; and thus new principles are needed to be joined together with the old ones. Third, it may be that the Founding Fathers have simply become; they dealt with bygone problems and their principles were relevant only to those old problems. Fourth, they may have been wrong or radically inadequate even for their own time.
An earlier version of this was written at the request of the Fund for the Republic; the Fund's generous assistance is here gratefully acknowledged.
1 Federalist, No. 10, p. 62. All references are to the Modern Library edition, ed. E. M. Earle.
2 Federalist, No. 49, p. 327.
3 Federalist, No. 39, p. 244. Here Madison speaks explicitly of the republican form of government. But see on the same page how Madison compares the republican form with “every other popular government.” Regarding the crucial question of the lodgement of political authority, Madison speaks of republic, democracy and popular government interchangeably. Consider that, in the very paper where he distinguishes so precisely between democracies and republics regarding direct versus representative rule, Madison defines his general aim both as a search for “a republican remedy” for republican diseases and a remedy that will “preserve the spirit and the form of popular government.” (p. 58.) Interestingly, on June 6 at the Federal Convention, Madison's phrasing for a similar problem was the search for “the only defense against the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government.” Madison, Writings, ed. G. Hunt, Vol. 3 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1902), p. 103. Italics supplied throughout.
4 Federalist, No. 10, p. 58.
5 The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Ford, Paul L. (The Federal Edition), Vol. 5 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904), p. 434 Google Scholar.
6 Federalist, No. 43, p. 286.
6a Middle Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691–1780. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1955)Google Scholar.
7 Madison must have thought that he had established this point beyond misinterpretation in The Federalist, No. 57. “Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.” (p. 371.)
8 This is not to deny the importance of the existing property qualifications for the understanding of the Founders' political theory. The legal exclusion from the franchise of even a very small portion of the adult population may have enormous significance for the politics and life of a country. This is obvious in the case of a racial, ethnic or religious minority. And the exclusion of otherwise eligible adult males on the grounds of poverty may be equally important. The property qualification clearly praises and rewards certain virtues, implies that the voter must possess certain qualities to warrant his exercise of the franchise, and aims at excluding a “rabble” from the operations of political parties. But important, therefore, as the property qualification was, it does not demonstrate that the Founding Fathers departed radically from the most important aspects of the principle of majority rule.
9 Federalist, No. 62, p. 403.
10 Federalist, No. 63, p. 415.
11 Federalist, No. 62, p. 403.
12 Federalist, No. 14, p. 85.
13 Ibid., p. 81.
14 Federalist, No. 43, p. 287.
15 Federalist, No. 55, p. 365.
16 Federalist, No. 51, p. 340.
17 Federalist, No. 53. p. 350–51.
18 Federalist, No. 62, p. 404.
19 Federalist, No. 30, p. 186.
20 Federalist, No. 15, p. 88.
21 Letter to Edmund Randolph, January 10, 1788.
22 Letter to William Eustis, May 22, 1823. The letters to Eandolph and Eustis were brought to my attention by Ketcham's, Ralph article, “Notes on James Madison's Sources for the Tenth Federalist Paper,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1 (May, 1957)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Democracy in America, ed. Bradley, Phillips (Knopf, New York, 1951) Vol. 2, pp. 122–23Google Scholar.
24 Ibid., p. 42.
25 Idem.
26 Federalist, No. 37, p. 232.
27 Federalist, No. 49, p. 331.
28 Federalist, No. 10, p. 56.
29 Federalist, No. 49, p. 329.
30 Ibid., p. 328.
31 Federalist, No. 38, p. 233.
32 Federalist, No. 49, p. 329.
33 Federalist, No. 38, p. 231.
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