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The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Karl Loewenstein
Karl Loewenstein
Affiliation:
Amherst College
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Extract

French constitutional theory, on the basis of extensive national experience, distinguishes between revolutions from below—elementary ground-swells among the masses which sweep irresistibly over the nation and destroy all constitutional obstacles—on the one hand, and revolutions from above, by coup d'état of a constituted organ, either a legislative body or a governmental agency, on the other hand. In the latter case, an effort is made to connect the new régime with the preceding order by what constitutional ropes, or even threads, are still available. This habit has created, in spite of frequent upheavals in the first half of French constitutional life since 1789, a strong sense of constitutional tradition and legal conservatism.

The events of July, 1940, may amount to a full-fledged revolution, but not a revolution in the common sense of the word, that is, a ground-swell rising from below. When France adopted the authoritarian form of government, no fascist mass party, today the indispensable prerequisite of popular upheavals, was in existence. It was a coup d'état from above, a deliberate act of the defeated military leaders and their political advisers—in short, a skillfully engineered political stratagem. The politicians among the group must have been well aware of the character of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, capable of being abrogated only by a legislative act of equal rank.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 1940 , pp. 867 - 895
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1940

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References

1 See Esmein, A. and Nézard, H., Eléments du droit constitutionnel (7th ed., Paris, 1921), Vol. I, p. 597Google Scholar: “La constitution écrite étant une loi et même une loi supérieure et même immuable, ne devait jamais pouvoir être abrogée que par une nouvelle loi constitutionnelle, rendue dans la forme voulue.”

2 In absence of official source materials, newspaper reports must be relied upon. Of particular value has been the information drawn from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and the semi-official organ of the Vichy government, Le Petit Dauphinois. Their accuracy cannot be verified and has, therefore, to be assumed. But even on this tentative basis, discussion of the subject seems worth while. French constitutional doctrine is evolved from a number of the most authoritative treatises on French constitutional law.

3 Laws of Feb. 24,1875 (obsolete with the exception of Arts. 8 and 9); of February 25, 1875; of June 21, 1879 (of only secondary importance); of Aug. 14, 1884 (the latter added only a new clause to the law of Feb. 25, 1875), but “de-constitutionalized” a number of others.

4 See Deslandres, M., Histoire constitutionnelle de la France, Vol. III: L'avènement de la Troisième République; la Constitution de 1875 (Paris, 1937), p. 513 ff.Google Scholar

5 See Joseph-Barthélémy, and Duez, Paul, Traité de droit constitutionnel (Paris, 1933), p. 887.Google Scholar

6 See Esmein, A. and Nézard, H., Eléments du droit constitutionnel (7th ed., Paris, 1921), Vol. II, p. 510Google Scholar; Tardieu, A., La révolution à refaire (Paris, 1932)Google Scholar; Ordinaire, M., La révision de la constitution (Paris, 1934)Google Scholar; and many others.

7 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 227; Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 579 ff.

8 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 634; Finer, H., The Theory and Practice of Modern Government (London, 1932), Vol. II, p. 1137 ff.Google Scholar

9 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 694 ff; Giraud, Émil, Le pouvoir éxécutif dans les démocraties d'Europe et d'Amérique (Paris, 1938), p. 226 ff.Google Scholar

9a What has been said in the text with reference to the implicit ratification, by the Chambers, of possibly unconstitutional previous acts of the Pétain government applies as well to actually committed or alleged violations of the constitution by M. Daladier and his colleagues who are at present under indictment before the Suprême Cour de Justice created by their successors. One of the main complaints is that the Government then in power failed or neglected to obtain the consent of the Chambers for the declaration of war as prescribed by Art. 9 of the constitutional statute of July 16, 1875. At no time after the outbreak of the war did Parliament invoke the political responsibility of the cabinet for the declaration of war; on the contrary, it voted repeatedly its confidence in the Government, thus demonstrating beyond doubt its complete solidarity with the actions and aims of the cabinet. Incidentally, M. Lebrun, as president of the Republic, and therefore formally responsible for the declaration of war, would be equally guilty of a violation of the constitution, not to mention M. Bonnet, a member of the Daladier cabinet and today one of the most articuJate critics of his former chief.

10 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., pp. 892–893.

11 This problem was discussed fully by the French National Assembly of 1789; see Loewenstein, K., Volk und Parlament nach der Staatsauffassung der franzoesischen Nationalversammlung von 1789 (Munich, 1922), p. 306 ff.Google Scholar The identical Situation was before the eyes of the constitutional lawyers in the last years of the Weimar Republic; see Anschuetz, G., Die Verfassung des deutschen Reichs (4th ed., Berlin, 1933), p. 404 ffGoogle Scholar; Thoma, R., in Anschuetz-Thoma, , Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts (Tuebingen, 1930–1932), Vol. II, p. 153 ff.Google Scholar

12 See Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 510.

13 See Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 889.

14 See infra p. 884.

15 See Cott, Paul, in Annales de l'Assemblée Nationale, Vol. XXX, p. 421.Google Scholar

16 New York Times, July 10, 1940.

17 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 892 f.

18 New York Times, July 10, 1940.

19 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 893; while Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 500, assumes the legal number of members as the basis for counting.

20 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 556.

21 One remembers that this happened at the first vote of confidence for the cabinet of M. Reynaud on March 20, 1940, which had been carried at first only by a majority of one vote.

22 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 557.

23 New York Times, July 11, 1940.

24 Loewenstein, K., Hitler's Germany (New York, 1939), p. 15.Google Scholar

25 New York Times, July 12, 1940.

26 A dramatic incident occurred when these men were attacked by some members of the extreme Right. Both Jeanneney and Herriot defended them; Herriot stated that they had left the country with the consent of the Pétain government and on a ship assigned to them by the authorities, and added that he had tried in vain to obtain permission for their return in time for the meeting of the National Assembly In the meantime it has been reported that on July 23, 1940, they were deprived of their citizenship because they had “fled” from France in her critical hour.

27 See Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II. p. 507 ff.

28 See the enumeration of similar clauses, which are rather frequent, by Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 179.

29 At the outbreak of the war, the French government declined politely and firmly the offer of the Count of Paris to serve in the French army.

30 See Farrand, M., The Records of the Federal Convention (New Haven, 1911), Vol. I, p. 20 ff.Google Scholar

31 See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849); Texas v. White, 7 Wall 700 (1869); Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. State of Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912). The last-mentioned decision is particularly pertinent because the introduction of the ultra-democratic devices of initiative and referendum in the state of Oregon was held by the plaintiffs to be inconsistent With the republican-representative character of government guaranteed to the states. See Field, Oliver P., “The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts”, 8 Minn. Law Rev. (1924) 485 ffGoogle Scholar; cf. Post, G., The Supreme Court and Political Questions (Baltimore, 1936), p. 15 ff, 103 ff, 107 ff, 125 ff.Google Scholar

32 Holcombe, A. N., State Government in the United States (New York, 1936), p. 41Google Scholar, describes a republican government as one which recognizes the will of the people as the ultimate source of authority and which implies interpretation and execution of this will of the people by responsible agents acting under the forms of law. This corresponds to a working definition of democracy which, as it is well known, is compatible with constitutional monarchy. Moreover, the definition neglects the incontestable historical fact that there have existed class republics (aristocratic and oligarchic), and republics with corporative ruling organs. See Jellinek, G., Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd ed., Berlin, 1922), p. 710 ffGoogle Scholar; Treitschke, H. von, Politik (Leipzig, 1918), Vol. II, pp. 206 ff, 250 ff.Google Scholar

33 “The cantons are required to demand from the Confederation its guarantee of their constitutions. This guarantee must be accorded, provided … that they insure the exercise of political rights according to republican [representative or democratic] forms.” The clause was inserted in the constitution of September 12, 1848, with reference to the canton of Neuchâtel, whose nominal head was a Hohenzollern. See Fleiner, Fritz, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (Tuebingen, 1923), p. 57Google Scholar, note 10, and p. 16.

34 Jellinek, op. cit., p. 669 ff.

35 See Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 60.

36 Similar provisions are found in the Austrian constitution of 1920, Art. 1; Constitutional Charter of Czechoslovakia of 1920, Art. 1, sec. 1; Polish constitution of 1921, Art. 1; Greek constitution of 1927, Art. 1; Spanish constitution of 1931, Art. 1.

37 See Koellreutter, O., Grundriss der allgemeinen Staatslehre (Tuebingen, 1933), p. 119 ffGoogle Scholar; Meissner, O. and Kaisenberg, G., Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht im Dritten Reich (Berlin, 1933), p. 162Google Scholar; Huber, E. R., Verfassung (Hamburg, 1937), p. 105 ffGoogle Scholar; Loewenstein, op. cit. in note 24 supra, p. 28 ff. In general, the political and juridical literature of totalitarian states is little interested in the classification of states, which is considered a pastime of the “liberalistic” age.

38 See Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 510.

39 See Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 895; Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 507 ff.

40 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 897; Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II., p. 507 ff.

41 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 895.

42 See the extensive discussions of revolution, coups d'états, and the related problems of the identity and continuity of the state in Brochet, Olivier, Étude du coup d'état en fait et en droit (Paris, 1935)Google Scholar; Martin, Paul, Portée juridique des révolutions en droit public interne (Montpellier, 1938)Google Scholar; and Raicu, Jean, L'égalité et nécessité (Paris, 1933).Google Scholar

43 See Loewenstein, K., “The Balance between Legislative and Executive Power; A Study in Comparative Law,” University of Chicago Law Rev., Vol. 5 (1938), p. 598 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar, with extensive literature listed in the footnotes.

44 See Enabling Act of March 24, 1933, Art. 2, sentence 1 (Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 16), and Reconstruction Act of January 30, 1934, Art. 4: “The government of the Reich may enact new constitutional law” (Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 40).

45 See on the legal implications of Art. 5 of the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933 Loewenstein, K., “Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 1933–1937,” Chicago Law Rev., Vol. 4 (1937), p. 544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46 New York Times, July 11, 1940.

47 See Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 510.

48 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 253, makes the following unequivocal statement: “Le Césarisme continues à affirmer que le peuple est titulaire de la souveraineté, mais qu'il a remis cette souverainété à un homme de confiance, le César. Et l'abandon du pouvoir au César par le peuple s'effectue par un acte exprès de volonté.”

49 Exceptions occurred under the Convention according to the Constitution of the Year III (see Sarraut, Albert, Le gouvernement direct en France, Paris 1899, p. 225 ffGoogle Scholar, the doctoral thesis of one of the leading French parliamentarians of today), and under the republican “Government of the National Defense” in 1870; in the latter case, the plebiscite was actually restricted to Paris and neighboring districts (see Sarraut, op. cit., p. 338 ff).

50 On this controversy, see Joseph-Barthélemy's (op. cit., p. 593 ff) affirmative opinion—that is, that the National Assembly is limited; and that of Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 502, upholding the negative.

51 See Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 579 ff.

52 Only a few illustrations can be cited here. After the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire, an ordinary statute enacted by the legislative bodies (Conseil des Cinq Cents and Conseil des Ancients) voted the Directory out of existence. After the débâcle of Sedan (September 1, 1870), the Corps Législatif (of the constitution of 1852) wanted at first a legal procedure for terminating the Napoleonic régime, but was overrun by a mob (over Gambetta's protest) “qu'on fît des choses regulières.” The Republic was proclaimed in the Hotel de Ville in Paris and a Government of National Defense was installed by way of revolution; see Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 585.

53 See Joseph Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 227; Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 580 ff; Duguit, L., Traité du droit constitutionnel, Vol. III (Paris, 1923), p. 639 ffGoogle Scholar; Martin, op. cit., p. 120 ff, 138 ff.

54 Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 227: “Le droit public Français a forgé la théorie dite de la déconstitutionalisation par effet de révolutions, pour remédier en partie à la vulnérabilité des constitutions. Les dispositions gui, dans les textes constitutionnels frappés par la révolution, ne sont pas propres au regime qui vient de tomber, subsistent; seulement, elles ne survivent qu'en qualité des lois ordinaires.”

55 Art. 3, sec. 2, sentence 2, of the statute of February 25, 1875.

56 Arts. 13 and 14 of the law of July 16, 1875.

57 See Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 228; Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 681; Martin, op. cit., p. 157 ff. The problem is rather complicated since Napoleon III, while maintaining the principle, inserted the death penalty for crimes against the life of the Emperor and members of the Imperial family in Art. 86 of the Code Pénal by a law of June 10, 1853.

58 Space forbids a discussion of the history and the present status of “political crimes” and “political justice” in France. It is obvious that in times of internal or external crisis the executive authorities can avail themselves not only of the normal repressive methods against high treason and sedition and of the military laws, but also of the stringent measures of the state of siege (based on the laws of August 9, 1849, and of April 3, 1878; see Joseph-Barthélemy, Précis, p. 237 ff; idem, Traité, p. 759 ff) which may lead—and did lead during the wars of 1914–1918 and of 1939–1940—to the infliction of the death penalty. But on principle, formally established in the famous Law on the Press of July 29, 1881, all manifestations of political opinion were declared free, and all provisions contrary to the principle were formally revoked (see Joseph-Barthélemy, , Précis, p. 175 ffGoogle Scholar). In the years preceding the present war, the French Republic resorted to legislative restrictions on subversive movements; see Loewenstein, K., “Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies,” Columbia Law Rev. Vol. 38 (1938), pp. 610 ff, 746 ff.Google Scholar

Another aspect of “political crimes” consists in what the French call la justice politique (see Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 867 ff), or impeachment of Anglo-Saxon law. The Senate is constituted as Cour de Justice (Law of February 24, 1875, Art. 9, and of July 16, 1875, Art. 12); the Chamber of Deputies may function as the indicting organ. The procedure is restricted to the president of the Republic and the ministers only. Penalties are confined to those contained in the penal laws, in particular under the term “attentat à la surété de l'état” (see law of August 10, 1889, Art. 23).

59 The author does not want to restate the famous controversy over the origin of the Déclaration—whether it was a product of the Anglo-Saxon or of the French political genius. He is, however, inclined to follow the thesis of Jellinek, with the modification that the doctrines of Montesquieu and the Enlightenment, on the one hand, and Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, on the other hand, share responsibility for the final formulation.

60 On the important difference between the American and the European legislative technique in dealing with individual rights, see Loewenstein, K., “Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies,” Columbia Law Rev., Vol. 38 (1938), p. 767 ff.Google Scholar

61 Napoleon I's Constitution of the Year VIII refrained from including a bill of rights. As a matter of fact, Napoleon's dictatorship, the first totalitarian régime in modern times, suppressed all civil liberties, while preserving that second great principle of the Revolution, i.e., equality. See Loewenstein, K., “Opposition and Public Opinion under the Dictatorship of Napoleon the First,” Social Research, Vol. 2 (1937), p. 461 ff.Google Scholar Even the dictatorial constitution of Napoleon III of January 14, 1852, embodied, in its very first article, the principle of the permanent validity of the Déclaration: “La constitution reconnait, confirme et garantit les grands principles proclamés en 1789 et qui sont la base du droit public Français.”

62 See Hauriou, Maurice, Principes du droit public (Paris, 1910), p. 214Google Scholar; idem., Précis du droit constitutionnel (Paris, 1923), p. 268 ff. Hauriou insists on the conventional character of all positive law. See also Martin, op. cit., p. 120 ff. With great emphasis, Duguit, L., Traité du droit constitutionnel, Vol. II, p. 158 ffGoogle Scholar: “Les déclarations de droit contiennent des dispositions impératives, mais elles s'adressent à l'état et non aux sujets.” See also idem., Vol. III, p. 562 ff. Jèze, G., “Valeur juridique des déclarations de droit et garanties de droit,” Revue du droit public (1913), p. 685 ff.Google Scholar

63 This line of reasoning is followed by Esmein, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 553; de Malberg, Carré, Théorie générale de l'état (Paris, 1920), Vol. I, p. 240 ffGoogle Scholar; Joseph-Barthélemy, , Précis, p. 44 ff.Google Scholar

64 Joseph-Barthélemy, , Précis, p. 45 ffGoogle Scholar, refutes, with convincing reasons, the contention that the Conseil d'État ever has recognized in its arrêts the juridical existence of the Bill of Rights. It has been regarded or referred to occasionally as “the frontispiece of all republican constitutions,” again as merely an ornamental obiter dictum and not a source of positive law.

65 See Loewenstein, K., “Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 1933–1937,” Chicago Law Rev., Vol. 4 (1937), p. 545 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

66 See Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 897; Esmein, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 507 ff.

67 See Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 899.

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