Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T09:11:49.845Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2007

MARIA MONTERO  and
JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA
MARIA MONTERO
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham
JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA
Affiliation:
University of Vigo
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.

Type
FORUM
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 101 , Issue 4 , November 2007 , pp. 847 - 850
Copyright
© 2007 by the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ansolabehere Stephen, James M. Snyder, Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting. 2005. Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments. American Journal of Political Science 49 (July): 550– 63.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith David, and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review 82 (June): 405– 22.Google Scholar
Baron David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review 87 (December): 34– 47.Google Scholar
Montero Maria, and Juan-J. Vidal-Puga. 2006. Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games. CeDEx Discussion Paper 2006-11.
Morelli Massimo. 1999. Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining. American Political Science Review 93 (December): 809– 20.Google Scholar
Morelli Massimo, and Maria Montero. 2003. The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games, Games and Economic Behavior 42 (January): 137– 55.Google Scholar
Peleg Bezalel. 1968. On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 16 (May): 527– 32.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.