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Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on Constitutional Questions: 1914–1917. I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Thomas Reed Powell
Thomas Reed Powell
Affiliation:
Columbia University
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Extract

In previous issues of this Review Professor Wambaugh and the late Judge McClain have summarized the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions from 1909 to 1914. It is the purpose of this and a succeeding paper to deal in like manner with the decisions of the last three years. Owing to the number of cases decided during the triennium, the writer must content himself with the rôle of annalist and refrain from assuming that of analyst. For the benefit of those who desire fuller comment or criticism, references are given to articles and notes in various legal periodicals discussing the more important cases.

Since the expiration of the October term of 1913, three changes have occurred in the personnel of the bench. Mr. Justice Lurton died July 12, 1914, and his successor, Mr. Justice McReynolds, took his seat October 12, 1914. Illness prevented Mr. Justice Lamar from participating in any of the decisions of the October term of 1915. He died on January 2, 1916. The commission of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who succeeded him, was not recorded until June 5, 1916, so that during the 1915 term only eight justices participated in the work of the court. Mr. Justice Hughes resigned June 10, 1916, to accept the Republican nomination for the presidency, and his successor, Mr. Justice Clarke, took his seat on October 9, 1916. The bench as at present constituted consists of Chief Justice White, appointed associate justice by President Cleveland and chief justice by President Taft; Mr. Justice McKenna, appointed by President McKinley; Justices Holmes and Day, appointed by President Roosevelt; Justices Van Devanter and Pitney, appointed by President Taft; and the three new justices appointed by President Wilson.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , February 1918 , pp. 17 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1918

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References

1 American Political Science Review (1910) IV, 483–497; (1912) VI, 513–523; (1915) IX, 36–49. For useful reviews of decisions under the due-process and equal-protection clauses, see Swayze, Francis J., “Judicial Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 26 Harvard Law Review 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Warren, Charles, “The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court,” 13 Columbia Law Review 294CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “A Bulwark to the State Police Power—The United States Supreme Court,” 13 Columbia Law Review 667. For a chronological list of all the Supreme Court decisions on the fourteenth amendment see Collins, C. W.: The Fourteenth Amendment and the States (Little, Brown & Co., 1912)Google Scholar, Appendix E. For chronological and other lists of state and federal statutes declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court see appendices in Moore, B. F.: The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, LIV, No. 2, Longmans, Green & Co., 1913).Google Scholar

2 Davidson v. New Orleans (1878) 96 U. S. 97, 104.

3 (1917) 242 U. S. 311. Justices Holmes and Van Devanter dissented, without opinion. See McGovney, D. O., “The Webb-Kenyon Law and Beyond,” 3 Iowa Law Bulletin 145Google Scholar; Orth, S. P., “The Webb-Kenyon Law Decision,” 2 Cornell Law Quarterly 283Google Scholar; Powell, T. R., “The Validity of State Legislation Under the Webb-Kenyon Law,” 2 Southern Law Quarterly 112Google Scholar; Rogers, Lindsay, “The Webb-Kenyon Decision,” 4 Virginia Law Review 558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also notes in 17 Columbia Law Review 144, 30 Harvard Law Review 491, 1 Minnesota Law Review 179, and 26 Yale Law Journal 399.

4 (1915) 238 U. S. 190. See 81 Central Law Journal 416, and 3 Virginia Law Review 143.

5 See infra pp. 40–45.

6 (1915) 238 U. S. 62. See Rogers, Lindsay, “Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors Before the Webb-Kenyon Act,” 4 Virginia Law Review 174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 (1916) 241 U. S. 48. See 15 Michigan Law Review 168.

8 Comp. Stat. 1913, Sec. 10,409.

9 (1915) 236 U. S. 568. For other articles dealing with the problem of state prohibition laws and interstate commerce, see Denison, W. T., “States' Right and the Webb-Kenyon Liquor Law,” 14 Columbia Law Review 321CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rogers, Lindsay, “The Power of the States over Commodities Excluded by Congress from Interstate Commerce,” 24 Yale Law Journal 567CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rogers, Lindsay, “Unlawful Possession of Intoxicating Liquors and the Webb-Kenyon Act,” 16 Columbia Law Review 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Snyder, C. R., “Growth of State Power under the Federal Constitution to Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating Liquor,” 25 West Virginia Law Quarterly 42Google Scholar; Safely, Charles H., in 4 Iowa Law Bulletin 221.Google Scholar

10 Supra, note 4.

11 “The Bill of Rights which declares that among the inalienable rights possessed by the citizens is that of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness … would be but an empty sound if the Legislature could prohibit the citizen the right of owning or drinking liquor, when in so doing he did not offend the laws of decency by being intoxicated in public.” Barker, Judge, in Commonwealth v. Campbell (1909) 133Google Scholar Ky. 50. See 81 Central Law Journal 345, 28 Harvard Law Review 818, and 4 Virginia Law Review 236.

12 Subsequent to the decision in the Clark Distilling case, Congress passed the so-called Reed Amendment (39 Stat. L. 1069) punishing any person who “shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce … into any state or territory” whose laws “prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.” The statute also contains a prohibition against liquor advertisements and the solicitation of orders for liquor. See Graves, J. K., “The Reed ‘Bone Dry’ Amendment,” 4 Virginia Law Review 634.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 (1917) 243 U. S. 332. Three dissenting judges, Justices McReynolds, Pitney and Van Devanter, thought the act not a regulation of commerce. The two latter found the act wanting in due process both because of its substantive effects and because of the want of due consideration by Congress prior to its passage. This latter ground was the basis of the dissent of Mr. Justice Day. See Ballantine, A. A., “Railway Strikes and the Constitution,” 17 Columbia Law Review 502CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bunn, C. W., “The Supreme Court on the Adamson Law,” 1 Minnesota Law Review 395Google Scholar; Burdick, C. K., “The Adamson Law Decision,” 2 Cornell Law Quarterly 320Google Scholar; Kales, A. M., “Due Process, the Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act,” 26 Yale Law Journal 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Powell, T. R., “The Supreme Court and the Adamson Law,” 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 607.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also notes in 30 Harvard Law Review 739, and 26 Yale Law Journal 496. For articles written before the decision was rendered, see Lauchheimer, M. H., “The Constitutionality of the Eight-Hour Railroad Law,” 16 Columbia Law Review 554CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Powell, T. R., “Due Process and the Adamson Law,” 17 Columbia Law Review 114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also 30 Harvard Law Review 63.

14 (1908) 208 U. S. 161.

15 (1915) 239 U. S. 325. In Pantomimic Corporation v. Malone (1916) 238 Fed. 135, it was held that a picture was brought into the United States when films in Canada were photographed by a camera in the United States. No corporeal object crossed the border. See note in 84 Central Law Journal 191. To a similar effect is United States v. Johnston (1916) 232 Fed. 970. See 19 Law Notes 44, and 20 Law Notes 162.

16 (1915) 236 U. S. 216.

17 For an interpretation of the federal statute regulating, through a combination of the commerce and the taxing power, the sale and use of drugs, see United States v. Jin Fuey Moy (1916) 241 U. S. 394. The statute was sustained in United States v. Brown (1915) 224 Fed. 135. See 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 502.

18 “The power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among the states is indeed contained in the same clause of the Constitution which confers upon it power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The grant is conceived in the same terms, and the two powers are undoubtedly of the same class and character and equally extensive.” Mr. Justice Matthews in Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern R. Co. (1888) 125 U. S. 465, 482. “It has frequently been laid down by this court that the power over interstate commerce is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce.” Mr. Justice Bradley in Crutcher v. Kentucky (1891) 141 U. S. 47, 57. See also Champion v. Ames (1903) 188 U. S. 321, 351.

19 (1909) 213 U. S. 318.

20 (1916) 241 U. S. 73.

21 (1914) 235 U. S. 33.

22 (1917) 242 U. S. 470. Chief Justice White and Justices McKenna and Clarke dissented on the question of interpretation. The opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna contains an interesting analysis of the problem of interpreting the meaning of a statute. See 84 Central Law Journal 171, 3 Cornell Law Quarterly 60, 30 Harvard Law Review 494, 15 Michigan Law Review 425. In United States v. Holte (1915) 236 U. S. 140, it was held, Justices Lamar and Day dissenting, that the woman transported in violation of the statute could be punished for conspiracy to commit a crime against the United States. See 80 Central Law Journal 194.

23 Seven Cases v. United States (1916) 239 U. S. 510. See 82 Central Law Journal 172. For the application of the federal Food and Drugs Act to Coca Cola, see United States v. Forty Barrels (1916) 241 U. S. 265.

24 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby (1916) 241 U. S. 33. See 82 Central Law Journal 385, and 2 Virginia Law Register, n. s. 388.

25 For a list of cases holding that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce see the brief for the plaintiff in error in Erie Railroad Co. v. Welsh (1916) 242 U. S. 303, as printed in 61 Lawyers' Edition 319–322. See notes in 82 Central Law Journal 421, 84 Central Law Journal 154, 15 Michigan Law Review 157. The cases on this question for the past three years will be found in the General Index at the end of volumes 59, 60, and 61 of the Lawyers' Edition of the Supreme Court Reports under the title “Master and Servant,” subtitle “Employers' Liability Act.”

26 See infra, pp. 41–45.

27 (1915) 239 U. S. 313.

28 (1917) 242 U. S. 409.

29 (1916) 241 U. S. 591.

30 (1917) 244 U. S. 617. Mr. Justice McKenna dissented.

31 (1917) 243 U. S. 66.

32 For other cases involving interpretations or applications of the Sherman Act see United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 461; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (1917) 244 U. S. 459; United States v. American Asiatic S. S. Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 537; Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 27; Lawlor v. Loewe (1915) 235 U. S. 522; D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 165. In cases interpreting the patent statute it has been held that the monopoly of the patentee does not include the right to restrict the resale price of patented articles, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 490, or to prescribe the materials with which patented articles may be used, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 502. Thus such restrictions imposed by the patentee must be created by collateral contract, and the contract must pass muster under the Sherman Act and its amendments. See Grosvenor, E. P., “The ‘Rule of Reason’ as Applied by the United States Supreme Court to Commerce in Patented Articles,” 17 Columbia Law Review 208CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Powell, T. R., “The Nature of a Patent Right,” 17 Columbia Law Review 663.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also 17 Columbia Law Review 543, and 31 Harvard Law Review 298.

33 (1910) 216 U. S. 1.

34 (1910) 216 U. S. 146.

35 (1916) 240 U. S. 236.

36 (1914) 235 U. S. 350.

37 (1916) 240 U. S. 227.

38 (1916) 242 U. S. 111.

39 (1894) 153 U. S. 436.

40 (1913) 231 U. S. 68. For a note on the validity of an amendment to the Massachusetts statute sustained in this case, see 16 Michigan Law Review 246.

41 (1915) 235 U. S. 549.

42 Heyman v. Hays (1915) U. S. 178; Southern Operating Co. v. Hays (1915) 236 U. S. 188.

43 Davis v. Virginia (1915) 236 U. S. 697. See 1 Virginia Law Register, n. s. 235.

44 Rearick v. Pennsylvania (1906) 203 U. S. 507. See Foster, H. H., “What is Left of the Original Package Doctrine,” 1 Southern Law Quarterly 303.Google Scholar

45 (1917) 244 U. S. 346.

46 (1915) 235 U. S. 610. See 80 Central Law Journal 123, and 51 National Corporation Reporter 140.

47 (1916) 242 U. S. 160.

48 (1915) 237 U. S. 220. See 19 Law Notes 52.

49 (1917) 244 U. S. 310. The chief justice and Justices Pitney and Brandeis dissented.

50 (1915) 235 U. S. 537.

51 (1914) 235 U. S. 197. See 49 American Law Review 601, 63 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 433, and 2 Virginia Law Review 470.

52 (1916) 241 U. S. 329.

53 (1906) 202 U. S. 246.

54 (1916) 239 U. S. 560.

55 Supra, note 51.

56 Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission (1916) 242 U. S. 255.

57 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas (1916) 240 U. S. 518.

58 South Covington & C. Street R. Co. v. Covington, supra, note 50.

59 Supra, p. 33.

60 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1914) 235 U. S. 151.See 49 American Law Review 600.

61 (1917) 242 U. S. 333.

62 (1915) 236 U. S. 151. See 28 Harvard Law Review 634. A note to the decision in the state court will be found in 2 California Law Review 231.

63 (1915) 238 U. S. 275.

64 (1915) 242 U. S. 120. See 84 Central Law Journal 25, and 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 368.

65 (1915) 238 U. S. 456.

66 (1915) 238 U. S. 466.

67 (1916) 240 U. S. 510. For further consideration of this case, see infra, p. 40.

68 (1915) 237 U. S. 52. See 80 Central Law Journal 361, 19 Law Notes 52, and 13 Michigan Law Review 698. This case and the one preceding held also that the states were not foreclosed from passing their statutes because of the federal Food and Drugs Act.

69 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 229.

70 Supra, note 42.

71 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 342. See 25 Yale Law Journal 670.

72 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 539; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. (1917) 842 U. S. 559; Merrick v. N. W. Halsey Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 568. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissents in all three cases, but without opinion, so it is impossible to tell whether his dissent is based on the commerce clause or on the fourteenth amendment or on both. See 80 Central Law Journal 175, and 17 Columbia Law Review 244.

73 Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission (1915) 236 U. S. 230; Mutual Film Corporation v. Hodges (1915) 236 U. S. 248.

74 (1915) 236 U. S. 615.

75 (1917) 244 U. S. 191.

76 Supra, note 67. See also Sligh v. Kirkwood, supra, note 68. The decisions holding that federal regulation has not inhibited by implication the exercise by the states of their reserved police power are summarized in detail in the margin of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield (1917) 244 U. S. 147, 156.

77 (1917) 243 U. S. 43.

78 (1917) 244 U. S. 360.

79 (1915) 244 U. S. 142. See 3 Cornell Law Quarterly 45, and 2 Minnesota Law Review 49. For notes on the decision in the state court see 82 Central Law Journal 43, 1 Cornell Law Quarterly 272, 29 Harvard Law Review 439, and 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 304.

80 (1917) 244 U. S. 170.

81 (1842) 16 Pet. 539.

82 Jurisprudence, page 30 (Columbia University Press, 1908).

83 If before trial plaintiff decided that he was engaged in interstate commerce when he was hurt, he may amend his declaration without bringing suit anew. Kansas City W. R. Co. v. McAdow (1916) 240 U. S. 51. See 82 Central Law Journal 189.

84 (1917) 244 U. S. 205. Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Pitney filed dissenting opinions which were concurred in by Justices Brandeis and Clarke. See 6 California Law Review 69, 3 Cornell Law Quarterly 38, and 17 Columbia Law Review 703.

85 Sixth-fifth Congress, First Session, Act of October 6, 1917, Public, No. 82.

86 Southern Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission (1915) 236 U. S. 439.

87 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Ohio Valley Tie Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 288. See 30 Harvard Law Review 400. But where the basis of liability is the failure of the interstate carrier to comply with its own rules as to the distribution of cars, and no exercise of functions by the interstate commerce commission is in issue, action may be maintained in the state court. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co. (1915) 237 U. S. 121. See 28 Harvard Law Review 816.

88 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Harold (1916) 241 U. S. 371. See 11 Illinois Law Review 373.

89 Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co. (1915) 237 U. S. 597. See Riddle, F. E., “The Carmack Amendment and Common Law Remedies,” 82 Central Law Journal 207.Google Scholar

90 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. De Fuentes (1915) 236 U. S. 157.

91 Supra, note 72.

92 Supra, note 67.

93 Supra, note 66.

94 Supra, note 49.

95 Supra, note 48.

96 Supra, note 13.

97 Supra, p. 41.

98 Supra, note 22.

99 242 U. S. 496.

100 Supra, note 84.

101 244 U. S. 221.

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