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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The diplomatic relations between China and Russia in the past decade present a tangle of converging factors among which the Chinese revolution, the World War, and the Russian revolution play a great part. They are, however, only a phase in the larger process of imperial dissolution and national revival which has encompassed both the Russian and Chinese states and remarkably transformed them within the space of a generation. It is in relation to the forces unleashed by the disintegration of the Romanov and Manchu empires that the decade's changes in diplomatic policy must be viewed.
The most significant factor underlying the reorientation of Russian and Chinese foreign policy was the abolition of the monarchy in each country; for, with the fall of the imperial houses, came the beginnings of political and administrative disintegration, the resurgence of local nationalism, and the loosing of the centrifugal forces which the defunct dynasties had held in check. It is not our problem here to trace the constitutional consequences of such a vacancy of power in either domain, but to note the salient fact that it was a difficult, if not impossible, task immediately to create an efficient substitute authority for the dead and departed emperors, and that, in view of that difficulty, provincial separatism was for a time allowed to gain such headway as to constitute a serious menace to the national integrity of both the dissolving empires.
1 December 1, 1911. Cf. China Year Book (1914), p. 621Google Scholar.
2 Cf. the treaty of Urga, November 3, 1912 (Izvestia, 1913, Vol. II, p. 16Google Scholar, and MacMurray, J. V. A., Treaties and Agreements With or Concerning China, 1894–1919, Vol. II, pp. 992 ff.Google Scholar), whereby Russia pledged her assistance in the maintenance of Mongolian autonomy while obtaining the extension and confirmation of her rights under the new régime; also the Sino-Russian Declaration of Peking, November 5, 1913 (Russian Bulletin of the Laws, No. 270, Sec. 1., December 6/19, 1913, and MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1066–1067) reaffirming Mongolian autonomy, recognizing China's nominal suzerainty over Mongolia, and pledging the signatories to abstain from colonizing. This agreement fell slightly short of a formal protectorate, Russia merely pledging her good offices in the regulation of Sino-Mongol relations.
3 Treaty of Kiakhta, June 7, 1915 (Izvestia, 1915, Vol. V, p. 6Google Scholar; MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1239 ff.) Inter alia, Mongolia was not permitted to conclude any international treaties on political and territorial questions.
4 Agreements of Kiakhta, September 30, 1914 (Izvestia, 1915, Vol. I, p. 3Google Scholar; MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1178–1179), and the treaty of Urga, January 24, 1916 (Bulletin of the Laws, No. 122, Sec. 1, May 10/23, 1916; MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1259 ff.).
5 Cf. the convention of Petrograd, July 3, 1916, and the secret treaty of the same date (Bulletin of the Laws, No. 190, Sec. 1, July 12/26, 1916, and MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1327–1328). Further details as to the negotiations are given in the Russkoie Slovo, April 1/14. 1916 (Cf. Bulletin Pŕiodique de la Presse Russe, No. 7, May 12, 1916).
6 Cf. treaty of Versailles, Articles 128–134.
7 Cf. treaty of Saint Germain, Articles 113–117.
8 The arrangement was effected at Peking on April 27, 1918, between the Chinese authorities and the shareholders of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, who laid claim to ownership of the railway. Cf. North China Herald, Vol. 127, p. 253Google Scholar, and “The Chinese Eastern Railway,” Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. II, p. 5 (February 27, 1926)Google Scholar.
9 Cf. “Les efforts et les succes de la Russie des Soviets en Chine,” L'Europe Nouvelle, Vol. VIII, p. 948 (July 18, 1925)Google Scholar.
10 Cf. Golos Rosii, September 16, 1919, cited by Dennis, A. L. P. in The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, p. 335Google Scholar; cf. also Izvestia, September 16, 1922, for the memorandum from Joffe to Wellington Koo, reiterating the program of 1919. A paraphrase is given in the London Times, January 15, 1920, p. 14Google Scholar, c. 1.
11 Following the Russian revolution, the Chinese government took steps to reassert its authority over Outer Mongolia, using as a pretext the pan-Mongolian activities of Ataman Semenov. In the autumn of 1919 China despatched an expeditionary force to Urga under General Hsu Shu-tseng—despite the provisions of the Urga and Kiakhta conventions—and coerced the Mongol khans into acceptance of the cancellation of their autonomy (November 16, 1919). General Hsu's brutal régime of pacification, which encountered much local opposition, was, however, short-lived. After a few months of Sino-Mongol civil government in 1920, the Chinese authorities were expelled from Urga by the bands of “White” Russians, Buriats, and Mongols, led by Baron Ungern von Sternburg, on February 3, 1921. Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Chinoise, No. 14, pp. 4–5 (July 14, 1919)Google Scholar; Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 95, pp. 4–6 (October 19, 1921)Google Scholar; and the North China Herald, Vol. 137, pp. 300, 518, 586Google Scholar.
12 The negotiations for the renewal of trade relations were consummated in July and August, 1920, receiving the approval of Peking on September 21, 1920. For the texts of these agreements cf. the North China Herald, Vol. 136, p. 806 (September 25, 1920)Google Scholar.
13 Cf. London Times, September 27, 1920, p. 9Google Scholar, c. 4, and the North China Herald, Vol. 137, pp. 10–11 (October 2, 1920)Google Scholar.
14 Cf. London Times, September 23, 1920, p. 7Google Scholar, c. 4.
15 Cf. the Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 92 (April 29, 1921), and the Krasnaya Gazeta, October 3, 1920. The mission is said to have been authorized originally to take up matters officially, but, following the overthrow of the Anfu party in Peking, was disavowed and became unofficial. London Times, October 23, 1920, p. 7Google Scholar, c. 5. Cf. also Soviet Russia, Vol. IV, p. 542 (November 27, 1920)Google Scholar.
16 It will be noted that when, in March, 1920, the soviet government had proposed the complete retrocession of the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, it was not fully master of the Tranabaikal region connecting with the railway; by fall the Far Eastern Republic was in a position to demand participation in the railway's operation, and Moscow could insist on rights for its vassal which it would have refused for itself but a few months before.
17 On the various aspects of Yurin's mission cf. North China Herald, Vol. 138 p. 191Google Scholar; Vol. 139, pp. 84, 442, 652; and Vol. 140, pp. 312, 386.
18 In the interim Paikes, a rather complacent functionary, was left in Peking to conduct minor negotiations.
19 It had been reported in April, 1921, that Moscow had sent a “feeler” to the Canton government, suggesting (1) mutual recognition, (2) resumption of commercial intercourse, (3) the spreading of bolshevism by the Cantonese, and (4) financial assistance to Canton by Moscow. Cf. the North China Herald, Vol. 139, p. 11 (April 4, 1921)Google Scholar.
20 Ibid., Vol. 145, pp. 3, 9 (October 7, 1922), for the correspondence involved and Dr. Sun's commentaries.
21 The possible connection of this project with the Russo-German alliance consummated at Rapallo is not without interest.
22 Cf. Izvestia, May 21, 1922, and Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 105 (July 8, 1922).
23 Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 111 (October 18,1922); Izvestia, September 1,6, 1922; and London Times, September 21, 1922, p. 11Google Scholar, c. 5.
24 One of Joffe's projects was to tie up Russian Turkestan to Eastern Siberia by a vast system of railway construction reaching from Ferghana to Vladivostok via the Hoang-Ho valley and the Peking-Kalgan railway. This was variously received at Peking, according to rival accounts, and seemed to Koo to savor of the railway imperialism of Czarist days. Cf. L'Europe Nouvelle, loc. cit., at p. 950; Izvestia, August 22, 1922; and Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 109 (October 4, 1922).
25 Cf. North China Herald, Vol. 146, p. 208 (January 27, 1923)Google Scholar.
26 Ibid., p. 289 (February 5, 1923); for the text of the agreement cf. also the London Times, January 27, 1923, p. 9Google Scholar, c. 2.
27 After the capture of Urga (cf. note 11), Baron Ungern von Sternburg headed for some months an irregular Russo-Mongol “White” government in Mongolia. With the complete reconquest of Asiatic Russia, soviet troops invaded Mongolia, annihilated Baron Ungern's bands, and executed their leader. The Red troops stayed in Mongolia partly to protect the Far Eastern Republic and partly to give Moscow leverage against Peking, which was too friendly to “White” elements to suit the soviet government. Meanwhile, a “People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia,” organized along soviet lines and supported by proletarian elements friendly to Moscow, was established at Urga under the protection of the Red armies. Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 95 (October 19, 1921), and No. 105 (July 8, 1922). Cf. also Izvestia, May 31, 1922.
28 Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 117 (March 9, 1923).
29 A small “autonomous republic of the Buriats and Mongols” had been created on January 9, 1922, within the Russian Soviet Republic, but intended to include as many of the Buriat and Mongol groups in the Far East as possible. In June, 1923, this was raised to a full-fledged republic, thereby making a double bid for the union of all Mongol peoples—(1) the political union, for which such a republic furnished a nucleus, and (2) the military and economic union which existed in fact, in virtue of the Russian occupation of Mongolia. Meanwhile efforts were made to improve the means of communication into occupied Mongolia, while trade between occupied Mongolia and China was subjected to vexatious restrictions. Cf. Izvestia, January 12, 1922, and June 19, 1923.
30 Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, Nos. 124 (September 2, 1923), and 126 (October 25, 1923); also Izvestia, August 3 and September 7, 1923.
31 Contrasting Czarist and soviet policy on his arrival in Peking, Karakhan declared that the soviet government based its policy on “respect for the sovereignty of peoples, and the absolute repudiation of all territorial or other aggrandizement at the expense of other nations.” To defend her interests and rights, he declared, China should be strong and powerful, “endowed with a redoubtable army,” whereas the imperialistic powers wished to make of China “a new Sick Man,” without an army, a prey to internal dissensions, and incapable of resisting attacks from abroad” (L'Europe Nouvelle, loc. cit., p. 951). The significance of Karakhan's remarks, in view of the mission then being undertaken by Borodin at Canton, at the invitation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, has recently become evident from the materials disclosed by the raid on the soviet embassy in Peking last April. It would appear that the lessons from Joffe's interview with Dr. Sun had already been taken to heart by the commissars—and the Komintern—in Moscow.
32 For the text of Karakhan's initial terms cf. the North China Herald, Vol. 150, p. 274 (February 23, 1924)Google Scholar; for the Chinese terms, Ibid., p. 354 (March 8, 1924).
33 For the text of the agreement cf. the North China Herald, Vol. 150, p. 433 (March 22, 1924)Google Scholar.
34 For the official English text of these treaties and declarations cf. the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Supplement, pp. 53–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A French version is given in L'Europe Nouvelle, Vol. VII, pp. 960–964 (July 26, 1924)Google Scholar.
35 This was a great diplomatic success for Karakhan, who was presently made the ambassador of the Soviet Union to China. It meant the first recognition of the Union by an Oriental state, preceding by six months the recognition finally obtained from Japan. China cannot, however, be said to have shown undue boldness in this move, as Great Britain, Germany, and Italy had, as noted above, already recognized the Soviet Union and France was engaged in informal conversations to that end. Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 133 (July 2, 1924), and Izvestia, June 1, 8, and 12, 1924.
36 Cf. Izvestia, October 23, 1925, and Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe No. 148 (November 7, 1925) and No. 149 (December 5, 1925).
37 Little difficulty other than that resulting from congested dockets and limited prison facilities has been encountered by soviet nationals, according to the testimony of M. Pergament, legal adviser to the soviet embassy in Peking. In the opinion of an American expert, however, this has been due to the leniency of Chinese courts toward Russian offenders rather than to any other cause. Cf. Quigley, H. S., “Extraterritoriality in China,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, p. 64Google Scholar. The problem has been complicated by the presence on Chinese soil of several hundred thousand Russians who are the avowed and bitter enemies of the soviet régime. Many of these have been naturalized by the Chinese government.
38 The text of the agreement is given in the China Year Book (1925), pp. 797–800Google Scholar. Cf. also Foreign Policy Association Information Service, “The Chinese Eastern Railway,” Vol. II, pp. 6–9 (February 27, 1926)Google Scholar, and Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 137 (November 22, 1924).
39 The whole problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway is, of course, too complex to be treated here. On the various Sino-Soviet crises concerning the railway cf. the following sources: Foreign Policy Association Information Service, “The Chinese Eastern Railway,” Vol. II, pp. 9–10Google Scholar; Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 154 (February 9, 1926); Pravda, February 2, September 4 and 9, 1926; London Times, September 23, 1926; and L'Europe Nouvelle, Vol. IX, pp. 1385–1386 (October 2, 1926)Google Scholar.
40 It is likewise impossible to touch here on the numerous ramifications of the Russo-Asiatic Bank controversy. It is safe to say, however, that the soviet government, having attempted in the treaty of Peking to outlaw all other claims than those of the contracting parties to the railway, would not recognize any agreement regarding the railway entered into by any other powers with any faction in China, such as represented, for example, by Chang Tso-lin. On the Russo-Asiatic Bank cf. L'Europe Nouvelle, Vol. IX, pp. 1538–1540 (November 6, 1926)Google Scholar; Pravda, September 16, 1926; and Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 137 (September 30, 1926), and No. 158 (November 20, 1926).
41 Pravda, June 21, 1924. Official proclamation of the People's Republic of Mongolia did not take place until July 8, 1924. In November, the constitution of the new Mongolian state was promulgated (Pravda, November 29, 1924). It is, from its bill of rights through its detailed administrative machinery, a Mongolian replica of the constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic. Cf. Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, Nos. 134 (July 19, 1924); 135 (September 11, 1924); and 138 (December 23, 1924), which contains an analysis of the constitution.
42 On March 6, 1925, Karakhan notified the Waichiaopu that the Red troops had been withdrawn. Chicherin described the situation at that time by saying that “the soviet government recognizes Mongolia as a part of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with internal affairs and to permit the establishment of independent relations by Mongolia” (Izvestia, March 6, 1925). “The People's Republic of Mongolia,” wrote a French observer, “although outside the framework of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics,, evolves, notwithstanding, in the order followed by the former People's Republics of Bokhara and Khorezmia, which later became soviet republics, then socialist, and were incorporated, after their dissolution, in the soviet republics of Central Asia” (Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Russe, No. 139 (January 31, 1925)).
43 Cf. Roosevelt, Nicholas, “Russia and Great Britain in China,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 5, pp. 80–90 (October, 1926), at p. 89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
44 This, though long surmised in Peking, was not clearly proved until disclosed by the documents seized in the raid on the soviet embassy in Peking, April 6, 1927. Cf. “The Soviet Plot in China” (published by the Peking Metropolitan Police). Documents 4, 5, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26.
45 Ibid., Documents 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, and, primarily, 28.
46 Ibid., Documents 1, 2, 3. Cf. also North China Herald, Vol. 163, pp. 63–64 (April 9, 1927)Google Scholar.
47 For the text of the U.S.S.R. protest, cf. North China Herald, Vol. 163, pp. 97 ff. (April 16, 1927)Google Scholar. A French text of the protest is found in L'Europe Nouvelle, Vol. X, pp. 608–609 (May 7, 1927)Google Scholar. For the Chinese rejoinder cf. North China Herald, Vol. 163, p. 145 (April 23, 1927)Google Scholar. The Waichiaopu, which had never sent a formal ambassador to Moscow, although it decided to appoint one, thought it best to keep a chargé at the soviet capital notwithstanding the withdrawal of the soviet mission.
48 Cf. London Times, March 10, 1927, p. 13Google Scholar, c. 6.
49 Cf. The Communist International, Vol. IV, No. 10 (June 30, 1927), p. 188Google Scholar, giving the views of the May plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and p. 200, where Stalin reviews “The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Communist International.” This note is further developed by Bukharin in a survey of “Developments in the Chinese Revolution,” Ibid., No. 11 (July 30, 1927), p. 210.
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