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David Easton and the Invisible Hand

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

J. S. Sorzano
J. S. Sorzano*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
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Abstract

This article demonstrates that, despite David Easton's assertions to the contrary, economic conceptions play a crucial role in his version of systems theory. A comparison between Easton's model of the political system and the classical economic model of Adam Smith reveals that they share the notions of system, scarcity, allocation, competition, maximization, self-regulation, homeostatic equilibrium, goal-seeking, and feedback. This comparison of Smith and Easton not only illuminates the logical and unacknowledged historical foundations of Easton's framework, it also clarifies some common misconceptions concerning systems analysis (e.g., the idea that it is static or that it is tautological) and underscores a number of important limitations on the utility of Easton's model as a tool for political analysis (i.e., the model requires a given pattern of behavior, a particular cultural environment and a specifiable institutional complex for its operation).

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Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 69 , Issue 1 , March 1975 , pp. 91 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1975

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References

1 See, for example, Astin, John D., “Easton I and Easton II,” Western Political Quarterly, 25, No. 4 (Dec. 1972), 734CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Colin Campbell, S. J. “Current Models of the Political System: An Intellective-Purposive View,” Comparative Political Studies, 4, No. 1 (April 1971), 25–27Google Scholar and Everson, D. H. and Paine, J. P., An Introduction to Systematic Political Science (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1973), p. 194Google Scholar.

2 Leslie, Peter, “General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science, 2 (April 1972), 172CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The most explicit allegation of the existence of economic elements in Easton's thought is provided by Mitchell's, William C. “Politics as the Allocation of Values: A Critique,” Ethics, 71 (Jan. 1961), 79–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Because of its publication date Mitchell's article could only deal with Easton's, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Knopf, 1953)Google Scholar. Despite this Mitchell accurately foresaw many of the central features of Easton's subsequent work by noting that “the allocative framework is in many ways the analogue of the theories of income distribution and the allocation of resources in economics, and particularly neoclassical theory since there, too, the emphasis is upon the economy as a distributive process or system.” (page 79).

3 A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 477, footnote 6.Google Scholar (Hereinafter referred to as Syterns Analysis.)

4 A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. xi–xii.Google Scholar (Hereinafter referred to as Framework.) Easton acknowledges the existence of some overlap with economics but insists that his main inspiration is drawn from other sources (p. xi).

5 These influences are cited by Easton in Framework (pp. xiiff.). To most readers, however, they may prove uninstructive since they presume some acquaintance with the personalities involved. James G. Miller who was associated with Easton in the Committee on Behavioral Science has been characterized as “an unabashed vitalist” thus lending at least indirect support to the physiological interpretation of Easton's approach. See Astin, John D., “Easton I and Easton II,” p. 727Google Scholar.

6 An indirect manner of achieving this result would be to assess the influence upon Easton's thought of Harold Lasswell and Talcott Parsons both of whom include characteristically economic notions in their overall approaches to the study of society.

7 It is interesting to note that Adam Smith's work has never been fully discussed from the point of view of systems theory. One partial exception is Louis Schneider's “Introduction” to a collection of readings from the works of the “Scottish Moralists” of the 18th century (i.e., Hume, Smith, Ferguson, Hutcheson, et al.). Schneider devotes several pages to a discussion of the “anticipations of functionalism” to be found in the works of these theorists. The Scottish Moralists On Human Nature and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. xlvii–lviGoogle Scholar. This neglect of Smith's work from the point of view of systems theory is especially surprising since as Parsons has noted “classical economics was the first instance in which a system of human activity was successfully analyzed as a dynamic system of inter-related variable elements.” ”The Rise and Decline of Economic Man,” Journal of General Education, 4 (1948–1950), 49Google Scholar. The prevailing opinion, however, seems to be that Smith's is not a systems model. For instance, Deutsch, Karl W. in The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1963)Google Scholar seems to exclude Smith from what he refers to as the “cybernetic” school of thought. The cybernetic model contains several elements which are characteristic of systems analysis, e.g., “self-monitoring, self-controlling, self-steering automatic processes” (p. 75), all of which are to be found in Smith's model. Deutsch classifies Smith as a “mechanist” (p. 29) a category which excludes such notions as “irreversible change, of growth, of evolution, of novelty and of purpose” (p. 27) most, if not all of which are also present in Smith's model.

8 Easton, David, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 147Google Scholar.

9 See above, footnote 1. It must be admitted that Easton's phraseology sometimes lends itself to physiological interpretations. For some of these see the particular instances cited by Astin, , “Easton I and Easton II,” p. 734Google Scholar.

10 For a good discussion of these inadequacies see Gregor, A. James, “Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 62 (June, 1968), 427–429CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 (New York: Norton, 1939).

12 “Politics as the Allocations of Values: A Critique,” p. 82.

13 “I am using Everett Hagen's conception of models as “… mental constructs consisting of a set of elements in interrelation, the elements and their interrelations being precisely defined.” “Analytical models in the Study of Social Systems,” The American Journal of Sociology, 67 (Sept. 1961), 144CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Of course, whether the specified relations among variables actually obtain (i.e., have an empirical referent) is a distinct and separate question, which will remain outside the scope of this essay. On this point, however, we may note a difference between Easton and Smith. While Easton is primarily interested in articulating a framework for political analysis, Smith, on the other hand, advanced more than a framework for the analysis of economic systems and tried to explain why economic behavior occurs in the patterns that we observe.

14 Hayek, F. A., The Counter-Revolution of Science; Studies on the Abuse of Reason (New York: Free Press, 1955), p. 56Google Scholar.

15 Young, Oran, Systems of Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 16Google Scholar; and Gouldner, Alvin W., “Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory,” in Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. Gross, L. (Evanston, Ill.: Peterson and Co., 1959), p. 252Google Scholar.

16 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Cannan, Edwin edition (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1965)Google Scholar. (Two volumes. Hereinafter referred to as Wealth).

17 Wesley Mitchell argues that Adam Smith's basic concern is in the process of production. Lecture Notes on Types of Economic Theory (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967), Volume I, p. 37Google Scholar.

18 Political System, pp. 128–129. See also Framework, p. 50.

19 Political System, p. 137.

20 Easton, , Framework, p. 57Google Scholar.

21 This is a common criticism of Easton's work. It is advanced by, among others, Evans, Michael, “Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System,” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 8 (July, 1970), 124CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Astin, John D., “Easton I and Easton II,” p. 735Google Scholar; Everson, & Paine, , An Introduction to Systematic Political Science, p. 195Google Scholar; and Thorson, Thomas L., Biopolitics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970)Google Scholar. Thorson states: “Notice that a political system is a political system because of what it does— it authoritatively allocates values for a society. A scientific theory, of course, is more than a definition.” (P. 62).

22 Thus, Sherman Roy Krupp states: “Functionalist theory assumes a system to have a basic organizing principle of goals and self-regulating mechanisms.” “Equilibrium Theory in Economics and in Functional Analysis as Types of Explanation,” in Functionalism in the Social Sciences; the Strengths and Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, Monograph 5 in a Series ed. Martindale, Don (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965), 65Google Scholar.

23 Ludwig von Bertalanffy's term. I am using it rather loosely to denote the fact that the system appears to have “a goal of its own.” For this usage see Rapoport's, Anatol “Foreword” in Buckley, W., ed Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. xviiiGoogle Scholar.

24 A. James Gregor, “Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis.” “A teleological system, as distinct from a nonteleological system, is one which displays a tendency to move toward some one state or some one class of states out of all its possible states …” (p. 433).

25 Wealth, I, pp. 78, 105, 106, 107Google Scholar.

26 Sebba, Gregor, “The Development of the Concepts of Mechanism and Model in Physical Sciences and Economic Thought,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 43 (May, 1953), 262Google Scholar.

27 Easton, , Framework, p. 128Google Scholar.

28 Easton defines “persistence” as “the perpetuation of any means through which values may be authoritatively allocated.” Framework, p. 78.

29 Ibid., p. 96.

30 Gregor has noted that the proposition that systems display specific tendencies is a testable one since “the truth or falsity of such a construction can be established by determining whether in fact the objects in the universe of inquiry do in fact display those properties.” “Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis,” (p. 435). Critics of Easton, however, have insisted that unless some numerical value can be given to the minimum level of support, the proposition that the system seeks to maintain support above a critical threshold is untestable. (Evans, , “Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System,” pp. 120–121Google Scholar; Leslie, , “General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis,” p. 157Google Scholar. Astin, “Easton I and Easton II,” p. 732.) The critics' contention is incontestable, but I see no reason why the variables in Easton's model cannot be quantified. For an effort in that direction see Trilling, Richard J., “Easton's Concept of Effective Support: Two Formal Models,” Comparative Political Studies, 4 (January, 1972), 491–507CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Mayntz, Renate, “On the Use of the Equilibrium Concept in Social System Analysis,” Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, 4 (Louvain, Belgium: International Sociological Association, 1964), 135–136Google Scholar.

32 Renate Mayntz would exclude such a system from the homeostatic class. Mayntz argues that the “constancy in the values of all system variables … should be excluded from the definition of homeostatic equilibrium, since it is its distinguishing mark that no overall constancy is presupposed.” (p. 134.) Similarly, H. M. Blalock and Blalock, A. M., “Toward a Clarification of Systems Analysis in the Social Sciences,” Philosophy of Science, 26 (April, 1959), 90Google Scholar, state. “… the notion of equilibrium always seems to imply that something is remaining unchanged or is assumed to remain unchanged over some period of time (however short) … These “somethings” (remaining unchanged) are always clearly specified by the physicist. It is seldom if ever implied that all variables under consideration are necessarily fixed. It is misleading to say that a given system is ‘in equilibrium’ … It would be preferable to say that a system is in equilibrium with respect to specific variables. The implication is clear: social scientists who use the concept of equilibrium need to make efforts to specify precisely what it is about the system they are assuming to remain unchanged.”

33 Lowe, Adolph, On Economic Knowledge; Towards a Science of Political Economics (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 108–109Google Scholar.

34 For Smith's theory of economic development see Spengler, Joseph, “Adam Smith's Theory of Economic Growth,” The Southern Economic Journal, 25 (April, 1959), 397–415, and 26 (July, 1959), 1–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Myint, H., “The Welfare Significance of Productive Labor,” The Review of Economic Studies, 11, No. 1 (1943), 20–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lowe, Adolph, “The Classical Theory of Economic Growth,” Social Research 21 (Summer 1954), 127–158Google Scholar; and Theatt, W., “A Diagramatic Presentation of Adam Smith's Growth Model,” Social Research 24 (Summer 1957), 227–230Google Scholar.

35 It is clear, however, that Easton regards certain variables as homeostatic ones. For example, he states “The persistence of a given type of political system requires more than the presence of essential variables. They need to operate above a certain level. In other words, there is a critical range and if disturbances displace the system [sic] beyond it, the entire system will change its character.” Framework, p. 93.

36 Systems Analysis, p. 157. For Easton's elaborate discussion of the concept of support see Part Three of the same work. By just referring to “support” I am greatly simplifying Easton's rich conception of support.

37 Systems Analysis, p. 275. Easton is here primarily referring to the quid pro quo form of support (“specific support”). Easton is emphatic in his insistence that just specific support is insufficient to allow a system to persist. It needs to be supplemented by a “cushion” of diffuse support upon which the system may draw from time to time. Still, outputs are related to the level of diffuse support in at least two ways. First because in the long-run lack of desired outputs diminish the level of diffuse support (p. 273). Secondly, because the longer outputs satisfy demands the more likely it is that diffuse support will be generated (p. 275).

38 For the view that Easton's system is a static one see Scott, Roger, “Systems Analysis Without Tears: Easton and Almond,” Politics 7, No. 1 (May, 1972), 76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Lasswell, Harold and Lerner, Daniel, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965), p. 7Google Scholar.

40 See Grampp, William, “Adam Smith and the Economic Man,” The Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a useful corrective to the simplistic conceptions about Smith's maximizing man.

41 Heimann, Eduard, History of Economic Doctrines; An Introduction to Economic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 74Google Scholar and Meek, R. L., “Adam Smith and the Classical Concept of Profit,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1 (June, 1954), 139CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Wealth I, p. 367Google Scholar.

43 Pribram, Karl, “Patterns of Economic Reasoning,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 43 (May, 1953), 246Google Scholar.

44 Michael A. Weinstein suggests that systems analysis is based upon a Hobbesian view of man. Systematic Political Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 7–11Google Scholar.

45 Karl Pribram has noted that “the maximization principle—as the rationale of the employer's behavior—appears to be the real source of the disruptive tendencies attributed by Marx to the operation of the economic forces.” “Patterns of Economic Reasoning,” p. 251.

46 Biopolitics, p. 62.

47 In Systems Analysis he explicitly acknowledges maximization, (pp. 363–364).

48 Biopolitics, p. 62.

49 Framework, p. 53 (my emphasis) and p. 80. See also Political System, p. 137 and Systems Analysis, p. 247.

50 For an overlapping analysis of the assumptions underlying Easton's conception of politics see William C. Mitchell's, “Politics as the Allocation of Values: A Critique,” pp. 79–90. He states. “Allocation theories in political science also make certain assumptions about the actors in a polity. These assumptions vary, but the dominant ones appear to conceive of political man as both essentially rational and motivated to maximize his returns, just as economic theory postulates an economic man.” (p. 81).

51 Yet, in a footnote, Easton seemingly denies that he is assuming maximizing behavior. He writes: “It may indeed appear from discussion of the ratio of demands to outputs that the member who is putting in support must, in some neo-Benthamite fashion, calculate the advantage to himself in the light of how the authorities act. If he fails to get the expected benefits, then he must conclude it is wiser to withhold support from these authorities. With the continuation of this process, he might take stock of his feelings toward the whole way of ordering political relationships and decide to withdraw support from the regime. Such a rational model of behavior might be useful if one wished to adopt the utilitarian assumptions that man knows his own interest and will pursue it. But for purposes of our analysis I have assumed no specific and dominant kind of motivation in political behavior.” (Systems Analysis, p. 409.) Easton thus distinguishes between the motivation and the behavior. He writes: “We do not need to make any monolithic or inflexible assumptions about the motivations of the authorities in the production of outputs. They may act to satisfy a need or desire for power, to fulfill a detached principle of right and wrong, to express a socialized sense of responsibility to the community at large, or to gain calculated advantage over their adversaries.” (Systems Analysis, p. 432.)

52 In Robert Merton's terminology this amounts to the distinction between “manifest” and “latent” functions. The former are consciously intended by the actors while the latter are the unintended consequences of the actors' behavior. Merton, Robert K., “Manifest and Latent Functions,” in System, Change and Conflict, ed. Demerath, N. and Peterson, R. (New York: The Free Press, 1967)Google Scholar. Similarly, Wsevolod W. Isajiw remarks that “… the question of finality, i.e., goals in functionalism is not one of ends or motives of the individuals but one of the ends of the system of action itself, regardless of the motives of the individuals participating in it.” Causation and Functionalism in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 53–54Google Scholar.

53 Ernest Nagel insists that to be considered a teleological system any set of interdependent variables must not only obey the principle of equifinality but must include a compensating mechanism or negative feedback: “For example, I would not say that a simple pendulum which moves in such a way that it strives to achieve the lowest potential energy is a teleological system. There are no compensating effects on the pendulum.” “Types of Causal Explanations in Science” in Cause and Effect, ed. Lerner, Daniel (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 27Google Scholar.

54 Isajiw, W. W., Causation and Functionalism in Sociology, p. 68Google Scholar. He states “Self-regulation means negative feedhack. …”

55 Blaug, Mark notes: “The price system is a mechanism that imposes orderly rules of behavior on economic agents and imposes them automatically, without central direction or collective design.” Economic Theory in Retrospect (London: Heinemann, 1968), p. 61Google Scholar.

56 “When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to the market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price.” Wealth I, p. 60.

57 Wealth I, pp. 61–62.

58 Wealth II, pp. 225–226.

59 Easton, , Framework, p. 100Google Scholar. Easton implies that a political Invisible Hand would seek to reestablish the status quo ante for the whole system once it is disturbed. As we have seen this is not necessarily the case.

60 Scattered through the text of his various works are references to the political system as “a self-regulating, self-directing set of behaviors” (Framework, p. 128) or as “an open, self-regulating, and goal-setting system” (Systems Analysis, p. 479). Similarly, he explicitly includes the self-regulating mechanisms as part of his conception of system. “Every persisting system has homeostatic devices to help it cope with stress.” (Framework, p. 95.)

61 The distinction between the goals of individuals and the goals of the system is one which Easton makes but often forgets. He frequently speaks of the goals of the individual members within the system as if they were the same as the system's goal. (For an illustration see Systems Analysis, p. 20. For a discussion of this topic see Peter Leslie, “General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis,” pp. 158–159 and Michael Evans, “Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System,” p. 131.) This conflation of the two types of goals is, however, inconsistent with the following essential propositions of Easton's approach. Thus, Easton constantly (and literally) refers to the system's self-regulating, self-directing and goal-setting capacities. He emphasizes the existence of automatic regulative homeostatic devices. He insists that “Here as in other areas of our analysis, the subjective or rational intentions of the actors do not necessarily dictate the consequences of their behavior for the system.” (Systems Analysis, p. 433.) And, finally, he argues that the notion of “regulation” can be used meaningfully despite the absence of conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the actor(s) (Ibid., pp. 115–116). One possible solution to this inconsistency is provided by Easton when he notes that individuals can deliberately and rationally create regulative devices which will help keep the variables of a system within their respective critical ranges (Ibid., p. 116). In this sense there is no necessary contradiction. As we shall see, self-regulation does not occur within an institutional vacuum but requires a specific complex of institutions which may, of course, be deliberately created. Indeed, Adam Smith's market society had to be consciously fashioned after the mercantilist order was dismantled. But once the institutional framework of the market was created it automatically regulated the economic processes.

62 Systems Analysis, p. 364.

63 Systems Analysis, pp. 363–364. Easton lists two other assumptions which parallel those of classical economics: a) the authorities are competent to achieve whatever goal they select, b) they have the resources to do so. These two assumptions parallel the conception of the economic actor as having the information, rationality and resources to select and implement his decisions.

64 Political System, pp. 266ff. For another useful discussion of the concept of equilibrium see Russett, Cynthia E., The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

65 Political System, p. 279.

66 Framework, p. 23.

67 Schumpeter, Joseph A., History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 889Google Scholar. He succinctly states “A housewife's behavior on the market may be analyzed without going into the factors that formed it.” See also Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), Vol. II, Chapter 14Google Scholar.

68 “Economics and Sociology: Marshall in Relation to the Thought of His Time” and “Wants and Activities in Marshall” both in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 66 (1931–1932), 316–347 and 101–140Google Scholar.

69 The Structure of Social Action (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 2 VolsGoogle Scholar.

70 For a concise description of how an individual comes to regard the maximization of profits as desirable see “The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sociology” (p. 38) and “The Motivation of Economic Activities,” (pp. 200–217) both in Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949)Google Scholar.

71 Kuznets, Simon, “Parts and Wholes in Economics” in Parts and Wholes, ed. Lerner, Daniel (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 52–53Google Scholar.

72 The Political System, p. 33.

73 “We do not inherit our political behavior, attitudes, values, and knowledge through our genes. They must be learned in some way.” Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 13Google Scholar.

74 These three types of outlooks can be briefly described as follows: the parochial actor “expects nothing from the political system.” The subject actor is predominantly oriented towards the “outputs, administrative, or ‘down-ward flow’ side of the political system.” He still does not conceive of himself as an active participant. This is, in fact, the essential characteristic of the third type—the participant actor —who is oriented in an “activist” fashion towards “both the input and output aspects of the political system.” Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 16–19Google Scholar. Since the authors are explicit in noting that the three types can exist simultaneously in a society the question of what percentage of actors has to be “participant” for Easton's model to function optimally has to be left to empirical investigation.

75 Easton observes that peasant societies display “a kind of political impermeability, a long-suffering patience on the part of the general membership that leads to the acceptance of one's fate and either a complete absence of any thought of politicizing one's wants or an unquestioned stifling of any urge to do so.” Systems Analysis, p. 109.

76 Nathan Rosenberg states “Atomistic competition, absence of collusion, and mobility of resources are not nearly sufficient to establish the linkage between unhampered pursuit of self-interest and social well-being. Smith himself clearly realized this. Indeed large portions of his Wealth of Nations are specifically devoted to analyzing the nature of the appropriate institutional framework.” “Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations,” The Journal of Political Economy, 68 (Dec., 1960), 558–559Google Scholar. Mark Blaug concurs: “What distinguishes Smith's theory of economic development … from later and even from more recent efforts in the subject is a continuous harking back to the framework of social institutions that harness and channel pecuniary motives. So frequently accused of Harmonielehre, the vulgar doctrine of the spontaneous harmony of interests, Smith instead seems to be forever emphasizing that, the powerful motive of self-interest is only enlisted in the cause of the general welfare under definite institutional arrangements.” Economic Theory in Retrospect, p. 63.

77 The literature on this point is voluminous. The following are some of the general accounts of the institutional requirements of the classical model. Schumpeter, Joseph, The Theory of Economic Development; An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, trans, by Opie, R. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 59, footnote 1Google Scholar; Stigler, George, “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated,” Essays in the History of Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 234–238Google Scholar; Morse, Chandler, “Becoming versus Being Modern: An Essay on Institutional and Economic Development,” in Modernization by Design; Social Change in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 304Google Scholar. On a more specific level we have: Samuels, Warren, “The Classical Theory of Economic Policy: Non-legal Social Control,” The Southern Economic Journal, 31 (July, 1964), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and (Oct., 1966) 87–100; Nathan Rosenberg, “Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations,”; Cropsey, Joseph, Polity and Economy. An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957)Google Scholar; Pollard, Sidney, The Idea of Progress, History and Society (New York: Basic Books, 1968), Chapter II, 119–195Google Scholar, and Blaug, MarkEconomic Theory in Retrospect, p. 63Google Scholar.

78 See, for instance, Berrien, F. K., General and Social Systems (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968), p. 117Google Scholar, and Deutsch, Karl W., “Mechanism, Organism and Society: Some Models in Natural and Social Science,” Philosophy of Science 18 (July, 1951), 230–252CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79 Systems Analysis, p. 366.

80 Systems Analysis, p. 379.

81 Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Influence,” pp. 357 ff; “On the Concept of Political Power,” pp. 306 ff., and “Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process,” pp. 272 ff.; all in Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: The Free Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

82 For a description of negative feedback in economic analysis see Samuelson, Paul A., “Some Notions on Causality and Teleology in Economics,” in Cause and Effect ed. Lerner, Daniel (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 99–143Google Scholar.

83 Systems Analysis, p. 371.

84 Systems Analysis, p. 365.

85 Thomas Thorson has previously suggested that Easton's model seems to be a generalized version of the American political process. Biopolitics, p. 61.

86 Systems Analysis, p. 418.

87 Systems Analysis, p. 420.

88 Systems Analysis, p. 420.

89 Systems Analysis, p. 428.

90 Systems Analysis, p. 434.

91 Systems Analysis, p. 437.

92 Systems Analysis, p. 435.

93 This seems to be true of all self-regulating mechanisms whether they be physiological, cybernetic or economic in nature.

94 For a similar conclusion concerning the limitations of Easton's model in the international arena see Nicholson, M. B. and Reynolds, P. A., “General Systems, The International System and The Eastonian Analysis,” Political Studies, 15, No. 1 (1967), 12–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95 Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II, page 97Google Scholar.

96 Latsis, Spiro J., “Situational Determinism in Economics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23 (1972), 207–245CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97 Ibid., p. 223.

98 This formulation of free will within a context of apparent systemic necessity has a long and outstanding pedigree. For instance, Kant long ago noted that the study of history “if it examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions.” He continues, “individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was would scarcely arouse their interests.” “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans, by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 41 (Emphasis in the original.)

99 This “logic of the situation” is one possible manner to deal effectively with the vexing problem of self-fulfilling and self-defeating predictions in the social sciences. (Easton, , Political System, pp. 24–31Google Scholar). On this topic see the recent exchange in the British Journal of Political Science starting with Ake's, Claude, “The Scientific Status of Political Science,” 2 (January, 1972), 109–115Google Scholar and especially the comments of Budge, Ian, “A Comment on Self-fulfilling and Self-defeating Predictions,” 3 (April, 1973), 249–250Google Scholar, and my reply “The Scientific Status of Political Science. A Note on the Oedipus Effect,” 4 (April, 1974), 254–256Google Scholar.

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