Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
On March 6, 1957, the Gold Coast, now called “Ghana,” attained fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth. African nationalists, Pan-Africanists and their supporters in other parts of the world hailed the event as a milestone on the road to complete emancipation of the Africans, as proof that the “dark continent” had come of age and that all of its people were now fully capable of governing themselves.
This study of several key factors in the development of political thought and practice in the former colony was undertaken with a view toward an assessment of the stability and soundness of the country's new political institutions and practices. In a more general sense, it may be regarded as a commentary on the process of institutional transfer from colonial (European) to African political control. Since the formal structure within which the transfer took place is classifiable, nominally at least, as parliamentary-democratic, the evaluation may also serve as a commentary on contemporary performance of what, to reflect its second-hand nature, may be termed “colonial-parliamentary democracy.”
1 For an explanation of the new designation “Ghana” by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, see Coast, Gold, Legislative Assembly, Debates (hereafter cited as Assembly, Debates), May 18, 1956, cols. 130–31Google Scholar; unless otherwise indicated, bibliographical references to official documents pertain to Gold Coast publications. The principal constitutional documents pertaining to the granting of independence are Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Proposed Constitution of Ghana, Cmnd 71 (HMSO, London, 1957)Google Scholar; Great Britain, Statutory Instruments (1957, No. 277); The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council 1957; Great Britain, The Ghana Independence Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 Ch. 6. For historical background, see Bourret, F. M., The Gold Coast (Stanford, 1952)Google Scholar; Apter, David E., The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, 1955)Google Scholar; Wright, Richard, Black Power (New York, 1954)Google Scholar; The Bow Group, Race and Power (The Bow Group, London, 1956) pp. 37–56Google Scholar; Borsa, Giorgio, L'esperimento Democratico Della Costa d'Oro (Instituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale, Milan, 1955)Google Scholar; see also, Coleman, James S., “A Survey of Selected Literature on the Government and Politics of British West Africa,” this Review, Vol. 49, pp. 1130–50 (Dec., 1955)Google Scholar.
2 Malinowski, Bronislaw, The Dynamics of Culture Change, Kaberry, Phyllis M., ed. (New Haven, 1945), p. 154Google Scholar.
3 This should in no way detract from the work of such outstanding authorities on Africa as Melville J. Herskowits, Malinowski himself, William R. Bascom, and others; it only doubts the relevance of historic-anthropological research in Africa to modern political problems.
4 E.g., Great Britain, Colonial Office, Gold Coast Report To His Excellency The Governor By The Committee On Constitutional Reform 1949 (hereafter cited as Coussey Report), HMSO, London, 1949), p. 15 (par. 81)Google Scholar; also, Bourret, op. cit., p. 78, and Wight, Martin, The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London, 1947), p. 34Google Scholar.
5 “We indicated the progressively complex impacts of new norms and structures of politics upon the traditional. Such impacts can be likened to the accelerator principle of which some economists speak in which the input of a unit compounds its consequences.” Apter, op. cit., p. 273.
6 Apter, op. cit.
7 Cf. SirJennings, Ivor, The Approach to Self Government (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 1–2, 8Google Scholar.
8 For discussions of the socio-economic problems likely to be faced by the new state, see Lewis, W. A., Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast (Government Printer, Accra, 1953), especially p. 8Google Scholar; Britain, Great and Coast, Gold, Volta River Project (HMSO, London, 1956) 2 volsGoogle Scholar; Pedler, F. J., Economic Geography of West Africa (London, 1955)Google Scholar; for a practical illustration of the problem sketched, Jennings, op. cit., pp. 47–48 (the example of the Maldivian Islands); also Nkrumah, Kwame, Ghana (Nelson, London, 1957), p. xGoogle Scholar, and Davison, R. B., “The Challenge of Ghana,” The Political Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 271–284 (July–Sept., 1957)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 Jennings, op. cit., p. 13.
10 See Nkrumah, op. cit. p. 58.
11 Apter, op. cit., pp. 17–20.
12 This side of the British model was underlined recently by The Economist in connection with the Anglo-Egyptian conflict of 1956; see the January 12, 1957 issue, pp. 95–96.
13 For biographical data see Nkrumah's autobiography, op. cit., and Bankole, Timothy, Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power (Allen & Unwin, London, 1955)Google Scholar.
14 Apter, op. cit., pp. 304–323.
15 Great Britain, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948 (hereafter cited as Watson Report), (HMSO, London, 1948), pp. 17–20Google Scholar; appendices nos. 11, 12; see also Nkrumah, op. cit., pp. 53, 57, 60–61 and 303–4.
16 At one time, he coined the term “Ghanacraey,” meaning a modern version of traditional practice; Borso, op. cit., p. 32. In the Preface to his Autobiography he summarizes his political beliefs as follows: “Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialist society. But even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind,” Nkrumah, op. cit., p. x.
17 To cite but two representative samples of public commentaries by Government spokesmen on this subject: “With regard to the new name, Ghana, for the country, I am surprised to learn that the People's Educational Association … demanded from the Government an explanation for it. Nobody has ever asked the imperialist Government for the meaning of Gold Coast but when our own Government proposes a new name for the country, the P.E.A. has the impudence to ask for Us meaning.” Assembly, Debates (May 22, 1956), col. 219, (my italics); and: “I should like to ask the hon. Members of the Opposition to tell us whether they sincerely believe that the minority should dictate or that the majority should dictate?” ibid. (August 1, 1956), col. 33.
18 See ibid. (May 18, 1956), col. 155; (May 22, 1956), col. 213–14; (August 2, 1956), cols., 76, 95, 102.
19 Apter in Africa in the Modern World, Stillman, Calvin W., ed. (Chicago, 1955), p. 139Google Scholar. There is reason to believe that charismatic leadership is to blame for the migration of intellectuals from the C.P.P. into the Opposition.
20 See Dr. Busia, as quoted in Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 279; also, Bawumia, and Owusu, , Assembly, Debates, August 2, 1956, cols. 67 and 79 respectivelyGoogle Scholar.
21 For a general discussion of African political parties see Coleman, James S. in Africa Today, Haines, C. Grove, ed. (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 225–256Google Scholar.
22 Constitution of the C.P.P. (Accra, n.d.), p. 12. The text of the party rules is also give in Nkrumah, op. cit., pp. 291–302.
23 Ibid., p. 15.
24 Ibid., pp. 10–11; cf. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition, op. cit., p. 316: “The authoritarian potential of the C.P.P. remains unknown.”
25 For specific illustrations of this, see Daily Graphic (Accra), July 14, 16, 1956Google Scholar.
26 “Operation 104,” C.P.P. 1954 Election Manifesto (C.P.P. National Headquarters Accra, n.d.), p. 4; and Government Proposals in regard to the future Constitution and Control of Statutory Boards and Corporations in the Gold Coast and Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company Limited (hereafter cited as CPC Enquiry and Report), (Government Printer, Accra, 1956), p. 26 (par. 60)Google Scholar.
27 Constitution of the C.P.P., op. cit., p. 7.
28 CPC Enquiry and Report, p. 26 ff.
29 Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (London, 1954), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.
30 1956 Election Results:
In October 1957, six groups identified with the Opposition, joined forces under the new name The United Party; see The Times (London), October 8, 1957, p. 9Google Scholar.
31 For purposes of the Assembly election, the country had been divided into 104 electoral districts. The Minister of Local Government, responsible for the election administration in general, appointed for each district a Returning Officer, who in turn appointed his Assistants. From among those, the Returning Officer designated the presiding officers, responsible for the individual polling stations. Candidates, properly nominated, and upon payment of fifty pounds' deposit, were allowed to appoint two Polling Agents of their choice. Voters, at least twenty-one years of age and subject to certain minor residence and tax qualifications, registered voluntarily. Upon proper identification from the register, voters were handed a ballot paper, bearing a printed number which corresponded with a number on the counterfoil. Special precautions had been taken to prevent counterfeiting of ballots. Before the voter was allowed to cast his ballot, his left thumb was stained with indelible ink to prevent duplicating voting. The balloting was to take place in a screened enclosure. The ballot paper was to be placed in one of several wooden boxes, depending on the number of candidates contesting the seat. Each box displayed the symbol of the candidate or party to be voted for. Further precautions were taken to avoid stealing of ballots, switching of ballot boxes or of symbols, spoiling of ballots already cast, and to keep the boxes secure until the official count was completed. The election was conducted under the Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954; governing the election administration were The Electoral Provisions Ordinance, 1953 and The Electoral Provisions (Assembly Elections) Regulations, 1954 as amended up to 1956; separate instructions were published for the guidance of Returning and Presiding Officers and for Polling Assistants. These were for official use only. For the list of candidates, see Gold Coast Gazette Extraordinary No. 42 (June 27, 1956), pp. 812–42Google Scholar.
32 Cf. Jennings, op. cit., pp. 59–84; also see Memorandum No. 2 on the General Election, 1956 (Government Agents and Returning Officers Conference, Tamale, June 15, 1956)Google Scholar, par. 3 and “Control of Drumming,” ibid., par. 5.
33 See a letter by the Commissioner of Police to the political parties entitled: “Measures To Ensure Calm Elections,” Gold Coast Weekly Review No. 23 (June 6, 1956), pp. 11–12Google Scholar.
34 One unusual but interesting case came before the court in Accra. Two men were sentenced for attempting to place a handbag “containing undisclosed matter,” into the Accra water reservoir. The men explained that they had committed the deed “so that anybody who drank the water might vote for Dr. Awooner Renner (M.A.P.), candidate for Accra West.”
35 For a discussion of the problem and for existing regulations see, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Representational and Electoral Reform (Government Printer, Accra, 1954), p. 14Google Scholar; also The Electoral Provisions (Assembly Elections) Regulations, 1954, Part IV, esp. pars. 54–64.
36 See, Why CMB-CPC Probe, Petitions submitted by N.L.M., etc. (Kumasi, n.d.);and CPC Enquiry and Report, pars. 54–85, 86–93, 163–173, 175–177, and summary of findings, par. 203.
37 The C.P.P., of course, collected regularly a certain percentage from the salaries of its officeholders in central and local government positions, but its expenditures exceeded income from this source by far.
38 According to a Government source, considerable sums were contributed to the Opposition by the “imperialists,” presumably the United Africa Company, Cadbury and Fry, Taylor Woodrow and other European concerns; see Inkumsah, A. E., Assembly, Debates (August 3, 1956), col. 136Google Scholar; also, CPC Enquiry and Report, par. 72.
39 A specimen shown to this writer by a member of the Cabinet would support the suspicion voiced by that source that the errors were the result of deliberate tampering, although no pattern was discernible favoring a particular party. In the constituency of the Minister of Local Government, who was responsible for the election and registration administration, a voter participation of 91 per cent was recorded, compared with an overall average of 46 per cent. For illustration of the registration problem, see Ministry of Local Government, Specimen Instructions to Polling Agents, pp. 2–3Google Scholar.
40 Apter, op. cit., p. 160.
41 The Times, (London), March 6, 1957, p. 6Google Scholar. Replying to criticism of the Government by the Opposition, the Minister of Interior issued this most revealing warning: “Another important point is that perhaps the hon. mover and the members of the Opposition have not realized the great harm that they do to the reputation of this country, outside as well as within, when they make such vain allegations. They little think that they give the impression to our friends both outside and within that the African is actually not qualified to handle his own affairs.” The Minister concluded: “In the future hon. Members should be very careful as to what they say here.” Assembly, Debates, March 4, 1956, as reprinted in Why CMP-CPC Probe, op. cit., p. 54.
42 On July 21, the CPP Minister of Communications announced that a new “get tough” policy, including deportations, would come into operation to deal with opposing elements. The Times (London) July 23, 1957, p. 7Google Scholar. The controversies arising over the deportations reflected not only the aversion of the new rulers to criticism, but also the problems flowing from the application of British principles of justice in a substantially alien setting; see The Times (London) September 25, 1957, p. 8, and September 28, p. 6Google Scholar.
43 In parts of the country it is considered entirely proper if an individual succeeds in defrauding the public treasury. “The imperialists have helped themselves so long, now let the African take his share,” is the not uncommon explanation of graft or bribery. This is not a monopoly of any political party or group. For an illustration, see CPC Enquiry and Report, p. 45 (pars. 212, 213). Evidence obtained at the Enquiry revealed the absence of a separation, in policy making and administrative respects, between operations of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, Ltd. (C.P.C.), and of the governing political party, the C.P.P. It was found that the C.P.P.'s Central Committee, through direct intervention, made decisions and gave instructions concerning the disposition of loans, and appointments of personnel on the sub-boards. In some respects, the Party's Central Committee actually ran the operations of the C.P.C. Evidence was submitted showing a certain correlation between approval of loan applications and electoral requirements of the C.P.P. The C.P.C. emerged as in fact part of the Party's organization; ibid., pp. 26–30 (pars. 54–100).
44 Training at the local level could have rendered parliamentary democracy at the national level more intelligible to the electorate.
45 See Coussey Report, p. 15 (par. 78).
46 For documentation on local government reforms, see State Councils (Northern Territories) Ordinance No. 5 of 1952; State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance No. 8 of 1952 and Amendment Ordinance No. 37 of 1955; State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance No. 4 of 1952 and Amendment Ordinance No. 38 of 1955; The Local Government Ordinance (Gold Coast), rev. ed. 1954, (Chapter 64).
47 The principal documentation on the constitutional debate preceding independence may be found in Report of the Constitutional Adviser (Bourne Report, Govt. Printer, Accra, 1955)Google Scholar; Report of the Achimota Conference (Govt. Printer, Accra, 1956)Google Scholar; Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence and Statement on the Report of the Constitutional Adviser and the Report of the Achimota Conference (Govt. Printer, Accra, 1956)Google Scholar; Statement by the National Liberation Movement and Its Allies on the Gold Coast Government's Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence (Kumasi, 1956)Google Scholar; Assembly, Debates, (August 1–3, 1956), cols. 17–178; The Government's Revised Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence (Govt. Printer, Accra, 1956)Google Scholar; Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Proposed Constitution of Ghana, Cmnd 71, op. cit., and Great Britain, Statutory Instruments (1957 No. 277), The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957.
48 The Economist, February 16, 1956, col. 55.
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