Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T15:45:35.623Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Jeffrey W. Legro
Jeffrey W. Legro*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Rational choice analyses of international cooperation have slighted the effect of state preference formation and the influence of cultural forces in that process. This article addresses these gaps by developing an explanation that specifies how organizational cultures of bureaucracies shape state aims and international outcomes. This approach is evaluated in a set of least likely cases—decisions on the use of force in war—where the conventional wisdom expects external material, not internal cultural, concerns to dominate. Before World War II, countries agreed to limit the use of three types of warfare, but during that conflict mutual restraint was maintained in only one. I show how this variation is best understood as a product of state preference dynamics, shaped largely by the collective beliefs and customs of military services. This result suggests ways to rethink the use of the preferences-interaction model and the role of cultural factors in that framework.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 1 , March 1996 , pp. 118 - 137
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Adler, Emanuel. 1992. “The Emergence of Cooperation.” International Organization 46:101–46.Google Scholar
Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Art, Robert J. 1973. “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique.” Policy Sciences 4:467–90.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Bachman, David. 1991. Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China. Cambridge: the University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baldwin, David A., ed. 1993. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary. 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Berger, Thomas U. N.d. “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan.” In The Culture of National Security, ed. Kazenstein, Peter. New York: Columbia University Press. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Betts, Richard K. 1977. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Blair, Clay. 1975. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.Google Scholar
Bloom, William. 1990. Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: The University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, Michael D., and Axelrod, Robert. 1984. “Coping with Complexity: The Adaptive Value of Changing Utility.” American Economic Review 74:30–42.Google Scholar
Douglas, Sholto, Lord of Kirtleside. 1966. Years of Command, vol. 2. London: Collins.Google Scholar
Evangelista, Matthew. 1988. Innovation and the Arms Race. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Evans, Peter B., Jacobson, Harold K., and Putnam, Robert D., eds. 1993. Double-Edged Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49:379–414.Google Scholar
Finnemore, Martha, N.d. Defining National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Frieden, Jeffry. 1991. “Invested Interests.” International Organization 45:425–51.Google Scholar
Frieden, Jeffry. 1995. “Actors, Preferences, and International Relations.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.Google Scholar
George, Alexander. 1979. “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison.” Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Lauren, Paul Gordon. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
George, Alexander, and McKeown, Timothy. 1985. “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making.” In Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2, ed. Coulam, Robert and Smith, Richard. Greenwich: JAI Press.Google Scholar
Glaser, Charles. 1994–1995. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security 19:50–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, Judith. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Gowa, Joanne. 1986. “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images.” International Organization 40:167–85.Google Scholar
Greif, Avner. 1994. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualistic Societies.” Journal of Political Economy 102:912–41.Google Scholar
Grieco, Joseph M. 1990. Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grieco, Joseph M., Powell, Robert, and Snidal, Duncan. 1993. “The Relative Gains Problem for International Relations.” American Political Science Review 87:729–43.Google Scholar
Haas, Peter, ed. 1992. Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, special issue, International Organization 46 (Winter 1992).Google Scholar
Haggard, Stephan, and Simmons, Beth A.. 1987. “Theories of International Regimes.” International Organization 41:491–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hallion, Richard P. 1989. Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911–1945. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.Google Scholar
Halperin, Morton H. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings.Google Scholar
Higham, Robin. 1966. The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918–1939. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.Google Scholar
Hinsley, F.H. 1979. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations: Vol. I. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30:167–214.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross, eds. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1988. “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation.” World Politics 40:317–49.Google Scholar
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, James. 1993. “Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice.” American Political Science Review 87:74–86.Google Scholar
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995a. “Thinking about Strategic Culture.” International Security 19:32–64.Google Scholar
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995b. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jones, Neville. 1987. The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force, 1923–1939. London: Frank Cass.Google Scholar
Katzenbach, Edward L. Jr. 1958. “The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century.” Public Policy 8:120–49.Google Scholar
Katzenstein, Peter, ed. 1978. Between Power and Plenty. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
Katzenstein, Peter, ed. N.d. The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Keegan, John. 1993. A History of Warfare. New York: Knopf.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. 1989. International Institutions and State Power. Boulder: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Viet Nam Decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kier, Elizabeth. N.d. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D. 1972. “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland).” Foreign Policy 7:159–79.Google Scholar
Krasner, Stephen. 1978. Defending the National Interest. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. 1986. The Army in Viet Nam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, David M. 1990. Corporate Cultures and Economic Theory. In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. Alt, James E. and Schepsle, Kenneth A.. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kupchan, Charles. 1994. The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Lake, David. 1988. Power, Protection and Free Trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Legro, Jeffrey W. 1994. “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation.” International Security 18:108–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Legro, Jeffrey W. 1995a. Cooperation Under Fire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Legro, Jeffrey W. 1995b. “Which Norms Matter?: Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism in World War II.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.Google Scholar
Levitt, Barbara, and March, James G.. 1988. “Organizational Learning.” Annual Review of Sociology 14:319–40.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack S. “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914.” International Security 15:151–87.Google Scholar
Lipson, Charles. 1985. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” World Politics 38:1–23.Google Scholar
Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Maoz, Zeev, and Russett, Bruce. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986.” American Political Science Review 87:624–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 1992. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Mearsheimer, John. 1994/1995. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19:5–49.Google Scholar
Miller, Benjamin. 1992. “Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management.” World Politics 45:17–26.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen. 1988. Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses.” World Politics 44:466–96.Google Scholar
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1992. “Liberalism and International Relations Theory.” Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series No. 92-6. Cambridge: Harvard University.Google Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1988. “Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics.” World Politics 41:75–97.Google Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining.” American Journal of Political Science 33:941–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murray, Williamson. 1980. “British and German Air Doctrine between the Wars.” Air University Review 31:39–57.Google Scholar
Murray, Williamson. 1985. The Luftwaffe. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America.Google Scholar
Murray, Williamson. 1992. “The Influence of Pre-War Anglo-American Doctrine on the Air Campaigns of the Second World War.” In The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War, ed. Boog, Horst. New York: Berg.Google Scholar
Nau, Henry R. 1993. “Identity and International Politics: An Alternative to Neorealism.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
Ouchi, William G., and Wilkins, Alan L.. 1985. “Organizational Culture.” Annual Review of Sociology 11:457–83.Google Scholar
Oye, Kenneth A., ed. 1986. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oye, Kenneth A. 1992. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Pedersen, Jesper S., and Sorenson, Jesper S.. 1989. Organisation Cultures in Theory and Practice. Aldershot, UK: Gower.Google Scholar
Posen, Barry. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Posen, Barry. 1991. Inadvertent War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Problem of Credibility. Cambridge: the University Press.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1991. “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.” American Political Science Review 85:1303–21.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 48:313–34.Google Scholar
Powers, Barry D. 1976. Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914–1939. London: Croom Helm.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42:427–60.Google Scholar
Quester, George. 1966. Deterrence Before Hiroshima. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Rhodes, Edward. 1994. “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?” World Politics 47:1–41.Google Scholar
Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Rosen, Stephen Peter. 1991. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Rosen, Stephen Peter. 1995. “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters.” International Security 19:5–31.Google Scholar
Ruggie, John G. 1982. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36:379–415.Google Scholar
Russett, Bruce. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schein, Edward. 1985. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sigal, Leon. 1988. Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, Malcolm. 1984. British Air Strategy Between the Wars. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Snidal, Duncan. 1986. “The Game Theory of International Politics.” In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Kenneth A.. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, Jack. 1984. The Ideology of the Offensive. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, Jack. 1991. Myths of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Spaight, J. M. 1947. Air Power and War Rights. 3d ed. London: Longmans, Green.Google Scholar
Stein, Arthur A. 1990. Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Stigler, George J., and Becker, Gary S.. 1977. “DeGustibus Non Est Disputandum.” American Economic Review 67:76–90.Google Scholar
Terraine, John. 1985. The Right of Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1934–1945. London: Hodder and Stroughton.Google Scholar
Tilly, Charles. 1984. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
Travers, Tim. 1987. The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918. London: Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Tress, Harvey B. 1988. British Strategic Bombing Policy through 1940: Politics, Attitudes, and the Formation of a Lasting Pattern. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1962. “Economic Imperialism.” In The Theory of Public Choice, ed. Buchanan, James M. and Tollison, Robert D.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. “Causes of War.” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
Van Evera, Stephen. 1986. “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914.” In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Kenneth A.. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Verba, Sidney. 1961. “Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System.” World Politics 14:93–117.Google Scholar
Völker, Karl-Heinz, ed. 1968. Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der Deutschen Luftwaffe. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt.Google Scholar
Wagner, R. H. 1991. “Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First.” American Political Science Review 85:727–50.Google Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security 18:44–79.Google Scholar
Wark, Wesley. 1985. The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Webster, Charles, and Frankland, Noble. 1961. The Strategic Air Offensive, 1939–1945. London: HMSO.Google Scholar
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46:391–425.Google Scholar
Wendt, Alexander. 1994. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” American Political Science Review 88:384–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Zisk, Kimberly Marten. 1993. Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.