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Constitutional Law in 1951–1952

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

David Fellman
David Fellman
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
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Extract

The 1951 Term of the Supreme Court, during which there was no change in its makeup, continued to exhibit the behavior pattern of the previous Term, both in the mechanics of operation and the drift of decision. The work of the Truman Court is a compound of new Justices and the shifting concatenation of historical forces. It operates amidst the strains and tensions of the Cold War. The leading cases of this Term, dealing with such subjects as presidential seizure of private property, the treatment of aliens, by-products of the trials of Communists, and the pressure on civil liberties generally, all reflect the push of current history.

The total number of dispositions during the 1951 Term, 1207, was almost the same as the number for the 1950 Term, which was 1202. There were only 83 signed opinions, as compared with 98 in the 1950 Term and 87 in the 1949 Term. Twenty-five years ago the number of signed opinions averaged around 200 per Term. The reduction in the number of signed opinions was matched by a growing number of dispositions on the merits by memorandum order. The Court disposed of 200 cases on the merits; 101 came up by appeal (in about equal numbers from the federal district courts and the state courts) and 99 reached the Court on certiorari (72 from the federal Courts of Appeals, 24 from state courts, and 2 from the Court of Claims). The Court continued to keep a tight rein on its discretionary jurisdiction.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 1953 , pp. 126 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1953

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References

1 Several books in the public law field which were published during the period under review are worth noting: Cahill, Fred V. Jr., Judicial Legislation (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Dilliard, Irving, ed., The Spirit of Liberty—Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Bauer, Elizabeth Kelley, Commentaries on the Constitution, 1790–1860 (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Smith, Franklin A., Judicial Review of Legislation in New York, 1906–1938 (New York, 1952)Google Scholar. Other titles on specialized subjects are cited later. For sketches of former Justices see: Mason, Alpheus T., “Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61, pp. 791–817 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Powell, Thomas Reed, “Charles Evans Hughes”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, pp. 161–72 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hickman, Martin B., “Mr. Justice Holmes: A Reappraisal”, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, pp. 66–83 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mosher, Lester E., “Mr. Justice Rutledge's Philosophy of the Commerce Clause”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 27, pp. 218–47 (1952)Google Scholar.

2 See Jackson, Robert H., “Advocacy before the Supreme Court”, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 1–16 (1951)Google Scholar.

3 Harper, Fowler V. and Rosenthal, A. S., “What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term—An Appraisal of Certiorari”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 99, pp. 293–325 (1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harper and Edwin D. Etherington, “What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1950 Term,” ibid., Vol. 100, pp. 354–409 (1951).

4 E.g., United States v. Kelly, 342 U.S. 193 (1952); Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952).

5 E.g., Remington v. United States, 343 U.S. 907 (1952) (propriety of the government's withholding from the defendant knowledge of the fact that the foreman of the grand jury was the financial and literary collaborator of the chief prosecution witness in a book publishing venture the success of which required a true bill); Koehler v. United States, 342 U.S. 852 (1951) (how federal judges should instruct juries in cases involving criminal prosecutions for violation of federally-guaranteed rights); Land v. Dollar, certiorari denied, 340 U.S. 884 (1950), motion for leave to ask for reconsideration of the denial continued on the docket, 343 U.S. 973 (1952). The case was finally settled out of court in June, 1952. See Note, “The Dollar Litigation: A Study in Sovereign Immunity”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 466–78 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 937 (1952).

7 342 U.S. 288 (1952).

8 United States v. Jordan, 342 U.S. 911 (1952).

9 That the new and more restrictive Rule 27(9) relating to the submission of amicus briefs, 338 U.S. 959, is not working to everyone's satisfaction is suggested by Justice Frankfurter's memorandum in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952). For a discussion of the new rule see Stern, Robert L. and Gressman, Eugene, Supreme Court Practice (Washington, D. C., 1950), pp. 295–97Google Scholar.

10 343 U.S. 579.

11 See Richberg, Donald R., “The Steel Seizure Cases”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, pp. 713–27 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wilmerding, Lucius Jr., “The President and the Law”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, pp. 321–38 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Williams, Arthur M. Jr., “The Impact of the Steel Seizures upon the Theory of Inherent Sovereign Powers of the Federal Government”, South Carolina Law Quarterly, Vol. 5, pp. 5–32 (1952)Google Scholar; Schwartz, Bernard, “Inherent Executive Power and the Steel Seizure Case”, Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 30, pp. 466–82 (1952)Google Scholar; Murphy, Jay W., “Some Observations on the Steel Decision”, Alabama Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 214–31 (1952)Google Scholar.

12 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

13 103 F. Supp. 569.

14 197 F. 2d 582.

15 Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 937 (1952).

16 28 U.S.C.A. §1254(1).

17 This happened, for example, in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

18 The government's position on these points of equity law was not mere declamation. See Freund, Paul A., “The Year of the Steel Case”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 66, pp. 89–95 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

20 191 F. 2d 450 (1951).

21 See Knauff, Ellen Raphael, The Ellen Knauff Story (New York, 1952)Google Scholar.

22 342 U.S. 580 (1952).

23 Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).

24 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

25 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

26 342 U.S. 524 (1952).

27 343 U.S. 169 (1952).

28 99 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Calif. 1951).

29 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

30 342 U.S. 308 (1952).

31 He relied upon Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942); The Venus, 8 Cranch 253 (1814).

32 Quoted from United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926). He also leaned heavily on Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) and Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110 (1814).

33 342 U.S. 76 (1951).

34 See Roche, John P., “Pre-Statutory Denaturalization”, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 35, pp. 120–37 (1949)Google Scholar.

35 Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).

36 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

37 See Desmond, Charles E., “Bail—Ancient and Modern”, Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 1, pp. 245–48 (1952)Google Scholar.

38 Rule 46(c). “AMOUNT. If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the presence of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”

39 Maximum penalties under the Smith Act are five years in jail and a fine of $10,000.

40 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). See Westin, Alan F., “The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 165–208 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fraenkel, Osmond K., “The Fourth Amendment and the Federal Courts”, Lawyers Guild Review, Vol. 12, pp. 73–77 (1952)Google Scholar; Yankwich, Leon R., “The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations”, Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 27, pp. 499–528 (1952)Google Scholar; Fairfield, William S. and Clift, Charles, “The Wiretappers”, The Reporter, Vol. 7, 12 23, 1952, pp. 8–22Google Scholar; Vol. 8, January 6, 1953, pp. 9–20.

41 He cited McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927) as authority for the proposition that the fiction of trespass ab initio is a rule of liability in civil actions only, and Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), to show that extension of the fiction is not favored.

42 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Said Chief Justice Taft: “There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry….” Justice Holmes said in dissent: “… For my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part….” Said Justice Brandeis, dissenting also: “Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law….”

43 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). This case held that a confession should be excluded if made during a period of unlawful detention in violation of a federal statute requiring prompt arraignment.

44 See Donnelly, Richard C., “Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 60, pp, 1091–1131 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 342 U.S. 48 (1951).

46 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).

47 342 U.S. 36 (1951).

48 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). See Chafee, Zechariah Jr., “The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution”, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 32, pp. 143–61 (1952)Google Scholar; Collings, Rex A. Jr., “Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?”, California Law Review, Vol. 40, pp. 335–61 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148 (1952).

50 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).

51 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).

52 Reliance was had on Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) and related cases.

53 Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).

54 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).

55 343 U.S. 768 (1952). See Note, “Duty of Union to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 490–502 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

57 Gressman, Eugene, “The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 50, pp. 1323–58 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Hoover, John Edgar, “Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 175–95 (1952)Google Scholar.

58 342 U.S. 117 (1951).

59 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

60 Justice Douglas, dissenting alone, noted that he had dissented, along with Justices Murphy and Rutledge, in the Wolf case. He said: “To hold first that the evidence may be admitted and second that its use may not be enjoined is to make the Fourth Amendment an empty and hollow guarantee so far as state prosecutions are concerned.”

61 343 U.S. 130 (1952).

62 Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).

63 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). See Comment, “Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61, pp. 948–1009 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952).

65 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U.S. 414 (1952). Two Justices dissented on the theory that this case should be approached as an antitrust problem, and that by merely regulating, the Commission is actually condoning a violation of the Sherman Act.

66 New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882 (1951). Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the ICC hadn't supplied an adequate basis for its decision, since all it did, so he argued, was to make findings that the interstate rates were reasonable, and then fix the intrastate rates at the same level. It made no findings as to what would constitute a fair proportion of the railroad's total income for intrastate traffic; there was no finding as to the necessary relation between interstate and intrastate commutation rates. He warned against over-reliance upon expertise; it is “the strength of modern government,” but it “can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.”

67 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). It was pointed out that American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) involved a conspiracy in the District of Columbia, and therefore presented no commerce issue. Three important cases in the commerce field not involving questions of constitutional law were: Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952), which approved a new approach of the Commission to the problem of curbing price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act; Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), in which, by a four-to-three vote, the Court expressed disapproval of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture, under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, relating to the marketing of milk in the Boston area by cooperative marketing associations; National Labor Relations Board v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), where by a six-to-three vote the inclusion of “management functions” clauses in bargaining agreements was held to be within the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act.

68 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

69 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). The Court had originally denied certiorari, 341 U.S. 952 (1951), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, but later reconsidered and granted it, 342 U.S. 858 (1951).

70 Citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).

71 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).

72 Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).

73 343 U.S. 341 (1952). See Smith, Louis, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago, 1951)Google Scholar.

74 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).

75 Musgrove v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E. 2d 26 (1948).

76 335 U.S. 900 (1949).

77 Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952).

78 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

79 Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952). Three Justices dissented without opinion. The Court's decision might conceivably encourage state appellate courts to dispose of cases raising federal questions without opinion.

80 Dixon v. Duffy, 342 U.S. 33 (1951).

81 Dixon v. Duffy, 343 U.S. 393 (1952).

82 Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 342 U.S. 35 (1951).

83 The phrase is Justice Rutledge's, in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947). For a brief discussion of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act and the events leading to its adoption, see Fellman, David, “The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts”, Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 31, at pp. 31–38 (1951)Google Scholar.

84 Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951). On the remand, the state court's decision was eminently satisfactory, People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E. 2d 824 (1952).

85 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See Note, “Motion Pictures and the First Amendment”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 60, pp. 696–719 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kupferman, Theodore R. and O'Brien, Philip J. Jr., “Motion Picture Censorship—The Memphis Blues”, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 36, pp. 273–300 (1951)Google Scholar; Inglis, Ruth A., Freedom of the Movies (Chicago, 1947)Google Scholar. For a discussion of the censor's trade see Alpert, Hollis, “Talks with a Movie Censor”, Saturday Review of Literature, 11 22, 1952, pp. 21, 50–54Google Scholar. For the background of the Burstyn case see Crowther, Bosley, “The Strange Case of ‘The Miracle’”, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 187, pp. 35–39 (1951)Google Scholar.

86 Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).

87 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The decision in the Burstyn case was fore shadowed by a dictum in the recent antitrust case, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), where Justice Douglas remarked that “we have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.”

88 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

89 In Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), a Texas decision upholding a municipal ordinance which authorized a board of censors to deny a license for the exhibition of any movie which in its opinion was “of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people” was reversed per curiam and without opinion, on the authority of the Burstyn case and Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Justice Frankfurter filed a brief statement to point up the fact that the statute violated due process on account of indefiniteness, and Justice Douglas concurred separately to emphasize the evil of prior restraint, here in “flagrant form.”

90 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

91 On this subject see Chafee, Zechariah Jr., Government and Mass Communications (Chicago, 1947), Vol. IGoogle Scholar, Chap. 5; Note, “Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts to Combat Hate Propaganda”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61, pp. 252–64 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For articles on free speech problems published during the 1951 Term see: Corwin, Edward S., “Bowing Out ‘Clear and Present Danger’”, Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 27, pp. 325–59 (1952)Google Scholar; Boudin, Louis B., “‘Seditious Doctrines’ and the ‘Clear and Present Danger’ Rule”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, pp. 143–86, 315–56 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richardson, Elliot L., “Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 1–54 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mendelson, Wallace, “Clear and Present Danger—from Shenck to Dennis”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 313–33 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bernard, Burton C., “Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the U. S. Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 50, pp. 261–96 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, “Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 521–34 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daykin, Walter L., “The Employers' Right of Free Speech under the Taft-Hartley Act”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 212–41 (1952)Google Scholar. See also Chafee, Zechariah Jr., Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech (New York, 1952)Google Scholar.

92 The well-known case of State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 Atl. 2d 877 (1941) was distinguished on the ground that it did not involve a case of libel at all, and dealt with quite a different statute.

93 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See Gellhorn, Walter, ed., The States and Subversion (Ithaca, 1952)Google Scholar. See also Chamberlain, Lawrence H., Loyalty and Legislative Action (Ithaca, 1951)Google Scholar, which deals only with the New York experience; Jahoda, Marie and Cook, Stuart W., “Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61, pp. 295–333 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fraenkel, Osmond K., “Law and Loyalty”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 153–74 (1952)Google Scholar.

94 Citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

95 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

96 343 U.S. 306 (1952). On this general subject see: Reed, George E., “Church-State and the Zorach Case”, Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 37, pp. 529–51 (1952)Google Scholar; Pfeffer, Leo, “Church and State: Something Less Than Separation”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 19, pp. 1–29 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O'Neill, J. M., Catholicism and American Freedom (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Howe, Mark De Wolfe, Cases on Church and State in the United States (Cambridge, 1952)Google Scholar; Boyer, William W. Jr., “Public Transportation of Parochial School Pupils”, Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1952, pp. 64–90Google Scholar.

97 Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951).

98 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

99 Query: What business does any American public school have to read or study anything that cannot be commented on?

100 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

101 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See Note, “Illegal Abductions by State Police: Sanctions for Evasion of Extradition”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61, pp. 445–50 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 119 U.S. 436 (1886). To the same effect was Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888).

103 160 U.8. 469, 484.

104 343 U.S. 790 (1952).

105 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See Imlay, Carl H., “The Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule”, Miami Law Quarterly, Vol. 6, pp. 147–61 (1952)Google Scholar.

106 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). The Stroble case also involved the issue of trial by newspapers; on the facts the Court concluded that the defendant had a fair trial. See Note, “Due Process for Whom—News paper or Defendant”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 101–11 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, “Freedom of the Press—A Menace to Justice”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 249–61 (1952)Google Scholar.

107 342 U.S. 134 (1951).

108 Four Justices refused to believe that the trial court would have accepted the plea of a mental defective.

109 Foulke v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951).

110 334 U.S. 736 (1948).

111 For other publications dealing with civil liberties problems see: Carr, Robert K., The House Committee on Un-American Activities (Ithaca, 1952)Google Scholar; Emerson, Thomas I. and Haber, David, Political and Civil Rights in the United States (Buffalo, 1952)Google Scholar; American Jewish Congress and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Civil Rights in the United States in 1951 (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Berger, Morroe, Equality by Statute (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Hyman, Jacob D., “Judicial Standards for the Protection of Basic Freedoms”, Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 1, pp. 221–44 (1952)Google Scholar; Brodie, Sydney, “The Federally-Secured Right to be Free from Bondage”, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 40, pp. 367–98 (1952)Google Scholar; Harris, Whitney R., “Freedom and Businessmen”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 196–211 (1952)Google Scholar; Comment, “Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61, pp. 171–204 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ransmeier, Joseph S., “The Fourteenth Amendment and the ‘Separate but Equal’ Doctrine”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 50, pp. 203–60 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hobbs, E. H., “Negro Education and the Equal Protection of the Laws”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 14, pp. 488–511 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Antieau, Chester James, “Equal Protection Outside the Clause”, California Law Review, Vol. 40, pp. 362–77 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rice, Pamela H. and Greenberg, Milton, “Municipal Protection of Human Rights”, Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1952, pp. 679–710Google Scholar.

112 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).

113 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).

114 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).

115 343 U.S. 214 (1952). See Richer, Joe, “Ray v. Blair—Its Political and Legal Significance”, Alabama Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 248–83 (1952)Google Scholar.

116 342 U.S. 421 (1952).

117 Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952).

118 Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).

119 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887). The rule was reconsidered and reaffirmed in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).

120 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).

121 Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).

122 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

123 Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).

124 Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951). See Griswold, Erwin N., “Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees—A Comparative Study”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 193–233 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

125 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).

126 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

127 First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).

128 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

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