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Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Gary J. Miller  and
Terry M. Moe
Gary J. Miller
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
Terry M. Moe
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract

Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures, subject to cost and demand constraints. However, theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget-maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super-optimal levels of production, nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation. In this bargaining model, the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget-maximizing bureaucrats, but the legislature's decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 77 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 297 - 322
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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