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Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Cheryl L. Eavey  and
Gary J. Miller
Cheryl L. Eavey
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Gary J. Miller
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Abstract

Niskanen's economic model of bureaucratic behavior assumes that bureaucratic agenda control allows the bureau to impose upon a passive legislature its most preferred alternative from among the set of alternatives that dominate the status quo. But does a monopoly on the agenda give bureaus this degree of influence over a voting body? This article reports on experiments that demonstrate that a monopoly on the agenda puts the agenda monopolist in a position to bargain with a voting body, without being able to impose his or her most preferred alternative on that body. This evidence supports theories of bureaucratic-legislative bargaining at the expense of theories of bureaucratic imposition.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 78 , Issue 3 , December 1983 , pp. 719 - 733
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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