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Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Allan P. Sindler
Allan P. Sindler
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Extract

As the panacea for their political ills, Southern states frequently have been counseled to develop competitive two-party systems. Presumably the very demonstration of the superiority of the bipartisan system in itself would go a long way toward achieving that desideratum. Not the least of the unhappy consequences of this uncritical approach was the accompanying tendency to lump non-two-party Southern states into the single category of “the one-party South.” Fortunately, the rich diversity of Southern political processes recently has been uncovered and subjected to systematic analysis. For those states of the South which lack an effective opposition party, it has been shown that Democratic politics runs the gamut from multifactional chaos to a structured and disciplined bifactionalism. Louisiana is properly classified in the latter camp, which attests to at least some beneficial by-products of charismatic demagogy. In the absence of any reasonable expectation of the imminent rejuvenation of the Republican party in Louisiana, a realistic appraisal of the state's politics must eschew exhortation and concentrate upon an empirical examination of the operation of Democratic bifactionalism.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 1955 , pp. 641 - 662
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1955

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References

1 Key, V. O. Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 1949)Google Scholar, has been of considerable methodological and substantive value to the writer in this study. Although the analysis here in part disagrees with some of Key's findings on Louisiana (and corroborates some of his findings also), this paper aims generally at extending the analysis of Louisiana bifactionalism deeper and further than Key's broader concern with many Southern states permitted him to do.

2 See Shugg, R. W., Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana, 1840–1875 (Baton Rouge, 1939)Google Scholar, for an able interpretation and documentation of this theme.

3 For statistical verification of this fact consult Key, , Southern Politics, pp. 523–24Google Scholar.

4 Key, p. 178, cites Calcasieu parish, containing Lake Charles, as an apparent exception to the urban pattern of anti-Longism. An examination of the ward data, however, eliminates the exception. Ward 3 of Calcasieu, in which Lake Charles is located, fell in the third quartile (quarter) of support for Huey Long in 1928 and for Longite candidate Spaht in 1952, and in the fourth (lowest) quartile of support for Earl Long in the 1940 and 1944 runoff primaries and for Russell Long in the 1948 senatorial primary.

5 The major urban parishes of Orleans, East Baton Rouge, Caddo, and Jefferson and the bossed parishes of Plaquemines and St. Bernard have been omitted. In addition, the seats of the following parishes were not incorporated areas and therefore were omitted: St. Charles, St. James, St. John, Cameron, and Livingston.

6 Key, p. 173.

7 Using parish voting data and a somewhat different statistical technique, Key, pp. 174–75, also concluded that Jones secured the bulk of Noe's first primary vote. Key's mistaken inference from that finding came from failing to probe further in the manner undertaken in the text above.

8 Key, p. 174, footnote 34, noted James H. Morrison's inability to deliver his following, but implied that the exception of Morrison helped prove the general rule of transferable followings by resorting to the following speculation: “… Morrison's 1948 vote consisted in considerable measure, not of his own following, but of support from the New Orleans ‘Old Regular’ organization, which further analysis would probably show was able in the second primary to deliver its vote against Jones, the ally of deLesseps Morrison, mayor of New Orleans and foe of the ‘Old Regulars’.” While the Orleans vote for Morrison behaved in the second primary as Key predicted, the fact remains that two-thirds of Morrison's vote (68,502 of 101,754 votes) came from parishes other than Orleans. It should be noted that Table V consists entirely of non-Orleans wards, the voting behavior of which provided the finding that Morrison's first primary vote was distributed four-to-one for Earl Long in the runoff. Because of the dominant influence of the Old Regulars in city politics, no wards from New Orleans have been included in any of the tables in this paper.

9 It would be relevant to note that reputed “personal leadership” virtually vanishes when the leader himself is not a candidate: e.g., in the 1952 first gubernatorial primary, while non-candidate James Morrison stumped for reform candidate Hale Boggs, the Florida parishes went overwhelmingly for reform candidate Robert Kennon.

10 A police jury is the governing body of a Louisiana parish (county).

11 The analysis is based, for the most part, on an extensive questionnaire, interview, and research project on the ticket aspects of the 1948 and 1952 gubernatorial primaries undertaken by the writer.

12 Key, p. 170.

13 Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1950, Title 18, Chapter 2, Sections 340, 357, 358. Poll commissioners were particularly useful to candidates because they were entitled to assist illiterate voters (now forbidden by Act 309 of 1952) and physically disabled voters in the polling booth. The system forced gubernatorial candidates, in order to secure fair representation of election-day personnel in the first primary, to make overtures to local candidates who controlled the selection of such personnel. The significance of this power may be gauged by the following form letter issued under the name of Earl Long and dated January …, 1940: “Dear Mr. ….: I am glad to note that you were drawn as an Election Commissioner, I am sure that you realize the heavy responsibility that rests on your shoulders. Anything that you can do to see that I get a square deal in this election will be appreciated and remembered. If I can render you any assistance, do not hesitate to call on me.”—Wisdom Collection of Long Materials, Howard Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans.

14 Most, though not all, of the parishes in which legislative candidates aligned with a state ticket in 1952 had a firm tradition of local tickets. The sheriff usually heads a local ticket, and its rationale again lies in the practical benefits accruing to each of the participants.

15 The author's data indicate some exceptions: Union, Catahoula, Rapides, St. Helena, and Livingston parishes had both public local tickets and open local candidate alignment in either or both 1948 and 1952.

16 An informant related that in the 1952 runoff primary Kennon headquarters in Shreveport would suggest to the inquiring voter support of designated candidates for the state legislature none of whom had affiliated publicly with the Kennon ticket.

17 Pointe Coupee Banner, Nov. 21, 1935.

18 Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), Jan. 16, 1944Google Scholar.

19 Daily Iberian (New Iberia), Feb. 23, 1948Google Scholar.

20 Political circular in Conway Scrapbook of Huey Long Materials, Vol. 7, p. 95, Louisiana State Library, Baton Rouge.

21 State-Times (Baton Rouge), Jan. 12, 1940Google Scholar.

22 For example, according to information received by the author in Rapides parish in the 1952 primary, Boggs, Kennon, and McLemore (all anti-Long gubernatorial candidates) jointly and secretly backed three candidates for the House. Two of them made the runoff, and then were endorsed openly by Kennon.

23 So strong was La Vieille Faction's grip upon the parish that the quadrennial appearance of a rival slate was held to be motivated by the desire to control parish patronage in the event the anti-Longs should capture the governorship. If true, here would be a Democratic factional analogy to the role of the Louisiana Republican party prior to 1952.

24 Key, p. 169. Key is correct in pointing out that Louisiana's bifactionalism fails to approximate, in absolute terms, a bipartisan scheme.

25 For a full analysis, see Heberle, Rudolf and Howard, Perry H., “An Ecological Analysis of Political Tendencies in Louisiana: The Presidential Elections of 1952,” Social Forces, Vol. 32, pp. 344–50 (May, 1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26 One finding from the data collected by the author bears directly on this point. In spite of the high degree of non-performance and even double-dealing engaged in by many of the parish candidates who affiliate with a state ticket, in only one case was an affiliate termed a factional deserter. In the situation referred to, a legislative candidate from a south Louisiana parish supported Longite Spaht in the first primary in 1952, made the runoff primary, and then “flopped” (as my informant put it) to support Kennon against Spaht in the gubernatorial runoff. Both the legislative candidate and Kennon failed to carry the parish.

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