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The Bicameral System in State Legislation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

James D. Barnett
James D. Barnett
Affiliation:
University of Oregon
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Extract

The submission of proposals for the abolition of the state senate to the people of Oregon at the two preceding general elections is occasion for a summary of considerations in reference to the bicameral system of legislation.

The bicameral system has been so long and so widely prevalent that until very recently its “necessity” has been almost universally regarded as “a demonstrated truth.” The British legislature, “the mother of parliaments,” is a development from the assembly of “estates.” Five distinct “estates” were present in the “Model Parliament” of 1295, but through the consolidation of interests, the organization of two legislative chambers, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, was soon evolved. The origin of the bicameral system was thus “not owing to any conviction that two houses would work better than either one or three, but was a matter of sheer accident,” and was not “the invention of any clever constitution-maker.” The bicameral system of legislation, generally based upon English precedent, has usually followed the extension of constitutional government, and at present most national legislatures consist of two chambers.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , August 1915 , pp. 449 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1915

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References

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