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An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

James L. Perry  and
Charles H. Levine
James L. Perry
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
Charles H. Levine
Affiliation:
Syracuse University
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Abstract

Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.

From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 70 , Issue 4 , December 1976 , pp. 1185 - 1201
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1976

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References

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63 An appendix containing the cases analyzed, the affiliations of the employee groups, and the year in which negotiations were conducted is available upon request from the authors.

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65 The content of the demands would have been extremely useful for further analysis, but the lack of uniformity in maintaining these as records within organizations and the often sensitive nature of their content militated against obtaining them.

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