No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
The disintegration of due process of law was somewhat advanced prior to October, 1937, as a result of judicial reversals of opinions on price-fixing and minimum wage legislation. As the process of transformation continued, it took four major forms. They were: (1) the withdrawal of substantive due process as a limitation on social legislation, taxation, rate-making, and regulatory action generally; (2) an expansion of substantive due process in cases involving freedom of expression, assembly, and religion, including rights of labor through the application of new concepts of freedom of speech; (3) the curtailment of procedural due process as a limit on administrative action except in cases involving the deportation of aliens; and (4) the use of procedural due process in such a way as to provide greater protection on the whole to persons accused of crime. This transformation has been accompanied by changed assumptions which accommodate governmental activity.
Thus, on the assumption that so long as one is free to possess the fruits of agricultural production there is no denial of due process of law, the Court has sustained rigid restrictions on the marketing of agricultural products even when retroactively imposed and when the quotas were so applied as to include the wheat produced by a farmer for his domestic consumption. On a further assumption that since Congress has the power to decide the issue of the advantages and disadvantages of holding companies, the Court not only sustained the Public Utility Holding Company Act, but in so doing asserted that the judiciary could not question the propriety of Congress' decision.
1 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
2 This phase of due process is treated in the portion of this symposium dealing with civil liberties. See pp. 42–52 below.
3 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939).
4 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942). See also United States v. Rock Royal Coöperative, 307 U. S. 533 (1939). With the Tenth Amendment out as a limitation on federal power, the Court has been forced to consider national legislation within the context of substantive due process. No national legislation has been invalidated on this ground since 1936.
5 North American Co. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 327 U. S. 686, 710 (1946).
6 See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80, 83 (1946).
7 310 U. S. 573 (1940); 311 U. S. 570 (1941).
8 310 U. S. 573, 581.
9 Ibid., 581.
10 Ibid., 581–582.
11 Ibid., 583.
12 Ibid., 584.
13 311 U. S. 570, 576–577. The dissenters in both cases preferred adherence to Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation, 300 U. S. 55 (1937), which, they correctly said, was contrary to these decisions. 310 U. S. 573, 584–585.
14 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
15 315 U. S. 575 (1942).
16 Ibid., 589.
17 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
18 Ibid., 602.
19 United Railways and Electric Co. v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 253–259 (1930); 310 U. S. 606–607. The Hope case makes a constitutional statute the controlling influence in rate-making. For example, Justice Douglas says: “Since there are no constitutional requirements more exacting than the standards of the Act, a rate order which conforms to the latter does not run afoul of the former.”
20 320 U. S. 625.
21 Ibid., 619.
22 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
23 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939); Graves v. Schmiddlapp, 315 U. S. 657 (1942), reversing Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567 (1926).
24 State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 181–182.
25 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
26 Wisconsin v. J. C Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1941).
27 Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport, 91 Law. Ed. Adv. Ops. 1274 (1947).
28 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1943). The tax was sustained even though the company had paid taxes on some portion of its fleet to other states, but the question of the validity of taxation in other states was held not to be before the Court.
29 310 U. S. 53 (1940).
30 Ibid., 63.
31 Ibid., 66.
32 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
33 297 U. S. 135 (1936).
34 N. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940).
35 Hirabayashi v. United States., 320 U. S. 81, 100, 101 (1943).
36 323 U. S. 214 (1945).
37 Ibid., 220.
38 Ibid., 235.
39 Ibid., 244. For an excellent analysis of the war power, see Corwin, Edward S., Total War and the Constitution (New York, 1946).Google Scholar
40 327 U. S. 1 (1946).
41 327 U. S. 1, 13.
42 Ibid., 23. See the dissents of Justices Murphy and Rutledge, pp. 26–28 and 79, respectively.
43 Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 437–438 (1944).
44 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 519 (1944).
45 321 U. S. 414.
46 Ibid., 433.
47 Ibid., 434–435.
48 Ibid., 444.
49 Ibid., 446–447.
50 Ibid., 458. See especially Justice Rutledge's dissent at pp. 472–473, 483.
51 18 How. 272 (1855).
52 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
53 See, for example, the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
54 307 U. S. 183 (1939).
55 Ibid., 183, 191.
56 Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938); Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 697 (1945).
57 Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Ry. Co., 305 U. S. 177 (1938); Gray v. Powell, 314 U. 8. 402 (1941); Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944); Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388 (1938); Driscoll v. Edison Electric Light and Power Co., 307 U. S. 104 (1939); Railroad Commission v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940); 311 U. S. 570 (1941); Fahey v. Mallonee, 91 Law. Ed. Adv. Ops. 1574 (1947).
58 Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 411 (1941); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Ry. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 182, 185, 187 (1938).
59 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
60 See the dissent of Chief Justice Stone. For judicial review of Selective Service administration, see Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 459 (1944); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
61 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
62 See, e.g., Avery v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 444 (1940); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942).
63 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
64 Ibid., 455, 462.
65 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945). See also Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946).
66 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
67 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
68 See especially Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). For other cases reversing convictions obtained on coerced confessions, see White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); see also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941), where a plea of guilt obtained by a trick was held a denial of due process. For federal cases, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). For cases where the conviction has been sustained on the finding that confessions were voluntary, see Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); and Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
69 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602.
70 91 Law. Ed. Adv. Ops. 1464 (1947).
71 Ibid., 1464, 1472.
72 Ibid., 1470.
73 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
74 91 Law. Ed. Adv. Ops. 1476.
75 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
76 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
77 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
78 Ibid., 103.
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.