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Sovereignty and Social Dynamics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Douglas W. Campbell
Douglas W. Campbell
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Extract

The ceaseless struggle of opposing ideas is the historical continuum of political theory. However concrete the situation which launches a particular conflict, all too often the struggle of ideas continues long after the objective scene of the conflict has moved on to quite different fields, long after new problems have outmoded old solutions, and long after new ways of thinking should have revised or displaced old concepts. This intellectual problem of continuity of ideas and of modes of thought is, of course, no more than the reflection of the larger issue of the liberation of human society from the “dead hand of the past.” The solution of this problem is no easy one, entailing as it does careful discrimination and emphasis upon the quality of “deadness,” but many reasoned attempts are being made toward this end.

The forms which these attempts are taking in the field of political theory (including the concept of sovereignty, which is the subject of this paper) and of political science in general are several. We have had an increasing, and productive, “realistic presentation of the facts of the governmental process” which has served to deflate such overweening concepts as that of sovereignty.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 28 , Issue 5 , October 1934 , pp. 825 - 837
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1934

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References

1 One need only mention the variations in scientific method shown in routine laboratory tests, in research, and in the relation of the minds of such men as Eddington and Einstein to their scientific work. In the application of the scientific method to social studies, we have an analogous situation—a similar gradation from a routine process, which utilizes dominantly a more or less complete and mechanical method, to that which is forced to depend to a large extent upon the apparatus and method of a scientifically trained mind.

2 An incidental benefit that might be expected from this broad and more accurate definition of “scientific method,” not narrowed to a particular process or to a particular subject, might be a more general realization that many a physical scientist is a scientist “in but a fraction of himself,” and is thoroughly unscientific in his social attitudes.

3 An excellent example of the problem of objectivity in the field of social studies and functions is to be found in the discussion and controversy over the nature of the judicial process. The principle involved in this effort is contained in a statement by Holmes, Justice: “What proximate test of excellence can be found except correspondence to the actual equilibrium of forces in the community—that is, conformity to the wishes of the dominant power? … Hence, the true science of law consists in the establishment of its postulates from within upon accurately measured social desires.” Collected Legal Papers, pp. 224–226Google Scholar.

4 Ward, P. W., Sovereignty (London, 1928), p. 169Google Scholar.

5 The dilemma and untenability of Laski's position is seen in his Grammar of Politics (London, 1925)Google Scholar, in which he attacks the theory of sovereignty as though to banish it permanently, only to find it necessary to re-introduce the concept as a part of his positive political system.

6 An article by ProfessorDickinson, (“A Working Theory of Sovereignty,” Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1927, and Mar., 1928)Google Scholar is a juristic interpretation taken as the primary basis and point of departure for the present one, since it seems to the writer to represent one of the clearest, most scientific, and most concise discussions of the present problem of sovereignty; and it shows clearly where the analysis of the concept was stopped. The problem could be approached equally well by a similar use of such a view as that of Laski. Our analysis and the concept arrived at would be the same in both cases, although the points of view of these two men are fundamentally opposites. These two approaches to the subject are mentioned only as representative of the recent discussions of the problem of sovereignty, and they do not exhaust the specific points of view to be found in these discussions. Other names might be added, such as those of Duguit and MacIver. The present author owes much stimulation to the point ol view presented in MacIver's The Modern State, although he does not find the treatment of sovereignty adequate.

7 Dickinson, , in Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1927, p. 525Google Scholar.

8 As is clear, the remote consequences in most cases cannot be dealt with in or by one narrow field of the social sciences, and hence the social sciences can never deal adequately with their problems so long as there is so much narrow specialization and provincialism within the field.

9 It is true that social relations elude or escape both classification and control because of their complexity and because of their basis in individual and social psychology. But unless our social scientists are ready to carry scientific study and the scientific method as far as it will go and stop there until it is possible to go further, it is futile to hope for as much social advance as is objectively possible; and it is equally futile to expect much of the scientific and rational analysis of alternatives from the man in the street.

10 His definition: “Political sovereignty has reference to the forces, or rather to some of the forces, which operate on the juristic sovereign …” His point seems to depend upon an extremely narrow definition of “political”; for he follows the above-quoted sentence thus: “For after all, the political motive, i.e., the fear of not being reëlected, is but one of a number of factors which may and probably will influence the minds which compose the sovereign organ when they set about to define the law.” (No italics in the original.) Dickinson, op. cit., p. 533.

11 Op. cit., p. 532, footnote. It is interesting to note that the qualifying adjectives themselves have introduced the civil war which has beset the concept.

12 Dickinson, op. cit., p. 533.

13 The latter factor, the political system, needs special mention because even without the limitations resulting from the social and economic system, the very fact that some people are and some are not officials in the mechanics of the political system itself gives political functionaries a superior position.

14 It is hardly necessary to enumerate the myriad of conditioning factors—the underlying “social climate,” the clash of interests, such as big business, the war veterans, the farmers, etc.

15 For example, Rousseau ignored this factor; Bentham looked upon organization as mechanical and static and without effect upon principle other than that intended, and completely effective in that; and the movement toward written constitutions has combined the two errors.

16 Michels, R., Political Parties (London, 1915), p. 418Google Scholar. The book is a discussion of “the sociology of political parties,” and so concerns the very basis of democracy.

17 Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1932), p. 5Google Scholar.

18 Michels, op. cit., p. 26.

19 It is this same type of division whereby the political functionary as a part of juristic sovereignty enjoys “unlimited power,” but the same official as affected by political forces or political sovereignty is limited in his capacity to act.

20 The point need not be labored that the necessary specialization into different fields is a fact quite different from the chauvinism which leads each to claim complete independence of the others.

21 It is of prime importance to note that a broader definition of “political” is based upon that social function of organization which is inherently “political.” Actually, the narrow, nineteenth-century definition of “political” and “economic” has been long since abandoned, so far as our modern government is concerned, under pressure of new problems.

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