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The Private Production of Public Goods: Organizational Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert C. Lowry
Robert C. Lowry*
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Abstract

I reformulate Mancur Olson's by-product theory of collective action as a theory of resource allocation by interest group managers. I then test alternative hypotheses about managers' objectives drawn from exchange theory and commitment theory. Financial data for 16 environmental citizen groups show that the production of public goods is subsidized by other activities, and revenues from member dues are not affected by spending on public goods. Spending on selective incentives and information generates revenues but also may contribute to the pursuit of collective goals. Estimated marginal revenues from fund-raising and selective incentives show that environmental citizen group managers are not preoccupied with maximizing revenues. Rather, they seek to maximize either spending on public goods or net resources available for influencing public policy and the environment, subject to a budget constraint.

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Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 91 , Issue 2 , June 1997 , pp. 308 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1997

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