Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T19:03:05.544Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Jeffrey L. Pressman
Jeffrey L. Pressman*
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Observers of city politics have often stated that political leadership—usually mayoral leadership—is a crucial ingredient in a city's ability to deal with its problems. And studies of successful leaders in urban systems have led to the formulation of a model of the “political entrepreneur” who is adept at accumulating political resources and pyramiding them to gain increased influence. Based on four years of observation of politics in Oakland, California, this study suggests that successful mayoral leadership and resource-pyramiding may be limited by governmental structure, the personality of the mayor, and the nature of the political system.

In Oakland, fragmented institutional authority and the council-manager form of government have created obstacles for elected officials. A privately oriented, “nonpolitical” mayor has avoided publicity and has tended to underutilize, rather than pyramid, his resources. Finally, in an amorphous political system characterized by a lack of group and party activity, a mayor is denied both information and support. By examining the ways in which the performance of Oakland's mayor diverges from a model of political leadership, we can identify some of the factors that support or limit such leadership.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 66 , Issue 2 , June 1972 , pp. 511 - 524
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

This paper is based upon four years of participation in, and observation of, the mayor's office in Oakland. The research was conducted under the auspices of the Oakland Project at the University of California at Berkeley, headed by Aaron Wildavsky and funded by the Urban Institute. I would like to thank Professor Wildavsky. Robert Biller, William K. Muir, Jr., Bill Cavala, and Robert Nakamura for their comments.

References

1 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam, 1968), p. 298 Google Scholar.

2 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 299.

3 George, Alexander L., “Political Leadership and Social Change in American Cities,” Daedalus (Fall, 1968), p. 1197 Google Scholar.

4 George, p. 1197.

5 See Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 225–227, 308 Google Scholar; Banfield, Edward C., Political Influence (New York: Free Press, 1961), chap. 8 and pp. 17, 309, 312–313, 320–321 Google Scholar; Wildavsky, Aaron, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1964), pp. 244–245, 248 Google Scholar; Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright, From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 109 Google Scholar; and McFarland, Andrew S., Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 153–219 Google Scholar.

6 McFarland, p. 154.

7 Fred I. Greenstein has stated that the likelihood of personal impact on politics (1) increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring; (2) varies with the actor's location in the environment; and (3) varies with the personal strengths and weaknesses of the actor. See Greenstein, , “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,” American Political Science Review, 61 (09, 1967), 634 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Greenstein, personal variability is most likely to manifest itself in those fluid situations in which “political actors lack mental sets which might lead them to structure their perceptions and resolve ambiguities” (p. 638). In positions which are typically free from expectations of fixed content, personal variations will be more evident (p. 639). McFarland also notes the importance of an ambiguous environment; he sees leadership opportunities in “conflicting expectations among others about the person's behavior in a position.” McFarland, p. 203.

8 Census report cited in the Oakland Tribune, May 14, 1971.

9 See, for example, Survey Research Center, University of California, Poverty and Poverty Programs in Oakland (Berkeley, 1967)Google Scholar and Stanford Research Institute, Human Resources Development for Oakland: Problems and Policies (Menlo Park, Calif., 1968)Google Scholar.

10 Stanford Research Institute, p. 10.

11 Wilson, Woodrow, “The Study of Administration,” reprinted in Political Science Quarterly, 56 (12, 1941), 494 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Oakland City Charter, Sec. 207.

13 Oakland City Charter, Sec. 219.

14 For a description of the crucial role in policy making that can be played by a city attorney, see “The Cambridge City Manager” in Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book, ed. Stein, Harold (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1952)Google Scholar.

15 The Municipal Year Book, 1968, p. 54.

16 Municipal Year Book, 1968, p. 58.

17 Municipal Year Book, 1968, p. 59.

18 The Montclarion (Oakland neighborhood news paper), 07 24, 1968 Google Scholar.

19 Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 217 Google Scholar.

20 Holden, Matthew Jr., “‘Imperialism’ in Bureaucracy,” American Political Science Review, 60 (12, 1966), 945 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Polsby, Nelson W. and Wildavsky, Aaron, Presidential Elections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 180 Google Scholar.

22 Informal remarks at meeting of San Francisco Bay Area Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration, Oakland, October 5, 1967.

23 Remarks before U.S. Civil Rights Commission, May 6, 1967.

24 Remarks at Oakland City Council Meeting, April 23, 1968.

25 McFarland, . Power and Leadership …, pp. 177ffGoogle Scholar.

26 Mayor's Inaugural Address, July 1, 1969.

27 In an essay entitled “Political Incentives,” James L. Payne and Oliver Woshinsky discuss, among other types, politicians who are motivated by an “obligation” incentive. Such people enter politics because they feel a duty to do so, and they are preoccupied with upright conduct in accord with fixed principles. Like Mayor Reading, they do not enjoy politics and have a great distaste for compromise. (Unpublished essay, April 1970). James David Barber describes a similar type—he calls them “Reluctants”—in his study of Connecticut legislators. The author found that many Reluctants entered politics because of a sense of duty, though they had a distaste for conflict and for politics. See Barber, , The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 130–154 Google Scholar.

28 Dahl, , Who Governs? p. 227 Google Scholar.

29 Who Governs? p. 309.

30 Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons. Inc., 1960), pp. 86 ffGoogle Scholar.

31 Lipsky, Michael, “Protest as a Political Resource,” American Political Science Review, 62 (12, 1968), 1151 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

33 Young, p. 159.

34 See May, Judith V., “Two Model Cities: Political Development on the Local Level” (Paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969)Google Scholar.

35 Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 148 Google Scholar.

36 Young, The Washington Community.

37 Muir, William K. Jr.,. “The Development of Policemen” (Paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 1970)Google Scholar.

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.