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Potential Responsiveness in the Bureaucracy: Views of Public Utility Regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

William Gormley ,
John Hoadley  and
Charles Williams
William Gormley
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
John Hoadley
Affiliation:
Duke University
Charles Williams
Affiliation:
University of Illinoisat Chicago
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Abstract

To whom is the bureaucracy responsive? A study of public utility regulation in 12 states helps to answer that question. To assess potential responsiveness in the bureaucracy, we examine indicators of attitudinal concurrence. Whether we look at issue priorities or value priorities, public utility commissioners are more responsive to staff members and utility company executives than to governmental consumer advocates. However, bureaucratic responsiveness to citizens varies unexpectedly across stages of the policymaking process. Concurrence between commissioners and citizen activists is relatively high on issue priorities, relatively low on value priorities. Success at the agenda-setting stage does not guarantee success in policy formulation. In practice, agenda responsiveness may be little more than an exercise in symbolic politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 77 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 704 - 717
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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