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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
In 1871 France was defeated in a six-months' war, by a rival seeking revenge for the humiliations of Jena and Auerstadt. In 1918 France emerged the victor from a fifty-one months' struggle with the same foe. But, unhappily, the spoils reaped from her victory offered slight compensation for the sacrifices she had recently been compelled to make or for the penalties she had paid forty-seven years before. The year 1918, indeed, saw the return of Alsace-Lorraine and the complete restoration of the territorial unity of the French nation; it witnessed no upheaval of government; it experienced no communist revolution. But it found France socially, politically and morally disorganized and exhausted; it found her finances upon the verge of bankruptcy; it found her manhood decimated by some fourteen hundred thousand, and one-tenth of her richest provinces scourged by the flame of war. The year 1918 found France with a form of government which in many respects was regalian and unrepresentative; it found profiteers not only preying upon the necessities of the people but systematically evading the payment of taxes; it found labor tremendously powerful and wielding its strength not so much to force the adoption of economic reforms, as to achieve distinct political privileges. The year 1918 found France confronted with a revengeful Germany, whose recuperative powers seemed far greater than her own, in a position likely to become more tragic with the developing antagonism of England and Italy and the probable withdrawal of the United States from European affairs. In fact, to many her situation appeared desperate: internal discord was undermining the social structure, while, across the Rhine, Berlin seemed preparing to fall upon a decadent state.
1 M. Millerand apparently forgets that other articles of the Constitution grant the President even wider powers, such as the suspensive veto, the right to initiate legislation, to dissolve parliament, etc.—powers which he never directly exercises any more than the English king now utilizes his veto power.
2 See also Living Age, November 6, 1920.
3 The new prime minister was Georges Leygues, a former colleague of Millerand in the famous Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet in 1899. The elevation of Aristide Briand to the premiership was contemplated by many; but the honor fell to Leygues, perhaps because of his friendship with Millerand and his willingness to carry on negotiations with the Vatican. On the defeat of the Leygues' ministry, in January, 1921, the selection of Briand as premier has been ascribed in part to the personal preference of President Millerand.
4 See Garner, J. W., American Political Science Review, Vol. 14, p. 17 (1919)Google Scholar; also articles in Revue Générale d'Administration, Vol. 422, pp. 17, 161, Vol. 423, p. 5 (1919), and Revue des Sciences Politiques, Vol. 43, p. 351 (1920).
5 For a fuller discussion of the movement for professional representation and for increased executive power in France, as well of other subjects touched on in this article, see the writer's Contemporary French Politics (Appleton, 1920), particularly chapters vii and xi.
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