Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
In any party system, it would seem of some importance to establish rules and qualifications for membership in the different party groups, in order to bring together those persons, and only those persons, who adhere to the respective party principles. That should be particularly important in a two-party system, where the principles and issues are presumably sharply defined and clearly distinguishable. This matter has received increasing attention during recent years, and the importance of the problem was well stated by the Chicago Tribune, in an editorial referring to the Illinois primary campaign of 1938:
“The advantages of party organization and party responsibility have been proved over a long range of political testing, and although the abuses at times seem substantial. If a party is to be recognized as having legal standing, and if it is to make its nominations under the direction of law, there should be, it would seem, some determined qualification of its voters…. There shouldn't be a pretence of one thing and a fact of another. If Democrats and Republicans are to have legal standing as such, then Democrats should not make Republican decisions and Republicans should not make Democratic decisions. To permit this is to commit a fraud against the citizens who are trying to make their organization and their decisions according to the prevailing theory of political action and party responsibility.”
1 Editorial, “Primaries and Parties,” in Chicago Tribune, Apr. 23, 1938.
2 Thompson, , The New Voter, p. 40.Google Scholar
3 This point applies particularly to the major parties, minor parties generally having strict membership provisions.
4 Quoted in editorial, “Child of the Sacred Primary,” in New York Times, May 29, 1923. See also Johnson, Borah of Idaho, Chap. 8, “Who Is a Republican?”
5 New York Times, Oct. 27, 1929.
6 Conservatives: Hastings (Del., chairman), Dickinson (Ia., vice-chairman), White (Me.), Barbour (N.J.); semi-progressives. Capper (Kans.); progressives: Norbeck (S.D.), Steiwer (Ore.), Carey (Wyo.); radical: Nye (N.D.).
7 New York Times, Jan. 2, 1934, p. 3, c. 8.
8 Ibid., June 18, 1938, p. 4, c. 3.
9 Ibid., Sept. 4, 1938, Sec. 1, p. 1, c. 8.
10 New York Times, Oct. 21, 1938, p. 13, c. 2. In 1941, Edward J. Flynn, who succeeded Mr. Farley in 1940 as Democratic National Chairman, said that “those Democrats who support the President are the party members loyal to the prin ciples and platform of their political party,” but indicated nevertheless that the question whether Democratic congressmen who opposed the President's policy should be read out of the party “is up to the enrolled voters of the districts.” Statement at press conference in Louisville, Ky., Aug. 22, 1941, quoted in Philadelphia Record, Aug. 23, 1941, p. 4, c. 7.
11 Editorial quoted with approval by President Roosevelt at press conference, Aug. 16, 1938. White House Press Releases, Aug. 16, 1938. At another press conference a week later, President Roosevelt discussed this matter further, particularly in relation to the Idaho Democratic primary, which he claimed 15,000–20,000 Republicans had entered in order to beat Senator Pope; he said this practice “violated simple political morality,” and was entirely contrary to the purpose of the primary system. New York Times, Aug. 24, 1938, p. 1, c. 1, p. 13, c. 1.
12 Remarks of James A. Farley, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Oct. 20, 1938. New York Times, Oct. 21, 1938, p. 13, cc. 2–3. The aptness of these remarks is indicated by the split in the Republican party over Mr. Wendell Willkie and his position on foreign policy, but only after the campaign of 1940 was concluded.
12a In connection with the preliminaries to the mayorality campaign of 1941, LaGuardia was referred to by an unfriendly newspaper as an “apostate member” of the Republican party, and by a friendly newspaper as not a “substantial Republican”; both conceded that he would nevertheless win the Republican nomination, as he did. Chicago Tribune, July 20, 1941, Pt. 1, p. 14, c. 1; New York Times, July 17, 1941, p. 1, c. 1.
13 “Which of these denominations he is most or least, statistical, historical, or philosophical inquiry may determine, if it can…. Classed sometimes as a progressive and sometimes as a reactionary, perhaps he is best described as a faithful Johnsonite—and sometimes a decidedly Too Much Johnson.” Editorial in New York Times, Aug. 29, 1940. In both California and New York, the laws permit a candidate to run under several party designations—as many as he wishes or can secure, but in California on condition that he also wins in the primary of “his own party.”
14 “Topics of the Times,” in New York Times, July 25, 1937, Sec. 4, p. 8E.
15 Thirty-eight in 1940.
15a In Illinois, the voter declares his party affiliation at the primary, and the election judge is required to announce this “in a distinct tone of voice, sufficiently loud to be heard by all persons in the polling place.” Illinois Election Laws (ed. 1939), p. 152.
15b Cf. provision in Minnesota Open Primary Law of 1933: “Every person qualified as a voter may register therein and vote at such primary election. No voter shall be required to declare his party affiliation.” Minnesota Election Laws (ed. 1934), pp. 40–41 [Sec. 306].
16 Eight in 1940: Wis. (1905), Mont. (1913), Minn. (1933), Wash. (1935), Ida. (1937), Mich. (1937), Utah (1937), N.D. (1939). The Washington primary is a hybrid form, explained later.
17 This distinction was amusingly indicated by an irate voter who moved from Wisconsin to Illinois and found himself confronted with the closed primary: “I felt as though the clerk had slapped me in the face when he asked me what do I want to vote, Republican or Democrat? I told him it was none of his business; that I was voting a secret ballot. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘if you want to vote, you will have to declare yourself.’ ‘Well, you know what I told him? I told him to keep his ballot and go plumb to h—.” S.M.P., Letter in Chicago Tribune, May 7, 1934, p. 14Google Scholar, c. 6. Cf. present Colorado closed primary law: “If an elector declines to state his party affiliation, he shall not be entitled to vote at said primary election.” Colorado Election Laws (ed. 1938), p. 48 [sec. 30].
18 This method is used also in Montana and Michigan; in Minnesota, Idaho, and North Dakota, the various party ballots are printed in separate columns on a single ballot, but the voter is expressly warned that voting with more than one party will invalidate his ballot; in Utah, the various party ballots are similarly printed in separate columns on a single ballot, but perforated, and the voter is required to detach the ballot of the party he has chosen.
19 Colorado Compiled Laws, 1921, p. 1938 [sec. 7542]. (Colorado changed to the closed primary in 1927.) Cf. open primary oath in Montana to same effect. Montana Election Laws (ed. 1940), pp. 43, 44.
20 The nonpartisan primary, used particularly for municipal and judicial offices, is a development of special interest to independents. The Arizona primary law recognizes this point in a unique manner by providing for separate party ballots for each party, “and also a blank ballot on which there shall be printed only the titles of the offices to be voted for by the electors at the polling place for which the ballot is printed, to be used by nonpartisan voters.” Arizona Election Laws (ed. 1930), pp. 50–51 [Art. 10, sec. 1281].
20a The Washington provision with respect to party affiliation is as follows: “It is expressly declared that the purpose of this act shall be construed so as to allow all properly registered voters to vote for their choice at any primary election, for any candidate for each office, regardless of political affiliation and without a declaration of political faith or adherence on the part of the voter.” Washington General Election Laws (ed. 1938), p. 36 [sec. 104]. Upon this the following apt comment was made: “At last the political millenium would seem to have been achieved for the independent voter and the party maverick! Not only is the primary so ‘open’ that he may participate in the nominations of a different party at each succeeding election, but he may even vote for a Republican candidate for the gubernatorial nomination, let us say, and at the same primary vote for a Democratic candidate for the nomination for United States Senator. Thus party affiliation becomes a farce, although the party labels are retained. This law may be a transition from partisan to nonpartisan nominations for all offices, but at the present time it is a most peculiar hybrid.” Louise Overacker, in this Review, Vol. 30, pp. 260–261 (Apr., 1936).
21 Quoted in Luetscher, , Early Political Machinery in the United States, p. 47.Google Scholar
22 Constitution of the Democratic Party of South Carolina (adopted May 21, 1902), Art. VI; and Rules Governing the Membership of Democratic Clubs … of South Carolina (adopted May 21, 1902), esp. Rules 1–2. Text in Macy, , Party Organization and Machinery, Appendix, pp. 276–277, 280–281.Google Scholar These rules were amended May 16, 1934, but the membership provisions were unchanged.
23 Holcombe, , State Government (rev. ed.), p. 179.Google Scholar Cf. Florida provision: “The State Executive Committee of each political party may by resolution declare the terms and conditions on which legal electors shall be declared and taken as proper members of such party, and therefore entitled to vote in the primary election herein required to be held, as members of that party….” Florida Primary Laws (1935), p. 25 [par. 377].
24 Constitution of the Democratic Party of Oklahoma (adopted July 26, 1921, and amended Feb. 28, 1924), Preamble. Text in Ewing, and Dangerfield, , Documentary Source Book in American Government and Politics, p. 611.Google Scholar
25 Proceedings, Republican National Convention, 1866, p. 14.
26 Ibid., 1860, p. 83.
27 Ibid., 1864, p. 175.
28 Ibid., 1940, p. 13.
29 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1878, p. 15.
30 Ibid., 1884, p. xxii.
31 Ibid., 1900, p. 22.
32 Letter of Victor Rosewater, Feb. 18, 1936, in New York Times, Feb. 20, 1936, p. 18, c. 6.
33 Of the forty-six states having primary laws in 1940, all but one of the closed primary states (Vt.) had a system of party affiliation tests; and even one of the open primary states (Mont.) required an oath of party affiliation, although not a public declaration with which party. Nine of these states permitted party authorities to prescribe additional tests or qualifications.
34 These various tests were applied in 1932 as follows: (1) past allegiance: Ohio, Pa., Wyo.; (2) present affiliation: Ariz., Calif., Colo., Del., Ia., Kans., La., Md., Mass., Nev., N.H., N.Y., N.D., N.C., Ore., S.D., W.Va.; (3) future intention: Mo., Neb., Tenn., Wash.; (4) past allegiance and present affiliation: Fla., Ill., Ky., Va.; (5) past allegiance and future intention: Ind., Minn., Miss.; (6) present affiliation and future intention: Ala., Okla., Tex.; (7) past allegiance and present affiliation and future intention: Me., N.J.
35 Convenient summaries with respect to these tests are found in Schaffner, Margaret A., “Primary Elections: The Test of Party Affiliation,” Wisconsin Legislative Reference Department, Comparative Legislative Bulletin, No. 13 (Aug., 1908)Google Scholar; McClintock, Miller, “Party Affiliation Tests in Primary Election Laws,” in this Review, Vol. 16, pp. 465–467 (Aug., 1922)Google Scholar; and Manning, R. E., “Party Affiliation as Prerequisite for Voting at Primaries,” Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service (Dec. 13, 1932).Google Scholar
36 This method was used by about eighteen states in 1940.
37 Over a period of many years in down-state Illinois, the writer has not heard a single challenge; neither has he ever heard the election officials repeat the voter's declaration of affiliation as required by the statute, and on at least one occasion he saw the official hand a party ballot to the voter without a request at all, which happened to be the party ballot desired.
The Instructions of the Cook County [Chicago] Elections Board to Primary Officials, issued Mar. 30, 1934, warned the judges against asking a question concerning party affiliation “in a manner that will suggest to such voter the party primary ballot which the judge might appear anxious to have the voter cast,” and expressly forbade the following:
“Don't say: ‘Do you want a Democratic ballot?’
“Don't say: ‘Do you want a Republican ballot?’
“Don't say: ‘You belong to the Democratic party, don't you?’
“Don't say: ‘You belong to the Republican party, don't you?’
“Use only one form of inquiry, as follows: ‘To which political party do you belong?’” Quoted by Brown, Parke, in Chicago Tribune, Mar. 31, 1934, p. 13Google Scholar, c. 1.
38 Used by more than twenty states in 1940.
39 N.Y. Election Law (1922), p. 98 [Laws of New York, ch. 588, sec. 172].
40 S.D. Primary Election Law (1923).
41 S.D. Primary Law, 1929 (Slocum Primary), Sec. 16.
42 On this problem in general, see Myres, S. D., “Party Bolting,” Arnold Foundation Studies in Public Affairs (Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.), Summer, 1932.Google Scholar
43 For a summary review of the judicial interpretation of this matter, see Merriam, and Overacker, , Primary Elections (rev. ed.), pp. 124–129.Google Scholar
44 Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners (1900), 129 Calif. 337, 346–347; 61 Pac. 1115, 1118.
45 Mechem, Floyd R. “Constitutional Limitations on Primary Election Legislation,” Mich. Law Rev., Vol. 3, pp. 364–381 (Mar., 1905), esp. p. 377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
46 The Democratic executive committee of Uvalde county, Briscoe's county, adopted a resolution in July, 1926, requiring the following pledge: “My vote having been challenged on the ground that I voted for, gave aid and support and comfort to a political party other than the Democratic party at the last general election, and having been duly sworn, I now declare under oath that I did not vote, give aid, support, or comfort to any political party other than the Democratic party and its nominees in the last general election. And I further declare that I will support the nominees of this party at the next general election.” This pledge would obviously have barred Briscoe and the other bolters.
47 Briscoe v. Boyle (Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 1926), 286 S.W. 275. In a case decided the previous year, the same court upheld the right of those participating in a Democratic primary to vote for independent candidates in the following general election, thus essentially holding the iron-clad pledge not binding. Cunningham v. McDermott (1925), 277 S.W. 218.
48 The most important of these were Thomas B. Love of Texas, long a Democratic leader in that state, for some time a member of the Democratic National Committee, and an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Wilson Administration; Senator F. M. Simmons of North Carolina; Senator J. Thomas (“Tom-Tom”) Heflin of Alabama.
49 Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
50 The essential feature of these resolutions, adopted Feb. 1, 1930, by a vote of 21–9, provided, with respect to any person desiring a place on the Democratic primary ballot, “that in the last preceding general election he must not have voted against any nominee or presidential elector of the Democratic party, if he participated in the primary elections or conventions of the Democratic party in 1928, and took a pledge to support the nominees of the Democratic party.” A candidate was also required, not only to take the statutory “iron-clad” pledge, but to do so “in good faith without any reservations” and “in writing” at the time of applying for a place on the ballot, and also to declare “that he does not now advocate a voter's entering a party primary or convention and taking the prescribed pledge with reservations, mental or otherwise.” Complete text in Love v. Wilcox (1930), 28 S.W. (2nd) 515, 517. It should be noted that the committee did not bar Hoovercrats from participating in the primary (in fact, it expressly invited them to do so), but merely from becoming candidates for office. This action was directed particularly against Thomas B. Love, who sought the Democratic nomination for governor.
It may be noted also that the Republican state committee of Texas adopted a resolution inviting the Hoovercrats to become “permanent members in good standing of the Republican party.” New York Times, Feb. 17, 1930.
51 Love v. Wilcox (1930), 28 S.W. (2nd) 515; see also Weeks, O. D., “The Texas Direct Primary System,” Southwestern Soc. Sci. Quar., Vol. 13, pp. 107–114 (Sept., 1932).Google Scholar
52 Thomas B. Love, whose right to run for the Democratic nomination for governor was upheld by the courts in the above case, ran fourth in the primary.
53 Action taken Apr. 11, 1930. Cong. Record, Vol. 72, pt. 7, p. 7012 (Apr. 14, 1930). In 1928, however, the Democratic state committee of Georgia ordered anti-Smith Democrats barred from the Democratic primary, this being directed particularly against Representative W. D. Upshaw, a fanatical prohibitionist; but the action was rescinded at the request of Upshaw's opponent, Leslie Steele, who thereupon defeated Upshaw in the primary by a vote of 14,270 to 9,333. New York Times, Aug. 11, 1928, p. 3; Sept. 14, 1928, p. 3.
54 In North Carolina, however, the venerable Senator Simmons was defeated for renomination by Josiah W. Bailey, largely on the Hoovercrat issue. The Virginia situation, with Bishop Cannon as a powerful Hoovercrat leader, was particularly interesting, although no legal bar was attempted. See L. A. B., “The Status of Hoovercrats under the Virginia Primary Law,” Va. Law Rev., Vol. 15, pp. 390–395 (Feb., 1929)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and J. N. Aiken, in New York Times, Feb. 17, 1929, Sec. III, p. 2, July 28, 1929, Sec. III, p. 2, Aug. 25, 1929, Sec. III, p. 1, Nov. 10, 1929, Sec. III, p. 1.
55 The pertinent part of this resolution, adopted Dec. 16, 1929, provided “that no person shall become a candidate for any state, district, federal, or circuit office or have his or her name printed upon the Democratic ballot in the primary election [of 1930], if such person either voted a Republican presidential ticket in November, 1928, or openly and publicly opposed the election of the nominees, or either of them, of the Democratic Convention held at Houston, Texas, in 1928, or who opposed the election of Democratic electors for president or vice-president in November, 1928.” Text in Wilkinson v. Henry (1930), 221 Ala. 254, 255; 128 So. 362, 363.
56 Telegram of Jouett Shouse, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee, to J. C. Inzer, member of the Democratic state committee of Alabama. New York Times, Dec. 14, 1929.
57 See letters of Senator Hugo Black and Senator Heflin to Ben F. Ray, in Cong. Record, Vol. 72, pt. 1, pp. 200–203. (Dec. 6, 1929).
58 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1930.
59 Wilkinson v. Henry (1930), 221 Ala. 254; 128 So. 362. (There was a lengthy dissent by one judge.) In another case, decided later, the Alabama supreme court also upheld a similar Republican rule, which required those who desired to become candidates in the Republican primary to state under oath “how he or she voted in the last general election of 1928, that is, whether said proposed candidate supported the Republican ticket or the Democratic ticket, or voted a split ticket.” Lett v. Dennis (1930), 221 Ala. 432, 129 So. 33.
59a For general discussion, see Lewinson, Paul, Race, Class, and Party (1932)Google Scholar, esp. Chap. 7 and App. III; Pate, James E., “The Texas White Primary Law,” Nat. Mun. Rev., Vol. 16, pp. 617–619 (Oct., 1927)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weeks, O. D., “The Texas Direct Primary System,” Southwestern Soc. Sci. Quar., Vol. 13, esp. pp. 114–120 (Sept., 1932)Google Scholar; and “The White Primary,” Miss. Law Jour., Vol. 8, pp. 135–153 (Dec., 1935). There are also a number of excellent notes and comments on the judicial decisions in various law journals.
60 See supra, p. 24, n. 22. For a convenient summary of the white primary membership rules, see Weeks, O. D., in Miss. Law Jour., Vol. 8, pp. 140–141 (Dec., 1935).Google Scholar
61 Nixon v. Herndon (1927), 273 U.S. 536; 71 L. Ed. 759. The Texas statute provided that “in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic primary election.” Texas Revised Civil Statutes, Art. 3093a [later 3107].
62 Nixon v. Condon (1932), 286 U.S. 73; 76 L. Ed. 984.
63 “Whether a political party in Texas has inherent power today without restraint by any law to determine its own membership, we are not required at this time to deny or affirm…. Whatever our conclusion might be if the statute had remitted to the party the untrammelled power to prescribe the qualifications of its members, nothing of the kind was done. Instead, the statute lodged the power in a committee, which excluded the petitioner and others of his race, not by virtue of any authority delegated by the party, but by virtue of an authority originating or supposed to originate in the mandate of the law…. Whatever inherent power a state political party has to determine the content of its membership resides in the State Convention…. Never has the State Convention made declaration of a will to bar Negroes of the State from admission to the party ranks…. Whatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of the committee has come to them, therefore, not as the delegates of the party, but as the delegates of the State.” Ibid., 286 U.S. 83–85; 76 L. Ed., 988.
64 Grovey v. Townsend (1935), 295 U.S. 45; 79 L. Ed. 1292.
64a “I know of no legal or constitutional reason why the Democratic party of Arkansas should not confine its membership to one-legged, bald-headed Asiatics if it wanted to. If we confine our membership by our own rules and regulations to legally qualified white electors, it is nobody's business but our own.” Letter of Lamar Williamson, then chairman of the Arkansas Democratic state central committee, to L. V. Murphy, July 15, 1932, quoted in Murphy, L. V., The White Primary System: Its Development and Political Aspects (unpublished mss.), p. 25.Google Scholar
65 Grovey v. Townsend (1935), 295 U.S. 52–53; 79 L. Ed. 1296.
66 Overacker, Louise, “Direct Primary Legislation in 1934–35,” in this Review, Vol. 30, p. 282 (Apr., 1936).Google Scholar A recent Supreme Court decision, although not directly in point, seems to support this view. U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) [Preliminary Print].
67 Even the Republican party in the South has a strong tendency to become “lily-white.” See Lewinson, Paul, Race, Class, and Party (1932), Chap. 8, esp. pp. 166–176.Google Scholar
68 Briscoe v. Boyle (1926), 286 S.W. 276.
69 In 1934, the LaFollette brothers formally abandoned the Republican party and organized the Progressive party. It is not yet (1941) clear what the results of this may be, but an interesting analysis of the Wisconsin Progressives in relation to the presidential primaries of 1940 was made by Catledge, Turner in New York Times, Mar. 27, 1940, p. 16Google Scholar, cc. 2–5.
70 In 1924, the Socialist party for the first time in its history ran no presidential candidate of its own, but endorsed the Progressive ticket of LaFollette and Wheeler.
71 The LaFollette faction ran Senator John J. Blaine and Governor Philip La-Follette for renomination, and the “regulars” ran John B. Chapple and former Governor Kohler.
72 This situation is vividly described by Evans, Arthur in Chicago Tribune, Sept. 19, 20, 22, 1932.Google Scholar
73 The figures are from the Wisconsin Blue Book for the corresponding years of 1929, 1931, and 1933. See Table I on facing page.
74 Cf. the following comment in a liberal journal: “Apparently the Democrats have been voting in the Republican primary as Progressives heretofore, and now propose to put over their own candidates.” Editorial in The Nation, Vol. 135, p. 293 (Oct. 5, 1932). Occasionally Republicans may also have invaded Democratic primaries in Wisconsin. For example, the New York Times, in commenting on the Wisconsin presidential primary of 1940, pointed out that Vice President Garner's friends had tried “to persuade Wisconsin Republicans to go into Democratic primaries (which they are permitted to do under the law of that State) in order to cast their votes against Mr. Roosevelt and a third term,” and intimated its own belief that such an invasion had occurred, “solely for a temporary strategic purpose,” and hence that estimates of the real Republican strength in Wisconsin would have to be revised upwards on the basis of the primary results. Editorial, “Wisconsin Primary,” in New York Times, Apr., 4, 1940.
75 See Berdahl, Clarence A., “The Operation of the Richards Primary,” Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci., Vol. 106, pp. 158–159 (Mar., 1923).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
76 Chicago Tribune, June 14, 15, 1930. At that time the Minnesota law provided the test of past allegiance and future intention. Minn. Election Laws (ed. 1930), p. 40 [sec. 306].
77 Oulahan, Richard V., in New York Times, Oct., 7, 1930.Google Scholar
78 Henning, Arthur Sears, in Chicago Tribune, Oct. 11, 1930.Google Scholar The Democratic nominee was Edward P. Costigan, himself formerly a Republican and in 1912 a Progressive. The Republican candidates were William V. Hodges, former treasurer of the Republican National Committee and a well-known political figure, and George Shaw, relatively unknown. Shaw was presumably supported by the invading Democrats, and defeated Hodges by 14,000 votes in the primary, but was in turn defeated by Costigan in the election.
79 Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1938, Pt. 1, p. 16, c. 3. The following comments after the primary are significant: “The size of the Farmer-Labor vote, as compared with that cast for party candidates in previous years, indicated that large numbers of Republicans and Democrats had ignored the advice of their candidates to vote in their own party columns. The urge by conservatives to eliminate Governor Benson from the fall elections apparently led many to mark the Farmer-Labor sections of the consolidated primary ballot.” AP dispatch in New York Times, June 22, 1938, p. 24, cc. 3–4. “The huge vote in the Farmer-Labor primary showed that many Republicans and Democrats crossed party lines to vote for Petersen.” Special dispatch in Chicago Tribune, June 26, 1938, Pt. 1, p. 9, c. 4. Benson was renominated, but the impressive vote for Petersen may have furthered the dissension within the Farmer-Labor party and contributed to the Republican victory in November. At this time Minnesota had the open primary.
80 For accounts of the New Jersey situation, see Henning, Arthur Sears, in Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1930Google Scholar; and New York Times, Sept. 21, 1937, p. 4, c. 2; Sept. 23, 1937, p. 11, cc. 1–2.
81 This period was changed to twenty-three months in 1939.
82 There were four candidates in the Republican primary, the principal ones being Mayor William Hale Thompson and Judge Lyle. It was estimated, on the basis of a postcard straw poll, “that 8 per cent of the Democrats are not playing with their party this time. That 8 per cent probably means 15,200 votes.” Oscar Hewitt, in Chicago Tribune, Feb. 14, 1931.
83 A newspaper photograph was published showing Democratic city leaders (A. M. Smietanka, candidate for municipal court judge; Edward J. Kaindl, candidate for city treasurer; A. J. Cermak, candidate for mayor; alderman John S. Clark, chairman of the Democratic executive committee; and others not shown), with the explanation, “at luncheon at the Steuben Club at which plans to keep party voters out of Republican primary were discussed.” Chicago Tribune, Feb. 10, 1931.
84 Evidently Mayor William Hale Thompson.
85 For this Chicago situation see Chicago newspapers, especially Chicago Tribune, Feb. 10, 14, 17, 20, 21, 25, 1931. The primary was held on Feb. 24.
86 The Democratic primary vote increased from 244,109 in 1928 to 327,312 in 1930 and 816,773 in 1932; while the Republican vote decreased from 1,663,319 in 1928 to 1,410,538 in 1930 and 1,315,245 in 1932. Official Vote of Illinois (1928), p. 59; (1930), p. 59; (1932), p. 61.
87 Under the Illinois law, the state primary is held on the second Tuesday in April in even-numbered years, which means the following dates: 1930—Apr. 8; 1932—Apr. 12; 1934—Apr. 10; 1936—Apr. 14; 1938—Apr. 12; 1940—Apr. 9; 1942—Apr. 14.
88 Brown, Parke, in Chicago Tribune, Mar. 31, 1934, p. 13, c. 1.Google Scholar
89 Decision by Judge John P. Barnes, Mar. 28, 1934. See also decision of Circuit Judge Klarkowski, in 1938. Infra, p. 48, n. 95a.
90 Illinois Attorney-General's Reports and Opinions (1934), pp. 76–79 [Opinion No. 595, Feb. 16, 1934].
91 County Judge William Leech of Lee county, quoted by Brown, Parke in Chicago Tribune, Apr. 9, 1934, p. 1Google Scholar, c. 1. Cf. view of Attorney-General Kerner in above-mentioned opinion: “No power exists in the legislature to control the politics of the citizen or to prevent him from changing his political affiliations or beliefs at any time he may choose so to do. In order to prevent, however, the unfair participation of members of one party in the primary of another, the limitation of two years was set up and is sustained on the theory of preventing control of the destiny and nominees of one party by the members of an opposite party going into a primary and nominating candidates whom they never expect to support” (p. 77).
92 Chicago Tribune, Apr. 6, 1938.
93 Quoted in ibid., Mar. 18, 1938, p. 9, c. 2.
94 This appeal, issued on Apr. 8, 1938, was signed by Bertha D. Bauer, Republican National Committeewoman for Illinois; Charles B. Goodspeed, Treasurer, Republican National Committee; John F. Tyrrell, Chairman, Republican State Committee; Mrs. Mary Silbis, Chairman, Woman's Division, Republican State Committee; Charles A. O'Connor, Chairman, Republican County Chairman's Organization of Illinois; Edward F. Moore, Chairman, Cook County Republican Central Committee; and Mabel B. Krutckoff, Chairman, Woman's Division, Cook County Republican Central Committee. It was also expressly endorsed by other prominent Republican leaders, including three former governors, Deneen, Charles S., Lowden, Frank O., and Emmerson, Louis L.. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 9, 1938, p. 3Google Scholar; Apr. 10, 1938, Pt. 1, p. 3, cc. 3–5.
95 See advertisement in Chicago Tribune, Apr. 11, 1938, p. 16; or Chicago Herald and Examiner, Apr. 11, 1938, p. 9.
95a Estimated as 100,000 or more. See Brown, Parke, in Chicago Tribune, Jan. 8, 1939, Pt. 1, p. 3Google Scholar, c. 2; and Percy Wood, in ibid., Jan. 16, 1939, p. 8, c. 4. In the case of the 13th legislative district in Chicago, involving a contest between the Democratic factions, Circuit Judge Klarkowski stopped recount proceedings and declared the Democratic primary entirely illegal because Republicans had been permitted to participate. Phinney, Warren, in Chicago Daily News, Sept. 30, 1938, p. 9, c. 1.Google Scholar
96 Statement issued Jan. 8, 1939, quoted by Brown, Parke in Chicago Tribune, Jan. 9, 1939, p. 3, cc. 6–7.Google Scholar
97 Illinois Election Laws (1939 ed.), p. 152 [par. 45].
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