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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
In his recent book, Moral Principles in Political Philosophy, Felix Oppenheim provides a useful examination of the assumptions of well known figures in the history of political philosophy concerning the logical status of moral principles. Classifying them as cognitivists (if they view fundamental moral principles as either true or false) or noncognitivists (if they view moral principles as neither true nor false), Oppenheim attempts to exhibit the inadequacy of the cognitivist point of view and, importantly, the adequacy of the noncognitivist position. My critique aims at demonstrating the inconclusiveness of Oppenheim’s arguments against cognitivism. Oppenheim presupposes the availability of a plausible and workable criterion for determining when a sentence counts as a statement (statements are for Oppenheim entities which are true or false and, thus, “cognitively meaningful”), but he fails to provide any attractive candidate for that position. Further critical discussion revolves around the following related questions: Is there adequate positive support for the noncognitivist view? Does it allow for the rationality of fundamental moral commitments? And can Oppenheim really justify his case that, far from being irrational or pernicious, noncognitivism is naturally associated with certain humanistic ideals, such as toleration of those of differing moral and political viewpoint?
1 All references, unless otherwise noted, are to Oppenheim, Felix E., Moral Principles in Political Philosophy. Page numbers in the text of the paper refer to pages in Oppenheim. (New York: Random House, 1968)Google Scholar.
2 That the ethical principles are “basic” I will leave tacit, as Oppenheim himself does at times. Further, he seems to use “moral statements” (or “assertions”), the expression used in his characterization of cognitivism, as interchangeable with “ethical principles,” the expression used in the characterization of noncognitivism.
3 I deliberately oversimplify here. His characterization of noncognitivism also involves the suppositions (1) N1 → N2, and (2) N2 → N3. Correlative implications may be inferred but are not explicit in his characterization of cognitivism.
4 One reason for dissatisfaction with Oppenheim's characterization of cognitivism is that the term “cognitivism” is often used in philosophical literature for the view that consists of C2. One might well believe that moral judgments are true or false without believing that they can be known to be true or false in the sense that they can be demonstrated to be true or false. Analogously, one might believe in the existence of other minds or in the correctness of inductive inference without believing that there is any method of demonstrating the correctness of either belief. Further, one might have reason to believe that every even number is the sum of two prime numbers without believing that there is a known method of demonstrating the claim. Oppenheim tends to ignore this possible position when he states “If, on the other hand, either A or B is a cognitivist, he must be convinced that he can demonstrate the truth of his own basic ethical principle and the falsity of that of his opponent” (p. 34). In other words, while “cognitivism” and “noncognitivism” are mutually exclusive positions as Oppenheim defines them, they do not exhaust the interesting and competing positions being discussed in the literature.
5 Warnock, G. J., Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan and Company, 1967), p. 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 While I have focused on what I take to be difficulties in Oppenheim's defense of noncognitivism, my objections should not be taken to imply more than they do. That is, Oppenheim has, I think, at numerous points successfully sorted out the relevant from the irrelevant charges that have often been made against both cognitivism and noncognitivism. Further he has provided a clear and useful account of how various classic and modern political thinkers are to be viewed from a noncognitivist standpoint I know of no other account which possesses equal clarity and scope.
Those interested in examining the issues in further detail may wish to read Stevenson's, CharlesEthics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944)Google Scholar, Hare's, R. M.The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar and his Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965)Google Scholar. Criticisms of noncognitivism may be found in Toulmin's, StephenReason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950)Google Scholar, Brandt's, RichardEthical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959)Google Scholar and Warnock's, G. J.Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan and Company, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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