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Operative Doctrines of Representation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Charles E. Gilbert
Charles E. Gilbert*
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College
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Extract

The main point of this article is to identify some traditions of American thought that figure in analysis of the distinctively democratic aspects of government. The discussion is centered on doctrines of “representation.” While that term has a generally understood meaning, its application in specific contexts depends upon values and expectations closely related to other largely procedural aspects of politics; and together these perspectives figure in appraisals and decisions of policy.

The “distinctively democratic aspects of government” have broadly to do, I think, with relations between public officials and the population. These can be conceptualized and described in terms of institutions, influence, identification, or exchange, and are so treated in various positive or empirical approaches. At the points where normative critique and empirical description join, the literature of American political science seems to have converged on several broad concerns that tend to organize and orient discussion—e.g., representation, responsibility, rationality, and lately, the “public interest,” of which “representation” surely has the clearest empirical reference. These are overlapping or intersecting concerns. They emphasize different aspects of government and different blends of calculation and control (or intellectual versus institutional elements); but they do not refer to distinct phenomena, and they relate to common normative traditions. Such terms are often, I think, of dubious utility because they tend to obscure the more detailed values at stake in action or discussion and perhaps thereby to discourage more pointed empirical inquiry relevant to those values. However that may be, the interrelatedness of these concerns and the broad relevance of “representation” can be briefly indicated.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 1963 , pp. 604 - 618
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1963

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Footnotes

*

A paper read at the annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 5–8, 1962, I wish to acknowledge especially the contributions to this paper by David G. Smith, and the helpful criticism of my colleagues J. Roland Pennock and Kenneth N. Waltz (Political Science) and Monroe Beardsley (Philosophy).

References

1 On “calculation” and “control,” see Dahl, R. and Lindblom, C. E., Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York, 1953)Google Scholar.

2 Parsons, Talcott, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill., 1951), p. 400 ff.Google Scholar

3 Gosnell, Harold P., Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom (New York, 1948), ch. 8Google Scholar.

4 Cf. the discussions in Lowell, A. L., Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York, 1914), ch. 9Google Scholar; and Eulau, H., et al., “The Role of the Representative …,” this Review, Vol. 53 (1959), p. 742Google Scholar.

5 Cf. Long, Norton E., “Public Policy and Admistration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 14 (1954), p. 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; C. E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Ibid, Vol. 19 (1959), pp. 79–88, and “Policy Analysis,” American Economic Review, Vol. 48 (1958), p. 298–312Google Scholar; March, Jas. and Simon, Herbert, Organizations (New York, 1958), ch. 6Google Scholar.

6 Pennock, J. R., “Responsiveness, Responsibility, and Majority Rule,” this Review, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 790–807Google Scholar.

7 See Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; and Arrow, Kenneth, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York, 1951)Google Scholar.

8 Thus, there will be some affinities with such discussions of these concerns as de Grazia, Alfred, Public and Republic (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; Meyerson, M. and Banfield, E., Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill., 1954)Google Scholar; Appendix by Banfield; Schubert, Glendon, The Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill., 1959)Google Scholar; and Friedrich, C. J. (ed.), Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass., 1960)Google Scholar; and it will be convenient to refer to these.

9 The distinction seems due to McTaggert; see Broad, C. D., Five Types of Ethical Theory (New York and London, 1930), p. 249 ff.Google Scholar

10 The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass., 1938)Google Scholar.

11 The Public Interest, op. cit.

12 Obligation and the Body Politic (New York, 1960)Google Scholar.

13 Cf. Dicey, A. V., Law and Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1905)Google Scholar, on the “collectivist” trend in British thought; Beer, Samuel, “The Representation of Interests in Britsih Government: Historical Background,” this Review, Vol. 51 (1957), pp. 613–650, eps. 635 ffGoogle Scholar. on the “Radical” model of representation; and Hamburger, Joseph, “James Mill on Universal Suffrage and the Middle Class,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 24 (1962), pp. 167–190CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 187 on the “populist” outcome of philosophical radicalism.

14 This brand of utilitarianism has probably been of some importance in the public administration movement in the U. S.—cf. the doctrine on authorities and special districts, on hierarchy and executive accountability, and on consolidation and enlargement of governmental units.

15 E. g. von Mises, F., Bureaucracy (New Haven, 1944)Google Scholar; von Hayek, F., Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago, 1948)Google Scholar; Simons, H., Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago, 1948)Google Scholar; Knight, Frank, The Ethics of Competition (New York, 1936)Google Scholar; Freedom and Reform (New York, 1947)Google Scholar; Intelligence and Democratic Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1960)Google Scholar.

16 “Human nature is also averse to the mental effort of critically considering the possibilities and costs of change, especially the labor of appraising alternatives and reaching intelligent agreement on what is desirable. There is an almost instinctive appeal to force, including persuasion, one of its most insidious and dangerous forms.” Intelligence and Democratic Action, p. 34.

17 “The mystery is not that representative institutions were discredited but that any other result could have been expected. The agency relation presents a problem for which there is no mechanical or intellectual solution, while direct democracy, on any considerable scale and with positive functions, is out of the question. … To substitute competitive politics for competitive business is to jump out of the frying pan into the fire. No possible ‘machinery’ will preserve responsibility without actual crowd rule, or will give political guidance … in the absence of moral leadership accepted as such by the masses.” Freedom and Reform, pp. 29–31; and cf. Intelligence and Democratic Action, pp. 127–8.

18 Cf. the quotation above. “It follows that the ultimate task of society as a whole, as of government … is to create such individuals in such a total culture situation, that agreement on right ideals will be possible, and will be achieved by non-political processes.” Freedom and Reform, p. 204.

19 Ibid. ch. 12, esp. pp. 355–6. Cf. von Mises, Bureaucracy, op. cit.

20 Intelligence and Democratic Action, pp. 124–5.

21 Handbook of Political Fallacies, ed. Larrabee, Harold A. (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 184Google Scholar.

22 Cf. Banfield, op. cit.

23 The most germane philosophical tradition seems to me to be the Lockean one described by Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955)Google Scholar. No single term occurs to me that does justice to what is described below: “liberalism” and “constitutionalism” are a good deal too broad and “proceduralism” somewhat too narrow. Since Schubert's writing on the “public interest” was referred to above I should point out that I don't use the word “rationalism” as he does; and this discussion should not be equated with his.

24 White, Morton, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (Beacon Press Edition: Boston, 1957)Google Scholar.

25 Banfield, op. cit. and cf. Brandt, R., Ethical Theory (New York, 1959), ch. 15Google Scholar, on “extended rule utilitarianism.” Since the ends in these appropriate classes are often imputed to everyone, or denominated “ends of the state,” the line between rationalism and idealism is often a thin one in theory as well as in practice. Woodrow Wilson's discussion of the representative role of the American president was cited above as an illustration of idealism; yet Wilson as political scientist seems to belong to the formalist tradition, as will be argued below.

26 The five “ends” listed are those of Merriam, Charles E., Systematic Politics (Chicago, 1945), esp. ch. 2Google Scholar.

27 An important way, but not necessarily the way. The rationalist tradition may not be at odds with, say, “behaviorism;” cf. Merriam's writing.

28 Cf. the doctrine of “public purpose” in our public law and in the period of “revival of natural law theories,” the “public” ends of the police power and the doctrine of “business affected with a public interest.”

29 It is interesting that the tradition has been less dominant in English political thought, where both idealism and utilitarianism have been stronger.

30 Wilson, Woodrow, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York, 1908)Google Scholar; Lowell, A. Lawrence, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York, 1914)Google Scholar; and Goodnow, Frank, Politics and Administration (New York, 1900)Google Scholar.

31 See esp. Systematic Politics, op. cit.; On the Agenda of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1941)Google Scholar; Public and Private Government (New Haven, 1944)Google Scholar; and The Role of Politics and Social Change (New York, 1936)Google Scholar.

32 Constitutional Government, p. 4.

33 Ibid, p. 14.

34 By “symbolic interactionism” I mean the common emphasis on socialization and communication in the work of, e.g., James, Dewey, Mead and Cooley in the disciplines mentioned above. Cf. Karpf, Fay, American Social Psychology (New York, 1932)Google Scholar for a summary discussion relating these developments.

35 New York, 1927. While the influence of this book is necessarily problematical, judging from internal evidence as well as from citation it was of enormous influence on political scientists trained in the 1930s and thus on the “group approach” to politics. Bentley's Process, of course, was published long before and is, indeed, a very different kind of book, despite some philosophical affinities between the two authors. I think it is arguable that Dewey's work has been the more influential in political science; but I do not know just how to argue the point here.

36 Cf. German Philosophy and Politics (New York, 1915)Google Scholar; Creative Intelligence (New York, 1917)Google Scholar; White, Morton, The Origins of Dewey's Instrumentalism (New York, 1943)Google Scholar; and White's discussion in Social Thought in America, op. cit.

37 “Conjoint … action is a universal trait. … Such action has results. Some of the results are taken account of. Then there arise purposes, plans, measures and means to secure consequences which are liked and eliminate those which are found obnoxious. Thus perception generates a common interest. … Consequences have to be taken care of, looked out for. This supervision and regulation cannot be effected by the primary groupings themselves. … Only the exigencies of a preconceived theory would confuse the stute with that texture of friendships and attachments which is the chief bond in any community, or would insist that the former depends upon the latter for existence.” The Public and its Problems, pp. 34–5; 27; 26.

38 “The underlying and generative conditions of concrete behavior are social as well as organic: much more social than organic as far as the differential wants, purposes, and methods of operation are concerned. … The desires, aims and standards of satisfaction which the dogma of 'natural’ economic processes and laws assumes are themselves socially conditioned phenomena.” Ibid, 103–4.

39 See esp. ibid, 19–27; 39–47.

40 Ibid, ch. 5; and esp. pp. 141–159.

41 Cf. Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922: Modern Library Ed.), p. 62 ff.Google Scholar, and the closing chapter.

42 The Public and its Problems, esp. p. 146. Dewey relied heavily on the type of community-society distinction stressed by Tönnies and Weber.

43 “The very fact that the public depends upon consequences of acts and perception of consequences, while its organization into a state depends upon the ability to invent and employ special instrumentalities, shows how and why publics and political institutions differ widely from epoch to epoch and place to place. To suppose that an a priori conception of the intrinsic nature and limits of the individual on one side and the state on the other will yield good results once for all is absurd.” The Public and its Problems, p. 65. Cf. Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920; Beacon Press Ed., Boston, 1948), p. xiiiGoogle Scholar.

44 The Public and its Problems, p. 76.

45 Follett, Mary Parker, Creative Experience (New York, 1924), p. 35Google Scholar.

46 See The New State (New York, 1918)Google Scholar, Creative Experience (New York, 1924)Google Scholar, and Dymanic Administration (eds., Metcalf, and Urwick, , New York, 1942)Google Scholar. Cf. Kariel, Henry S., “The New Order of Mary Parker Follett,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1955), pp. 425–440CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 Creative Experience, p. 198.

48 Ibid, pp. 198–9.

49 “ This is recognized in Bosanquet's, Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 4th ed. 1953)Google Scholar, Introduction and Preface to the Third Edition.

50 Chicago, 1956.

51 The term “representative government” does't help us in construing “representation.” Repreentative government sometimes simply refers to government by officials chosen in generally competitive elections; but, it frequently further implies distance and discretion for representatives and is contrasted to “popular” government. On his interpretation, to be concerned for the “representativeness” of government is not necesarily equivalent to concern for “representative government.”

52 Garceau, , “Research in the Political Process,” this Review, Vol. 45 (1951), p. 69Google Scholar. Bentley's, summary discussion of this point is in The Process of Government, pp. 455–6Google Scholar.

53 There is considerable overlap here: some versions of populism appear to stem from the rationalist or even idealist tradition, simply placing greater stress on political equality; and the participatory tradition has, in some thinkers, close affinities with pragmatism.

54 Hartz, Louis, “Democracy: Image and Reality,” in Chamber, W. N. and Salisbury, R. H. (eds.), Democracy in the Mid-twentieth Century: Problems and Prospects (St. Louis, 1960)Google Scholar.

55 Cf. Homans, George C., Social Life: Its Elementary Forms (Boston, 1961)Google Scholar.

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