Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 September 2020
This study explores why, at critical moments, governments may withhold vital information from the public. We explain this phenomenon by what we call idiosyncratic events, or events independent of the information receiver’s state-contingent payoff functions. Idiosyncratic events often influence the receiver’s belief on the sender’s performance. If such events are correlated with the events determining the payoff functions, the sender may withhold information so as to improve his image. This result may be applied to the manipulation of information regarding a number of recent real-world phenomena, including the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 and the ongoing outbreak of COVID-19.
We are grateful to Shozo Ota, whose survey and lecture on ochlocracy (Ota 2013) have greatly contributed to the basic design of this research, and anonymous reviewers and the editor of the APSR for constructive comments and advice. We are also grateful to Tadaaki Chigusa, Lisa Yano, Shintaro Miura, and Shigehiro Serizawa. Thomas Lustenberger and Enzo Rossi have kindly provided their central bank speech data. Financial support from Mannheim University and the JSPS (science grants #23000001, 16H02015, 19H01471, and 19K13658) are gratefully acknowledged.
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