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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
What social conditions are prerequisite for given forms of community-wide political behavior (“democracy,” “dictatorship,” etc.)? What transitions are possible between one such form of power exertion and another? What social conditions are necessary to, or determinate of, a given type of transition? Working hypotheses for the exploration of these problems are presented in this article.
An understanding of the factual limits on the effectiveness of political aspiration and exhortation has suddenly become essential in the struggle for survival of the free areas of the world against totalitarian domination. The discussion and appraisal of foreign policy is dangerously confused because of the failure of political knowledge authoritatively to define the real areas of choice. We no longer have time to embark upon policies merely because they are sentimentally acceptable, if it is possible to determine in advance their probable failure. With the accelerated transformation of age-old social structures caused by industrialism and by the spreading specialization of tasks, a similar necessity for political knowledge is bound to arise in domestic policy as well. The time is here when the broader policy choices must be confined within a practicable range by established theories correlating power behavior with social conditions.
1 See especially Drucker, Peter F., The New Society; The Anatomy of the Industrial Order (New York, 1950)Google Scholar.
2 The numbering of the forms is thought to measure the degree to which public expression of group interests affects policy decisions, Form 1 having the highest, and Form 5 the lowest, value. This would be an important evaluative criterion, according to the theory of MacIver, R. M. in The Web of Government (New York, 1947)Google Scholar, but it is no part of the definition of the terms as here used.
3 Specifications for Forms 2 and 4 refer to the existence of certain forms of belief-systems, in the former case what is usually called a “constitution,” in the latter an “ideology.” For an exploration of what can be meant objectively by the existence of a normative system, see the author's “Law as an Objective Political Concept,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 43, pp. 229–249 (April, 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 In naming the forms, “constitutional” has been used for both Form 1 and Form 2 and “totalitarian” for both Form 4 and Form 5, on the assumption that empirically the specification for Form 2 would be likely to be true for instances of Form 1, and that for Form 4 for instances of Form 5. Both Form 2 and Form 3 are designated “traditional,” on the assumption that no instances of the other forms occurred before very recent times, unless possibly in some city-states. Form 2 is probably rare or non-existent today. The foregoing considerations are essentially literary and none of these linkages is asserted in the definitions.
5 It seems expedient to refer to social classes in analysis by symbols rather than words, in an effort to preserve the extreme abstraction with which they are defined. For a hundred years analysis by social class has been the most obvious lead to effective political explanation. It has failed to produce reliable knowledge because of the character of the classes specified. They have been equally identifiable by a variety of attributes. “Proletariat,” “bourgeoisie” “elite,” etc., have either been common linguistic terms ambiguously defined by the culture, or, at most, they have been “historical individuals” in Weber's sense and unsuitable for causal explanation involving the passage of time.
6 It is believed that empirically an increase in the V class steadily accompanies technological progress, the increase attaining a very rapid rate in the late historical stages of industrial development. While a society of simple technology requires verbally skilled persons only for managing its religious and political affairs, in an advanced industrial society economic production can be carried on only with the stimulation and direction afforded by countless pen-pushers and talkers. This is because technological progress constantly breaks down tasks into units whose social relations are less and less directly intelligible either to the participants or to the public.
7 Restriction of the A class to persons of the most assured deference represents an attempt to get around the road block that has obstructed the development of previous “elite” and “ruling class” theories, as well as other social class theories of politics: multiple and ambiguous reference of the terms selected. Most serious attempts at a science of politics have used some sort of elite concept. A valuable selection and presentation of such theories is Burnham's, JamesThe Machiavellians (New York, 1943)Google Scholar.
8 Recent knowledge is tending to show that the assumed normal income-orientation of behavior (based on the popularization of formal economics in the nineteenth century) is pure social myth, and that deference and assured status are more nearly universal human goals. Industrial management studies have particularly contributed to this insight. See Roethlisberger, F. J., Management and Morale (Cambridge, Mass., 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Russell, Bertrand, Power, a New Social Analysis (New York, 1938)Google Scholar. The relation between a class of assured deference and the more constitutional political forms in these hypotheses is suggested by this trend of thought.
9 This is suggested by Brinton's, Crane analysis of the events preceding the major revolutions in The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1938)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 The first exception is suggested by the aphorism: “The Revolution eats its children.” Positive demonstration of “loyalty” or “orthodoxy” is always impossible. More and more persons are likely to be discredited when public attention centers on such questions. The second exception turns out to be logically necessary in order that the system may postulate that totalitarian dictatorship arises only out of prolongation of the revolutionary process. Cf. Neumann, Sigmund, Permanent Revolution (New York, 1942)Google Scholar.
11 In determining possibilities, it should be noted that a condition postulated for a final state could exist in an initial state if it does not contradict any condition postulated for the initial state, regardless of whether it is positively postulated for the initial state.
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