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Hobbes and His Audience: The Dynamics of Theorizing*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Mark Gavre
Mark Gavre
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

This paper argues for a conceptualization of political theory based upon a jurisprudential model of reasoning, rather than the more commonly accepted model of logical demonstration. The purpose of political theorizing is to persuade and convince, not to prove; consequently it is a form of argument necessarily directed at a particular audience or audiences. Hobbes is examined as a theorist who directed his argument at those audiences which were politically most significant. This paper explores that aspect of Hobbes's theory which was intended to persuade his Puritan audience. Hobbes attempted to persuade the Puritans by presenting his argument in a manner subtly similar to the style of reasoning they were familiar with in religious terms. This interpretation is supported by a comparison of the arguments of Hobbes and Calvin. This analysis of Hobbes is intended to illustrate both a general view of the nature of political theorizing, and the advantages of adopting an historical method in examining past political theorists.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 68 , Issue 4 , December 1974 , pp. 1542 - 1556
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1974

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References

1 See, for example, Stevenson, Charles L., Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944)Google Scholar; Peters, Richard S., Hobbes (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967) pp. 166–167Google Scholar.

2 According to Quinton, Anthony, Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar, “the works that make up the great tradition of political thought are methodologically very impure. They are only to a small … extent works of philosophy in the strict sense.” Statements of values he classifies as “affirmations of ideology” not “analysis” (pp. 1,3); cf. Barry, Brian, Political Argument (London: Routledge, 1965) pp. 37Google Scholar, 290n.

3 See MacDonald, Margaret, “Natural Rights” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, First Series, ed. Laslett, Peter (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956)Google Scholar; Wisdom, John, Paradox and Discovery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970)Google Scholar, and Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953)Google Scholar; Toulmin, Stephen, Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

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5 Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. 153; Toulmin, p. 2, suggests that the methods we use in everyday life to make and assess arguments do not conform to the canons of the science of logic because formal logic has become a theoretical study unrelated to practical activity.

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9 MacDonald, p. 54.

10 “The presence of an individualist and a social justification of liberty in the essay On Liberty is not the product of a divided mind or confusion or lack of the necessary courage, but rather of design. There are two justifications because there are two audiences.” Friedman, Richard B., “A New Exploration of Mill's Essay On Liberty,” Political Studies, vol. 14, no. 3 (September, 1966), 303–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Leo Strauss has suggested that Rousseau, in A Discourse on The Arts and Sciences, presents two distinct arguments addressed to two different audiences. “On The Intention of Rousseau” in Hobbes and Rousseau, ed. Cranston, Maurice and Peters, Richard S. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972) pp. 263–64Google Scholar.

11 E.g., McNeilly, F. S., The Anatomy of Leviathan (London: Macmillan, 1968)Google Scholar, views the argument of Leviathan in such narrow terms that several prominent aspects of the book are dismissed as irrelevant: “… although the notion of a universal fear of death is constantly mentioned, it does not perform any actual, still less any indispensible, part in the argument” (p. 250). Hobbes's “pessimistic view of human nature” and his idea of the desire for precedence are similarly treated.

12 Cf. Ashcraft, Richard, “Hobbes's Natural Man: A study in Ideology Formation,” Journal of Politics, vol. 33, no. 4 (November, 1971), 1077–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mintz, Samuel I., The Hunting of Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. viii, 147Google Scholar; Skinner, Quentin, “The Context of Hobbes's Theory of Political Obligation,” in Cranston, and Peters, , Hobbes and Rousseau, pp. 109–119Google Scholar.

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14 “Autobiography” p. 28; cf. Leviathan, ed. Oakeshott, Michael (London: Basil Blackwell, 1955) pp. 122–125Google Scholar; Macgillivray, Royce, “Hobbes's History of the Civil War,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 31, no. 2 (April-June, 1970), 179–198CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Very little is known of Hobbes's life, but those few facts that are known support the idea that he was a royalist. Hobbes spent most of his adult life as a member of the aristocratic and royalist family of the Cavendishes. Prior to the Civil War he was a member of a circle of royalist intellectuals. (See Coltman, Irene, Private Men and Public Causes (London: Faber, 1962), pp. 135–192Google Scholar). Later, in exile, he tutored the future Charles II.

15 See Greenleaf, W. H., Order, Empiricism, and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 47–53Google Scholar; Tillyard, E. M. W., The Elizabethan World Picture (New York: Vintage BooksGoogle Scholar, n.d.).

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17 E.g., Grose, Robert, Royalty and Loyalty (London, 1647)Google Scholar.

18 Quoted in Greenleaf, p. 49.

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20 Ibid., p. 114–124, 179–187; cf. Pocock, J. G. A., The Ancient Constitution and The Feudal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957)Google Scholar; Skinner, Quentin, “History and Ideology in The English Revolution,” The Historical Journal, vol. 8, no. 2 (June, 1965), 151–178CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 De Cive, p. 116, and also 66; Leviathan, pp. 111, 463.

22 Behemoth, ed. Toennies, Ferdinand, second edition (London: Cass, 1969) p. 47Google Scholar.

23 Ibid., p. 50.

24 Ibid., p. 114; Leviathan, p. 119; Hanson, Donald W., From Kingdom to Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) pp. 248–249CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a discussion of Hobbes's criticism of moderate royalists, see Irene Coltman, pp. 135–192.

25 Behemoth, p. 47.

26 Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)Google Scholar argues that the basis of Hobbes's view of human life is non-scientific. Watkins, R. W. N., Hobbes's System of Ideas (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968)Google Scholar argues for the close connection between Hobbes's scientific and political ideas. Strauss, however, says that Hobbes used the language of science to justify his view as the only true and universally valid one.

27 Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Laski, Harold, The Rise of Liberalism (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936), pp. 91–180Google Scholar; Leo Strauss, p. 121; Hill, Christopher, Puritanism and Revolution (New York: Schoken, 1964), pp. 275–291Google Scholar.

28 Behemoth, pp. 57, 63, 82, 89–90. Clearly it would be easier to persuade those whose ideas were merely disruptive of the established order than those who had deliberately rebelled and developed a justifying political doctrine.

29 Leviathan, pp. 29, 67–68. This problem does not confront Hobbes as severely in dealing with the other two groups since the language of science and self-interest can make its appeal on nonpolitical levels.

30 Leviathan, p. 47; Behemoth, p. 24; E. W., IV, 418–419.

31 Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, preface. From Hobbes's perspective, Hooker's reliance on Aristotle and the philosophy of order was a major defect in his political theory, since it prevented him from affecting his Puritan audience which held different metaphysical assumptions. That is, Hooker would have presented Hobbes with an excellent example of intelligent yet ineffective political theorizing.

32 Perhaps the outstanding example of Hobbes's coopting the opposition is his use of the idea of representative government. The doctrine of representative government, popular with many opposition groups, was, of course, rejected by Hobbes: “What bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for the Multitude?” (De Cive, p. 9). Yet Hobbes took the concept and interpreted it in such a manner as to make it politically innocuous: the representative (sovereign) had total freedom of action, while the represented (the subjects) had all the obligations. Thus Hobbes was able to turn a politically dangerous opposition doctrine into a defense of absolute sovereignty. See Pitkin, Hanna, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 14–37Google Scholar. Similarly Hobbs co-opted the idea of government based on consent. But in his version, even a government based on conquest, in which the defeated subjects submit out of fear for their lives, is interpreted as an example of voluntary consent. Leviathan, pp. 129–133.

33 Leviathan, pp. 29, 6.

34 Though Hobbes rejected most of Aristotle, calling him “the worst teacher that ever was,” he approved of his Rhetoric: “but his Rhetoric and discourse on animals was rare.” Quoted in Strauss, , The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p. 35Google Scholar. For a discussion of the similarities between Hobbes's work and Aristotle's Rhetoric see Strauss, pp. 30–43.

35 Aristotle, , Basic Works, ed. MeKeon, Richard (New York: Random House, 1947) pp. 327–28, 1331Google Scholar. According to Hobbes's own translation, “in rhetoric the principles must be common opinions, such as the judge is already possessed with …. the end of rhetoric is victory, which consists in having gotten belief …. belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to persuade or dissuade in matter of state.” E.W., VI, 426, 436.

36 Hobbes does refer to other groups, including Catholics, as causes of the civil war, but theyplay a very minor role in comparison with the Presbyterians. See Behemoth, p. 20; Macgillivray, , “Hobbes's History of The Civil War,” p. 190Google Scholar.

37 That Hobbes was familiar enough with Calvin to have adopted this approach is very likely; he attended the strongly Puritan Magdalen Hall, Oxford, where students normally read Calvin. For comments on Hobbes's interest in religious issues see Doyle, , “The Contemporary Background of Hobbes's State of Nature,” Economica 7 (December, 1927), 336–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glover, Willis B., “God and Thomas Hobbes” in Brown, Keith C., ed., Hobbes Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 142Google Scholar.

38 In constructing his parallel argument Hobbes was perhaps subtly employing his “good fancy”, i.e., the ability to observe “similitudes … as are but rarely observed by others,” a skill which he recognized was sometimes necessary in order to achieve understanding: “In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, judgment does all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy” (Leviathan, pp. 43–44). Hobbes might have expected that the Puritans' political understanding would be opened by the apt similitude he presented them.

39 Since this paper is concerned with Hobbes's political theory and not with his statements on religion, it will not deal with Bks. III and IV of Leviathan. Hobbes's discussion of religion follows the same pattern as his political theory; it is an argument aimed at the two religious groups most politically disruptive, the Puritans and the Catholics. See Leviathan, p. 452; Pocock, J. G. A., “Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes” in his Politics, Language and Time (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 179, 180–7Google Scholar.

40 Walzer, , The Revolution of The Saints (New York: Atheneum, 1968) pp. 26, 34, 41, 42, 47Google Scholar; Lakoff, Sanford, Equality in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) pp. 70–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glover, Willis B., “Human Nature and the State in Hobbes,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. IV, no. 4 (October 1966) 294–311Google Scholar; Hill, Christopher, Society and Puritanism (New York: Schocken, 1967) p. 242Google Scholar: Hood, Francis C., The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), pp. 2–3, 66Google Scholar.

41 The Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Allen, John (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1949) I, xvii, 10Google Scholar.

42 Quoted in Walzer, pp. 31, 33; Calvin, , Works, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1844) p. 94Google Scholar.

43 De Cive, p. 29; Leviathan, p. 460; E.W. VII, 73; see also Leviathan, pp. 80–82, 111, 118.

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45 Works, I, 243Google Scholar; Institutes, I, iii, 3Google Scholar.

46 Leviathan, p. 16, also p. 43; De Cive, p. 13.

47 E.W., V. 186.

48 Leviathan, pp. 29, 17; also pp. 46, 80.

49 Leviathan, pp. 19, 30, 111.

50 Ibid., pp. 17, 29–30.

51 Institutes, II, iii, 1Google Scholar; II, iii, 13; II, iii, 7; Works, I, 444Google Scholar.

52 Works, I, 443Google Scholar; Walzer, , The Revolution of the Saints, p. 167Google Scholar.

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55 Ibid., p. 84: see also p. 242.

56 Institutes, I, xvii, 11Google Scholar; II, vii, 3; II, viii, 3.

57 Works, I, 127Google Scholar; Institutes, II, i, 5–6Google Scholar; II, vi, 2.

58 Leviathan, pp. 129–130; also De Cive, p. 24n; Oakeshott, , Leviathan, intro. p. xxxviGoogle Scholar.

59 Institutes, 1, v, 13Google Scholar; I, iv, 1–3. Wolin points out that Calvin insisted that interpretation of scripture be limited to the appropriate officers of the church, who presumably would be among the elect, thereby avoiding the disintegrating effects of private visions in the institutional church as well. Wolin, Sheldon S., Politics and Vision p. 180Google Scholar.

60 DeCive, p. 32n; also Leviathan, pp. 174, 176. The reason which men have in civil society is the creation of and dependent on, that society. See Wolin, , Politics and Vision, p. 257 ffGoogle Scholar; Campbell, Blair, “Prescription and Description in Political Thought, The Case for Hobbes,” American Political Science Review, 65 (June, 1971) 382–384CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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62 Quoted in Watkins, , Hobbes's System of Ideas, p. 74Google Scholar. See Mansfield, Harvey C., “Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government,” American Political Science Review, 65 (March, 1971), 100–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Calvin's use of political language in describing God (e.g., “divine government”, “sovereignty”, “ruling”) allows for, if not encourages, a political interpretation of his doctrine.

64 Institutes, I, xvi, 1–4Google Scholar; I, xvii, 6; I, xiv, 12; Works, I, 82–3Google Scholar.

65 Leviathan, pp. 112, 119, 120; E.W., IV, 250; De Cive, p. 129.

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67 Ibid., pp. 138–139, 143.

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69 De Cive, p. 11; Leviathan, p. 109, also pp. 86, 89, 138; Behemoth, p. 144.

70 Institutes, III, ii, 14–15Google Scholar; Troeltsch, II, 585.

71 Institutes, II, i, 4Google Scholar; I, xvii, 2; I, xvii, 8.

72 Leviathan, p. 243, also p. 41.

73 De Cive, pp. 129, 128; also Leviathan, p. 211.

74 De Cive, p. 129.

75 De Cive, p. 9; cf. Lakoff, p. 73.

76 See Haller, William, The Rise of Puritanism (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 152–160Google Scholar.

77 E.g. Glover, , “Human Nature”, p. 304Google Scholar.

78 According to Watkins, , Hobbes's System of Ideas, p. 101Google Scholar, “Each of us is condemned to solitary confinement within his body. We can transmit and receive signals through the walls of our cells, and we may even work out and execute a common plan. But our minds never meet.”

79 Harrington's term, quoted in Wolin, , Politics and Vision, p. 285Google Scholar.

80 Leviathan, pp. 107, 112.

81 De Cive, p. 33.

82 Leviathan, p. 379, also pp. 5, 218.

83 Works, I, 74Google Scholar.

84 Watkins, p. 103. Cf. Hill, Christopher, “William Harvey and the Idea of Monarchy,” Past and Present, 27 (April, 1964), 54–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

85 Leviathan, p. 379.

86 Ibid., p. 463.

87 Ibid., pp. 255, 305, 306.

88 See Ashcraft, , “Hobbes's Natural Man,” pp. 1089–90, 1109–1111Google Scholar.

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