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The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Peter Moser
Peter Moser*
Affiliation:
University of St. Gallen
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Abstract

Tsebelis (1994) argues in the American Political Science Review that the European Parliament has important power due to its right as a conditional agenda setter. I claim that Tsebelis' argument is based either on an incomplete analysis or on inaccurately specified decision rules. An accurate modeling of the cooperation procedure as stated in Article 189c of the Treaty of the European Community and as applied in practice changes the results considerably. Based on such a model, I provide an explanation of why the European Parliament sometimes can make successful amendments.

Type
Forum
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 834 - 838
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

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References

REFERENCES

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