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The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1987

Joseph Greenberg  and
Kenneth Shepsle
Joseph Greenberg
Affiliation:
University of Haifa
Kenneth Shepsle
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Abstract

The authors elaborate a model of electoral competition for a fixed number of seats in a legislature. The novel feature of this model is that candidates (or parties) not only choose spatial locations as platforms but also determine whether to enter the contest at all. In most previous spatial models, the set of candidates is specified exogenously. Here, however, the spatial positions and the set of candidates are determined endogenously. An equilibrium in this context is defined and results are proved, suggesting that entry may disrupt spatial equilibria. Finally, the authors compare their treatment of spatial competition with entry to that of Palfrey.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 81 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 525 - 537
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1987

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References

Black, Duncan. 1958. Theory of Committee and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Greenberg, Joseph, and Weber, Shlomo. 1985. Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation. American Political Science Review 79: 693–703.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoag, Clarence, and Hallett, George. 1926. Proportional Representation. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Palfrey, Thomas. 1984. Spatial Equilibrium with Entry. Review of Economic Studies 51:139–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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