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The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Richard M. Merelman
Richard M. Merelman*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
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Abstract

This article identifies four fundamental modes of thought employed in the cognition of policy problems. These modes of thought are moral, cause-effect, sociocentric, and imaginative. Nine variants of these four forms are described and investigated among a small sample of adolescents. The maturation of these forms of thought appears limited during adolescence, and change is not well predicted by the respondent's level of politicization. The article concludes with some speculations about the structure of socialization theory as it relates to the development of fundamental forms of political thinking.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 65 , Issue 4 , December 1971 , pp. 1033 - 1047
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1971

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Footnotes

*

This is a much revised version of a paper given to the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California, September 8–12, 1970. I am indebted to David Sears and Fred Greenstein, whose comments on the earlier version have materially improved this edition. I am also indebted to my two research assistants, Anne Macbung and Sheldon Berman, without whose prompt and energetic efforts in my behalf this paper would have died aborning; Miss Machung especially performed beyond the call of duty. Thanks also goes to ray colleague, Jack Dennis, for his aid in funding the project.

References

1 Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, Children In the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969)Google Scholar; Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Hess, Robert D. and Easton, David, “The Child's Changing Image of the President,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 632–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jaros, Dean, “Children's Orientations toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data,” Journal of Politics, 29 (May, 1967), 368–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jaros, Dean, Hirsch, Herbert, and Fleron, Frederick J. Jr., “The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture,” American Political Science Review, 62, #2 (1968), 564–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Greenberg, Edward S., “Political Socialization to Support of the System: A Comparison of Black and White Children,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1969Google Scholar.

2 Adelson, Joseph, Green, Bernard, and O'Neil, Robert, “Growth of the Idea of Law in Adolescence,” Developmental Psychology, 1, 4 (1969), 327–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Adelson, Joseph and O'Neil, Robert, “The Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 2 (1966), 295–306CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Langton, Kenneth P., Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Jennings, M. Kent and Niemi, Richard G., “The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child,” American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 169–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hyman, Herbert, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Greenstein, Children and Politics; Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren, and Stokes, Donald, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), Chap. 7Google Scholar; Dennis, Jack and McCrone, Donald J., “Preadult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies, 3 (July, 1970), 243–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 For a psychiatric investigation of thought styles, see Shapiro, David, Neurotic Styles (New York: Basic Books, 1964)Google Scholar. For studies that bear on modes of policy thought, see Lane, Robert E., Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham, 1970)Google Scholar; Converse, Philip E., “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Apter, David E., ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–62Google Scholar; Merelman, Richard M., “The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization,” American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969), 75–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Haan, Norma, Smith, M. Brewster, and Block, Jeanne, “Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background, and Personality Correlates,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, v. 10 (1968), 183–201CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

6 I derive this line of thought largely from systems analysis. See Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965)Google Scholar, Chap. 7.

7 For the theoretical underpinnings of a notion of political competence, see Smith, M. Brewster, “Competence and Socialization,” in Socialization and Society, ed. Clausen, John A. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 270–321Google Scholar.

8 For other characteristics, see Converse, “The Nature of Brief Systems …,” Campbell, et al., The American Voter, Chapter 9.

9 Piaget, Jean, The Moral Development of the Child (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965)Google Scholar; Kohlberg, Lawrence, “The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: 1. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought,” Vita Humana, 6, 1 (1963), 11–33Google Scholar.

10 Bull, Norman J., Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 91Google Scholar.

11 For an examination of the development of causal thought see Sigel, Irvin E., “The Attainment of Concepts,” in M. L. and Hoffman, L. W., eds., Review of Child Development Research, Vol. 1 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), 209–49Google Scholar. On the idiosyncratic aspects of problem solving, see Busell, Guy T., “Patterns of Thinking in Solving Problems,” University of California Publications in Education, v. 12, 2 (1956), 63–148Google Scholar.

12 Elkind, David, “Cognitive Development in Adolescence,” in Adams, James F., ed., Understanding Adolescence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 128–59, 141–2Google Scholar.

13 This conceptualization derives largely from Inhelder, Bärbel and Piaget, Jean, The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (New York: Basic Books, 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Parenthetically, students of public policy rarely consider in any detail the varying methods by which the public perceives policy. There is no examination at all of this problem in two recent and influential attempts to synthesize the emerging field of policy analysis. See Ranney, Austin, ed., Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968)Google Scholar; and Sharkansky, Ira, ed., Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: Markham, 1970)Google Scholar.

15 There is probably more to these dimensions than just cognition. To some uncertain extent successful performance may be facilitated by a sympathetic identification with the poor. This is especially apparent for moral, empathic, and linkage thought, but also applies to the other dimensions in lesser degree. That motivation supports these forms of cognition does not detract from their cognitive status, however, for they remain forms of cognition. Moreover, identification may grow from comprehension just as comprehension may grow from identification. Put another way, motivation is always based partly upon cognitive attainments as well as upon affect.

This comment raises a seemingly more important general question. Can we really treat these dimensions as if they are independent of particular political preferences? Certainly many of the scales appear to chart development from a set of perspectives associated mainly with the Right to a set associated mainly with the Left. Might there be some normative bias associated with the definition of dimensions and the construction of scales? Perhaps, but most of the developmental literature from which the dimensions were drawn provides empirical support for age-graded development in the directions indicated by the discussion. At best, therefore, an argument might be made to the effect that a different set of dimensions might yield a pattern of development from apparently Left to apparently Right political perspectives. But such an argument need not deter our investigation.

16 On sociocentrism, see especially Piaget, Jean, The Language and Thought of the Child, trans. Gabain, Marjorie (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1967)Google Scholar. For hints about the development of orientations relevant to policy thinking, see also: Yarrow, Marian Radke and Campbell, John D., “Person Perception in Children,” in Gordon, Ira J., ed., Human Development (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1965), pp. 265–76Google Scholar; Witkin, Herman A., Goodenough, Donald R., and Karp, Stephen A., “Stability of Cognitive Style from Childhood to Young Adulthood,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7 (October, 1967), 291–301CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Haan, Smith, and Block, “Moral Reasoning …”; Elkind, “Cognitive Development …,” and Maccoby, Eleanor E., “The Development of Moral Values and Behavior in Childhood,” in Clausen, , ed., Socialization and Society, pp. 227–70Google Scholar.

17 For a comprehensive picture of the vicious circle at work, see Clark, Kenneth B., Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1965)Google Scholar, Chaps. 3 and 6.

18 This “vicious circle scale” places a premium on the ability to see interrelationships rather than on the capacity to approach poverty from multiple perspectives. My belief is that inferring causality is a matter of constructing connections and, ultimately, syntheses. Other approaches to poverty might be explanatory, but they do not highlight causal thought.

19 This concentration on the vagaries of fortune is reminiscent of the “magical thinking” very young children manifest. For examples, see Piaget, Jean, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, trans. Gattegno, C. and Hodgson, F. M. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962, first published, 1951), pp. 257–8Google Scholar.

20 The use of such terms, though rare, varies directly with the age of the respondent.

21 I have taken the “distal” concept from James C. Davies, who applies it to social groups, and have used it to characterize perceptually distant issues. See Davies, James C., Human Nature in Politics (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 183Google Scholar.

22 “Rhetorical effects” refers to the considerable number of respondents who said that others' poverty caused their parents to stress to them the importance of eating all the food they were served. Poverty's sole effect, in these cases, was as a goad to the inculcation of good habits. These superficial effects, hortatory and rhetorical in character, are unlikely to influence more fundamental perceptions of poverty.

23 Prime examples of the environmental approach are Langton, Political Socialization …, and Jennings and Niemi, “The Transmission …”

24 Examples of this approach include the articles cited above by Adelson and his colleagues: Merelman, “The Development of Political Ideology …” White, Elliott S., “Intelligence and Sense of Political Efficacy in Children,” Journal of Politics, v. 30 (August, 1968), 710–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, to a limited extent, Lane, Robert E., “Political Education in the Midst of Life's Struggles,” Harvard Educational Review, 38, 3 (1968), 468–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 For example, Easton and Dennis contend that, “… socialization is … one kind of response through which political systems may be able to ward off certain kinds of stress on the structure of political authority …,” Children in the Political System, p. 388. This observation implies that the political system is a major, and relatively autonomous, socialization agency.

26 Easton and Dennis, 249–54.

27 The questions asked were:

How interested would you say you were in politics?

Very interested, moderately interested, not very interested. (Scoring—2 points for very interested, 1 for moderately, 0 for not very.)

Have you ever done any campaigning for a political candidate? Yes (3 pts.) No (0 pts.)

Are you a member of any extra-curricular activities having to do with government or current affairs? Yes (2pts.) No (0 pts.)

How often do you read about politics in the newspapers? Not very often (0 pts.) Moderately often (1 pt.) Very often (2 pts.)

How often do you watch the news on TV? Not very often (0 pts.) Moderately often (1 pt.) Very often (2 pts.)

Finally we asked four questions in order to provide a score based on the respondent's level of knowledge about current political issues. One point was given for each correct answer.

28 I am indebted to David Sears, who brought this important point home to me with considerable force.

29 The closest methodological approximation to this ideal is the study of identical twins. For a controversial attempt to generalize from such studies about influences on intelligence, see Jensen, Arthur, “How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement,” Harvard Educational Review, v. 39 (Winter, 1969), 1–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Especially suggestive on this score is the work of Adelson and his colleagues, cited above. See also Gallatin, Judith and Adelson, Joseph, “Individual Rights and the Public Good,” Comparative Political Studies, 3, 2 (1970), 226–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 The work of Piaget is most suggestive on this score. For important cross-national comparisons in causal thinking, see Bruner, Jerome S.et. al., Studies in Cognitive Growth (New York: Wiley, 1966)Google Scholar. A helpful review of some of the tangled terminology used in the area of causal and conceptual thought is Pikas, Anatol, Abstraction and Concept Formation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)Google Scholar. Another useful literature review of both moral and causal development is Wallace, J. G., Concept Growth and the Education of the Child (The Mere, Upton Park, England: National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales, Occasional Publication Series No. 12, 1965)Google Scholar, Section III.

32 On the importance of stating theories in a falsifiable form, see Popper, Karl R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1955)Google Scholar, Chap. 4.

33 For one example of the sort of study that has challenged the developmental conception, see King, W. H., “The Development of Scientific Concepts in Children,” in Gordon, , ed., Human Development, pp. 265–76Google Scholar.

34 Hunt, J. M. V., “The Impact and Limitations of the Giant of Developmental Psychology,” in Elkind, David and Flavell, John M., eds., Studies in Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jean Piaget (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 3–67, 52Google Scholar.

35 See Greenstein, Children and Politics …, Chap 3; Dennis, and Easton, Children in the Political System, 183Google Scholar. The article which first countered these points of view is Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron, “The Malevolent Leader …” However, this latter research focused on a particular poor subgroup—Appalachian whites—that could be expected to be alienated in some respects. By contrast, we examined middle- and upper middle-class whites from stable suburban and farm backgrounds almost all of whom were motivated scholastically and college-bound.

36 For a conceptual and empirical approach to thought hierarchies, see Guilford, J. P., “The Structure of Intellect,” Psychological Bulletin, 53, 2 (1956), 267–93CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

37 White, Robert, Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory; A Proposal Regarding Independent Ego Energies (New York: International Universities Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

38 For pertinent experimental formulations, see Maier, Norman R. F., Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961, first published in 1949)Google Scholar; and Aronfreed, Justin, Conduct and Conscience: The Socialization of Internalized Control over Behavior (New York and London: Academic Press, 1968)Google Scholar, Chaps. 3 and 11.

39 See, especially, Freud, Anna, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (London: Hogarth Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

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