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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
The decisions of the Supreme Court during the October terms of 1914, 1915, and 1916, indicate on the whole a more tolerant attitude towards the judgment of state legislatures on questions of the police power than one would be apt to infer from the criticisms called forth by the few cases in which laws were declared invalid. The cases on these questions gave rise to more diversity of opinion among the judges than did those arising under the commerce clause. In most of the important cases there was dissent, and several were decided by a vote of five to four. Chief Justice White, and Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds were opposed to the Oregon ten-hour law, the Washington compensation law and the Washington employment agency law; while Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke were in favor of all three. On certain crucial questions these six justices seem quite likely to counteract each other, and leave the balance of power with Justices McKenna, Day and Pitney. Justices Pitney and Day were in favor of the ten-hour law and the compensation law and opposed to the employment agency law. Mr. Justice McKenna was in favor of the ten-hour law and the employment agency law and opposed to the compensation law. In the Oregon Minimum Wage Case, the court was divided four to four, Mr. Justice Brandeis not sitting.
2 (1917) 244 U. S. 590. See 5 California Law Review 494, 85 Central Law Journal 111, 17 Columbia Law Review 635, 31 Harvard Law Review 490, 12 Illinois Law Review 428, 2 Minnesota Law Review 56, 5 Virginia Law Review 361, and 27 Yale Law Journal 134.
3 (1916) 241 U. S. 340.
4 (1915) 236 U. S. 1. See 49 American Law Review 596, 15 Columbia Law Review 272, 28 Harvard Law Review 496, 19 Law Notes 13, 13 Michigan Law Review 497, 63 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 566, 20 Virginia Law Register 954, 2 Virginia Law Review 540, and 24 Yale Law Journal.
5 (1908) 208 U. S. 161.
6 (1915) 236 U. S. 373.
7 (1915) 236 U. S. 385. See 50 American Law Review 97, 3 California Law Review 323, and 13 Michigan Law Review 506. On the general subject, see Frankfurter, Felix: “Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law,” 29 Harvard Law Review 353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 (1917) 243 U. S. 426. See 17 Columbia Law Review 538, 15 Michigan Law Review 584, 3 Virginia Law Register, n.s. 221, 5 Virginia Law Review 55, and 26 Yale Law Journal 607.
9 (1905) 198 U. S. 45.
10 (1915) 236 U. S. 338.
11 (1909) 211 U. S. 539.
12 (1917) 243 U. S. 629. See Brown, R. G., “The Oregon Minimum-Wage Cases,” 1 Minnesota Law Review 471Google Scholar; Powell, T. R., “The Constitutional Issue in Minimum-Wage Legislation,” 2 Minnesota Law Review 1Google Scholar, and “The Oregon Minimum-Wage Cases,” 32 Political Science Quarterly 296. Por a discussion of the decision in the state court, see 28 Harvard Law Review 89.
13 See 31 Harvard Law Review 1013. For articles dealing with the general subject of the constitutionality of what is commonly called “social legislation,” see Corwin, E. S., “Social Insurance and Constitutional Limitations,” 26 Yale Law Journal 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kales, A. M., “Due Process, the Inarticulate Major Premise, and the Adamson Act,” 26 Yale Law Journal 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keedy, E. R., “The Decline of Traditionalism and Individualism,” 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 764CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mechem, F. R., “The Changing Legal Order,” 15 Michigan Law Review 185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14 (1914) 235 U. S. 380.
15 (1915) 235 U. S. 571. See 50 National Corporation Reporter 506.
16 (1916) 239 U. S. 614.
17 For the results where statutes do not take away the common-law remedy against third persons, see 18 Columbia Law Review 598.
18 (1911) 201 N. Y. 271.
19 (1917) 243 U. S. 188. See Powell, T. R., “The Workmen's Compensation Cases,” 32 Political Science Quarterly 542.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also 84 Central Law Journal 227, 15 Michigan Law Review 513, 1 Minnesota Law Review 449, 2 St. Louis Law Review 181, and 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 682.
20 (1917) 243 U. S. 210.
21 (1917) 243 U. S. 219. See 51 American Law Review 439, 54 National Corporation Reporter 410, and 26 Yale Law Journal 618.
22 (1911) 219 U. S. 104.
23 (1917) 243 U. S. 29.
24 (1917) 242 U. S. 539. See Laylin, C. D., “The Ohio ‘Blue Sky’ Laws,” 15 Michigan Law Review 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Spielman, R. S., “The Constitutionality of Blue Sky Laws,” 49 American Law Review 389.Google Scholar See also 84 Central Law Journal 99, 17 Columbia Law Review 244, and 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 785.
25 (1917) 242 U. S. 559.
26 (1917) 242 U. S. 568.
27 Of the statute in question, the learned justice says: “It burdens honest business, it is true, but burdens it only that, under its forms, dishonest business may not be done. This manifestly cannot be accomplished by mere declaration; there must be conditions imposed and provision made for their performance. Expense may thereby be caused and inconvenience, but to arrest the power of the state by such considerations would make it impotent to discharge its function. It costs something to be governed.” And of the objection that the law “shields contemplated purchasers from loss of property by the exercise of their own ‘defective judgment’ and puts them as well as the sellers under guardianship,” he says: “If we may suppose that such purchasers would assert a liberty to form a ‘defective judgment,’ and resent means of information as a limitation of their freedom, we must wait until they themselves appear to do so.”
28 (1916) 240 U. S. 432. See Duncan, C. S., “The Economics and Legality of Premium Giving,” 24 Journal of Political Economy 291.Google Scholar See also 29 Harvard Law Review 779, 24 Journal of Political Economy 498, 20 Law Notes 161, and 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 734.
29 (1916) 240 U. S. 369.
30 (1916) 240 U. S. 387.
31 (1915) 235 U. S. 461.
32 The doctrine of the Langford Case was followed in Farish v. State Banking Board, (1915) 235 U. S. 498, in which it was held that the immunity of the state from suit was not waived by the unauthorized participation of the banking board in previous litigation between the same parties.
33 Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, (1915) 236 U. S. 229; Same v. Same, (1915) 236 U. S. 247; and Mutual Film Corporation of Missouri v. Hodges, (1915) 236 U. S. 248. See 49 American Law Review 612, and 13 Michigan Law Review 515.
34 (1915) 237 U. S. 589. See 50 American Law Review 126, 81 Central Law Journal 39, and 51 National Corporation Reporter 50.
35 (1916) 240 U. S. 328. See 2 Virginia Law Register, n.s. 60.
36 See Bailantine, A. A., “Railway Strikes and the Constitution,” 17 Columbia Law Review 502CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Parkinson, T. I., “Constitutional Aspects of Compulsory Arbitration,” 7 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science of New York 44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
37 McNaughton v. Johnson, (1917) 242 U. S. 344. See 15 Michigan Law Review 516.
38 Lehon v. Atlanta, (1916) 242 U. S. 53. See note in the Lawyers' Edition of the Supreme Court Reports, vol. 61, p. 146.
39 Crane v. Johnson, (1917) 244 U. S. 339.
40 12 American Political Science Review 37–38.
41 Price v. Illinois, (1915) 238 U. S. 466.
42 Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, (1916) 240 U. S. 510.
43 Sligh v. Kirkwood, (1915) 237 U. S. 52. See 80 Central Law Journal 361, and 28 Harvard Law Review 819.
44 (1916) 242 U. S. 153. See 26 Yale Law Journal 416.
45 (1915) 237 U. S. 171. See 19 Law Notes 51.
46 (1915) 239 U. S. 384. See 1 Southwestern Law Review 47, and 44 Washington Law Reporter 714.
47 147 Cal. 609.
48 (1917) 242 U. S. 526. See 84 Central Law Journal 155, 3 Cornell Law Quarterly 135, 15 Michigan Law Review 502, 1 Minnesota Law Review 441, 2 Southern Law Quarterly 233, 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 686, 2 Virginia Law Register, n.s. 940, and 26 Yale Law Journal 420.
49 See Eubank v. Richmond, (1912) 226 U. S. 137. On the general subject of aesthetics and the police power, see H. L. McBain, American City Progress and the Law, chapter 2. See also Millard, E. L., “Present Legal Aspect of the Billboard Problem,” 11 Illinois Law Review 29Google Scholar, and a note on “Aesthetics and the Fourteenth Amendment,” in 29 Harvard Law Review 860.
50 (1916) 239 U. S. 486. See 4 California Law Review 416, and 16 Columbia Law Review 239.
51 (1915) 237 U. S. 391.
52 (1915) 239 U. S. 426.
53 It was also contended that the statute was invalid because it did not apply to hotels having less than fifty rooms, and therefore discriminated against larger hotels, but the contention was not sustained. For a case in which a provision of the Louisiana anti-trust law was declared invalid because so framed as to apply exclusively to the American Sugar Refining Co., see McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., (1916) 241 U. S. 79. The statute also created certain presumptions from paying more for sugar in other states than in Louisiana, and from closing or keeping idle a factory more than a year. The opinion of the court indicates that these presumptions would have been held vicious, even if the statute had not been invalid because of its discriminatory features. See 1 Southern Law Quarterly 279.
54 (1915) 238 U. S. 491. See 51 National Corporation Reporter 241, and 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 77.
55 Mississippi R. Com. v. Mobile & O. R. Co., (1917) 244 U. S. 388. See 27 Yale Law Journal 121.
56 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1916) 242 U. S. 60. See 17 Columbia Law Review 347, and 2 Southern Law Quarterly 165.
57 (1915) 238 U. S. 340.
58 (1915) 236 U. S. 605. See 1 Southern Law Quarterly 56.
59 (1915) 236 U. S. 585.
60 (1914) 235 U. S. 121.
61 (1917) 243 U. S. 257.
62 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Clough, (1917) 242 U. S. 375. See Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, (1917) 242 U. S. 409, for a case sustaining an order of the secretary of war compelling the elevation of a bridge so as to lessen the interference with commerce on the river below.
63 Farmers' Irrigation District v. Nebraska, (1917) 244 U. S. 325.
64 (1915) 238 U. S. 67.
65 (1916) 242 U. S. 283.
66 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1916) 240 U. S. 324.
67 Michigan C. R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, (1915) 236 U. S. 615; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1915) 238 U.S. 1; Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 351. See 28 Harvard Law Review 799.
68 Sutton v. New Jersey, (1917) 244 U. S. 258. See 3 Virginia Law Register, n.s. 376.
69 Puget Sound Traction L. & P. Co. v. Reynolds, (1917) 244 U. S. 574. See 66 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 83.
70 Phoenix R. Co. v. Geary, (1915) 239 U. S. 277.
71 (1916) 240 U. S. 518.
72 (1917) 242 U. S. 603. See 84 Central Law Journal 209, 3 Iowa Law Bulletin 245, and 62 Ohio Law Bulletin 241.
73 (1917) 244 U. S. 39.
74 (1916) 241 U. S. 252. See 17 Columbia Law Review 710.
75 (1915) 235 U. S. 651. See 63 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 430.
76 (1916) 240 U. S. 294.
77 (1917) 244 U. S. 191.
78 (1917) 243 U. S. 422.
79 (1915) 239 U. S. 388. See 82 Central Law Journal 80.
80 (1917) 244 U. S. 492.
81 12 American Political Science Review 29–32.
82 (1914) 235 U. S. 292.
83 (1916) 240 U. S. 319. See 82 Central Law Journal 279.
84 (1915) 237 U. S. 642.
85 (1916) 240 U. S. 184.
86 (1916) 240 U. S. 625.
87 (1915) 239 U. S. 103.
88 (1915) 238 U. S. 143.
89 (1916) 239 U. S. 478. See 14 Michigan Law Review 502, and 1 Southern Law Quarterly 256.
90 (1916) 240 U. S. 55. See 82 Central Law Journal 189 and 14 Michigan Law Review 419.
91 (1915) 239 U. S. 207.
92 For another case in which a special assessment was sustained, see Houck v. Little River Drainage District, (1915) 239 U. S. 254, which held that a maximum tax of 25 cents an acre could be imposed upon lands within a drainage district to defray preliminary expenses, even though some of the owners assessed may not be benefited by the completed drainage plans.
93 (1915) 239 U. S. 441. See 29 Harvard Law Review 550.
94 (1916) 240 U. S. 242.
95 (1914) 235 U. S. 23.
96 (1916) 241 U. S. 419.
97 (1914) 237 U. S. 135.
98 (1917) 244 U. S. 499. See 31 Harvard Law Review 307.
99 (1917) 244 U. S. 522.
100 United States v. Hvoslef, (1915) 237 U. S. 1. See Goodwin, C. N., “United States v. Hvoslef: A Constitutional Source of National Revenue Impaired,” 29 Harvard Law Review 469.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
101 Thames & Mersey M. Ins. Co. v. United States, (1915) 237 U. S. 19.
102 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 103; Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, (1916) 240 U. S. 115; Dodge v. Osborn, (1916) 240 U. S. 118. See Hackett, F. W., “Constitutionality of the Graduated Income Tax Law,” 25 Yale Law Journal 427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also 4 California Law Review 336, 26 Columbia Law Review 530, 14 Michigan Law Review 680, and 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 498.
103 A similar provision on the corporation tax of 1909 was sustained in Anderson v. Forty-two Broadway, (1915) 239 U. S. 69.
104 (1917) 243 U. S. 563. See 54 National Corporation Reporter 902.
105 (1915) 239 U. S. 244.
106 (1916) 240 U. S. 30.
107 (1916) 240 U. S. 572.
108 To a similar effect is Greenleaf Johnson L. Co. v. Garrison, (1915) 237 U. S. 251. See 28 Harvard Law Review 806.
109 (1916) 241 U. S. 351.
110 (1917) 243 U. S. 316. See 30 Harvard Law Review 764.
111 (1915) 239 U. 8. 323.
112 (1915) 238 U. S. 846. See 81 Central Law Journal 145.
113 (1915) 239 U. S. 57.
114 Ramapo Water Co. v. New York, (1915) 236 U. S. 579, arose out of the same project, from which the complainant sought to restrain the city on the ground that it interfered with its vested rights acquired by a charter giving it power to store and supply water. The company had proceeded no further under its charter than to file maps and acquire options on some lands in the district to be taken for the municipal reservoir. The Supreme Court disposed of the contention by saying that in the absence of a decision on the point from the state court it would refuse to believe that the complainant had acquired any vested rights by what it had done under its charter.
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