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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Any attempt impartially to analyze the issues involved in the controversy between President Wilson and Senator Chamberlain, which culminated in a victory for the former in the passage of the Overman bill, will meet with serious difficulties. An error, too common to much current journalism, and not entirely absent from the more technical and highly specialized articles when they deal with political subjects, is that of attributing a certain result to one factor when it is brought about by a plexus of causes. Most important political controversies, especially those of national import, involve numerous currents of cause and effect, which, to be understood clearly and appraised impartially, demand of the conscientious publicist careful consideration in their true relationship. Because the fight over coördination involved many prominent men, much diversity of opinion, issues both national and international, and—though indirectly—the question of universal military service, its treatment in an adequate manner is by no means easy.
What is meant by coördination? The noun is defined in the Century dictionary as “the act of arranging in due order or proper relation, or in a system; the state of being so ordered.” The verb “to coördinate” is defined: “to place, arrange, or set in due order or proper relative position; bring into harmony or proper connection and arrangement.”
1 The only amendment accepted by the administration leaders, that proposed by Senator Jones of Washington, a supporter of the Overman bill, limits the effect of the reorganizations made under the bill to six months instead of one year after the war.
2 “The President of the United States is the ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the active service of the United States.’ The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself and it is at the same time so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have in other respects coupled the Chief Magistrate with a council have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.” The Federalist, Paper 74.
3 “Of all the cares and concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. Unity of plan, promptitude, activity and decision are indispensable to success, and these can scarcely exist except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the power. Even the coupling of the authority of an executive council with him in the exercise of such powers enfeebles the system, divides the responsibility and not infrequently defeats every energetic measure. Timidity, indecision, obstinacy and pride of opinion must mingle in all such councils and infuse a torpor and sluggishness destructive of all military operations. Indeed, there would seem to be little reason to enforce the propriety of giving this power to the Executive Department (whatever may be its actual organization), since it is in exact coincidence with the provisions of our State constitutions, and therefore seems to be universally deemed safe if not vital to the system.” Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United states, chapter xxxvii.
4 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. ed. 281.
5 The new British war cabinet of five members replaced, not a single executive, but an unwieldy body of twenty-three; and clearly involved supplanting the former prime minister.
6 The handling of the Irish question by the British cabinet offers ample illustration of the truth of this statement.
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