Despite the fact that physicians have dispensed prescription drugs for profit for several years, the practice is currently under intense challenge and controversy. This recent flare-up can be explained by several factors including the involvement of the Federal Trade Commission (FTQ, increased competition among physicians, alternative delivery systems and drug repackagers.

Federal laws including the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and Controlled Substances Act regulate dispensing practices, but have been interpreted to regulate dispensing by pharmacists, not physicians. All states have laws applicable to the dispensing of prescription drugs by physicians, but the wording of these laws raises unclear legal issues. Both uncertainty about these legal issues and pharmacists' concern over the increase in physician dispensing has promoted state legislative efforts to restrict or regulate the practice. These legislative efforts and the corresponding regulatory actions by state boards have triggered FTC involvement.

From a social policy perspective physician dispensing raises significant concerns of ethics, conflicts of interest, patient welfare and economics. Based upon social policy, physician dispensing for profit is not a practice which should be condoned or allowed to flourish.

The authors present a case study to illustrate how a mentally impaired but socially intact nursing home resident, who had no one to act as an advocate for her, was denied appropriate treatment for an acute illness which ultimately resulted in her death. The case raises important questions about advocacy for the mentally-impaired, acutely-ill institutionalized patient. This Article explores the role of the advocate, how advocates are selected, what qualities and talents they should possess, and what responsibilities should be assigned to them. The authors suggest that nursing home residents should be encouraged to engage in self-advocacy to the greatest extent possible. The competent elderly should be urged to name their preferred advocates. Individuals who serve in advocacy roles should be advised to seek information regarding the patient's wishes from those who know the patient well. Furthermore, there is a need for quality education and training of those who serve in advocacy roles on behalf of nursing home residents, and state laws need to specify the responsibilities of persons who serve as advocates.

Within the past few years a number of children have been excluded from attending public school because they are linked to AIDS. School boards have justified their decisions to exclude these children on the basis that protecting the public's health, safety and welfare outweighs the rights of these children. Most courts have rejected this justification and have held that either under the equal protection clause of the Constitution or section 504 of the Rehabilitaiton Act of 1973, children cannot be excluded from the classroom solely because they are linked to AIDS.

This Note discusses both section 504 and equal protection analyses used by the courts. When analyzing a school board's decision to exclude an AIDS-linked child from the classroom, most courts have used a higher level of scrutiny and individualized inquiry in order to ensure that the rights of both the AIDS-linked child and his or her uninfected classmates and teachers are protected.

After applying these analyses to a hypothetical case, this Note concludes that both section 504 and the equal protection clause ensure that AIDS-linked children will not be barred from the classroom unless the presence of additional factors increases the risk of these children transmitting the virus to others.

Criminal confessions made in response to custodial questioning are excluded from evidence unless a defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. In Connelly, the Supreme Court erred by holding that, absent explicit police coercion, a mentally ill individual's waiver is valid. The Court failed to consider the defendant's subjective impairments that might invalidate his waiver. By contrast, the Patterson Court suggested that a defendant's right to counsel may attach at an early stage in a criminal proceeding if the defendant has a significant need for counsel.

This Note addresses the special needs of a mentally retarded person in the criminal justice system. The Note argues that mentally retarded suspects require careful explanation of Miranda rights in order to understand them. The intellectual and adaptive deficiencies which characterize mental retardation also necessitate an inquiry into a valid waiver that accounts for these disabilities. Furthermore, the special needs of the mentally retarded mandate that the right to counsel attach as early as the precustodial stage of an investigation. Early access to counsel most effectively assures that a mentally retarded person's waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.