In screening the majority of job applicants, most of this nation's railroads administer a low-back X-ray examination in an attempt to ascertain the likelihood that the applicant will sustain future work-related low-back pain or injury. Many applicants are rejected for employment on the basis of the X-ray findings. The railroads apparently perceive this screening program as a cost-effective means (1) of decreasing the incidence of compensation claims for work-related injuries, brought against the rail-roads under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), (2) of reducing the number of lost workdays resulting from low-back pain or injury, and (3) of protecting particularly susceptible workers from job-related hazards.

The authors of this Article submit that low-back X-ray examinations are poor predictors of future low-back pain or injury. They assert that the railroads' use of such examinations misclassifies a substantial number of job applicants as being at increased risk for such pain or injury, and, in consequence, unfairly denies them employment. Furthermore, the authors claim, the screening program has other negative consequences. For example, applicants rejected for railroad employment on the basis of X-ray findings may as a result have difficulty finding jobs in other industries. In addition, they state, there is a potential radiation hazard to examinees. Moreover, both the railroads and those applicants accepted for employment may inappropriately be reassured by normal findings.

On balance, the authors conclude, the screening program has a negative social value. The authors suggest that the program, in effect, erroneously labels many applicants as handicapped, and then denies them employment. Such persons might have legal recourse under federal and state statutes prohibiting employment discrimination against the handicapped.

Certificate-of-need statutes give designated state agencies veto power over investment in health care facilities. Some states have sought to temper the arbitrary character of this power by expanding the opportunities for community input into the certificate-of-need process. Massachusetts, for example, has enacted a statute that allows groups of ten taxpayers to petition for a public hearing on any certificate-of-need application.

Some observers question whether the benefits of taxpayer-group participation are substantial enough to compensate for the delays and abuses that the statute allegedly invites. To help resolve this question, this Comment examines historical data on Massachusetts taxpayer groups and on their activities and assesses the significance of their composition and tactics to the certificate-of-need process.

Although flaws exist in the Massachusetts ten-taxpayer mechanism, in this writer's view it has succeeded partially in making the certificate-of-need process responsive to community opinion. Many groups lack the skills and qualities needed to make constructive use of the ten-taxpayer mechanism. Nevertheless, it serves a valuable purpose by creating a public forum for and by encouraging public participation in the certificate-of-need process, especially by those who might otherwise try to circumvent that process through use of special legislation, of private pressure, or of other similar means.

Two recent cases have raised important questions concerning the appropriateness of state intervention in parental choices of unorthodox medical treatment for children with life-threatening conditions. This Note first discusses whether, and if so, when, state intervention in a child's treatment selection by its parents is appropriate, and then analyzes the tests a court should apply in deciding upon an appropriate treatment. The Note recommends a decision-making approach that requires the appropriate state agency to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents' choice of medical treatment either is directly or is indirectly harming their child. Under this approach, if the state meets its burden of proof the court then must apply the ‘best interests’ test, rather than the ‘substituted judgment’ test, to choose an appropriate medical treatment for the child.