This Article explores who, in the first instance, should decide whether to withhold or withdraw treatment from a defective newborn. The Article begins by defining the term “severely defective newborn” and discussing potential sources of liability for persons who decide to withhold or withdraw treatment. It next analyzes the ability of parents, physicians, and courts to make these treatment decisions. The Article concludes that, although parents and physicians may eventually make the specific determination, the legislature should at least set guidelines so that the decisions will be, in some measure, consistent, predictable, adequately informed, and in accord with community values.

The Supreme Court of the United States and other courts currently are considering the question of the extent to which the health care field should be subject to antitrust rules. This Article explores the special characteristics of the health care field, and the problems they create for antitrust analysis. Two current cases—Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society (awaiting decision by the Supreme Court) and Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. (pending in the District of Massachusetts)—illustrate the issues raised by efforts to contain health care costs through the setting of maximum fees. This Article suggests that traditional antitrust principles should and will prevail over arguments that such restraints are in the public interest.

In the past, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were victims of anticompetitive practices, but the growth of HMOs casts them as potential antitrust violators. Such contentions should be halted since they frustrate growth encouraged by both the federal and state governments.

This Note discusses a solution to the potential antitrust problems. HMOs can be exempt partially from antitrust regulation by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. To secure immunity under McCarran-Ferguson, the entity must function in the business of insurance, be regulated by the state, but not be engaged in acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.

This Note sets forth potential antitrust violations by HMOs, examining the possible application of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption to them. Each of the elements required to satisfy McCarran is discussed in general and applied to HMOs. This Note concludes that the exemption can be applied to HMOs so long as their conduct fulfills the requirements of the McCarran Act.

A decertification action by the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) substantially impacts on the lives of Medicaid patients who reside in the affected nursing home. Decertification means that the federal government, the state government, or both will no longer pay for the care of Medicaid patients in the decertified home. Thus, a decision to decertify necessitates the transfer of elderly and infirm Medicaid patients out of the decertified home. Since this transfer may threaten the lives and health of these patients, they should be granted the right to participate in pre-decertification proceedings.

However, in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, the Supreme Court decided that patients do not have the right to participate in predecertification proceedings. The Court rejected the patients’ due process arguments, finding: 1) that decertification does not deprive the patients of any constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property; and 2) that any adverse consequences of decertification are only an “indirect and incidental” result of government action.

This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court opinion and concludes that the patients have protectable property and life interests that entitle them to participate in some form of hearing prior to the decertification of the nursing home where they reside. In addition, this Comment suggests alternative methods for asserting nursing home patients’ legal rights.