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The Interfaces of Law and Medicine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2021

Cyril H. Wecht
Cyril H. Wecht*
Affiliation:
Pittsburgh Institute of Legal Medicine, Duquesne Law School; Faculty of the Pittsburgh School of Medicine and Dentistry; Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
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Abstract

The relationship between the legal and medical professions is improving, but many problems remain. There has been and continues to be substantial growth in medicolegal organizations of various kinds. Better medicolegal investigative methods are being developed, and medicolegal teaching programs are on the increase. The two professions have worked together successfully on such problems as human heart transplantation and drug abuse. On the other hand, several problem areas continue to cause difficulty and friction, including medical experimentation on humans, the legal definition of death, abortion, euthanasia, and medical malpractice. The author calls on the existing medicolegal organizations to apply their expertise and influence to define and resolve these problems.

Type
ASLM Annual Oration
Information
American Journal of Law & Medicine , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , March 1975 , pp. 89 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics and Boston University 1975

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References

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

2 Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1973); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

3 Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338 (1965).

4 Flores, Sata Rosa Municipal Ct., Calif. (Dec. 1974) Lyons, Cal. Sup. St. (May 22, 1974).

5 Tucker's Adms. v. Lower, Ct. of Law and Equity, Richmond, Va. (May 25, 1972, No. 2831).

6 Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207 (1938).

7 Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 379 S.W.2d 788 (Texas Civ. App. 1964).

8 Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579 (1958).

9 KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).

10 MD. ANN. CODE, ART. 43, § 54F (Maryland Acts of 1972, ch. 693, sec. 2).

11 VA. CODE SEC. 32-364. 3:1 (Virginia Acts of 1973, ch. 252).

12 Fla. H. 551, 2d Fla. Legal (1971), 111. H. 1586 77 Gen. Assem. 1st Sess. (1971), and Wise. S. 550 Bienn. Sess. (1971).

13 Subsequent to these remarks, the ABA's Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law Section approved the following definition of death: “For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of brain function, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead.“ (ABA Annual Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 12, 1974.) Also, in September, 1974 the State of California adopted a statute which permits physicians to pronounce a patient dead if the patient has suffered “total and irreversible cessation of brain function.” Hospitals, J.A.H.A., (Oct. 16, 1974).

14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

15 Helling v. Carey, Sup. Ct. Washington (March 14, 1974).

16 The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert, denied 287 U.S. 662 (radio sets required for ocean going tugs in spite of trade practice to the contrary).

17 Id. at 741.

18 Gonzales v. Nork, Calif. Superior Ct. (1974).

19 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 50 111. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964); cert, denied, 383 U.S. 46 (1965).