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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2021
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or the “Act”) litigation presents a standing paradox. In the current posture, it appears that states lack standing to challenge the federal law on behalf of individuals, while individuals possess standing to challenge the federal law on behalf of states. This Article contends that there is no principled reason for this asymmetry and argues that standing doctrine should apply as liberally to states as to individuals, assuming states allege the constitutional minimum requirements for standing and especially where the legal challenge turns on the allocation of power between the federal government and the states. While states may have no greater claim to judicial review of federal laws than individuals, they should not have any less.
The Supreme Court will not have to reach this particular procedural conundrum to decide the merits of the Florida lawsuit on which it granted certiorari because the particular constellation of plaintiffs before the Court covers all fronts.
1 This contention is both broader and less qualified than previous commentators’ suggestions. See, e.g., Schapiro, Robert A., Judicial Federalism and the Challenges of State Constitutional Contestation, 115 Penn. St. L. Rev. 983, 1005 (2011)Google Scholar (expressing concern with judicial decisions granting states “a special pass into court” or granting “special solicitude” to state standing, and concluding, “[p]erhaps states deserve no less judicial protection than other parties, but they do not seem to need more”); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 519 (1995) (limiting state standing to challenge federal legislation to situations in which states’ interests are primarily threatened and denying state standing “when individuals are the more immediate objects of such regulation”).
2 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.); Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012); Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
3 Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604; see 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(b) (West 2012) (requiring that all “applicable individuals” (1) shall maintain “minimum essential coverage” for themselves and their dependents, or (2) pay a monetary penalty).
4 Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2012) (extending Medicaid eligibility to adults under age sixty-five, who are not pregnant and not already covered, with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (listing limits on conditional spending power).
5 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603, and cert. granted sub nom. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604, and cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604.
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (listing three requirements for standing, including “injury in fact”).
7 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270-71 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
8 Jess Bravin & Vanessa O’Connell, Business Owner's Bankruptcy Disclosed to Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204879004577108951415171134.html (discussing changed circumstances of one plaintiff, which might impact her standing to bring a challenge to the individual mandate).
9 See Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977) (regarding requirements of association standing).
10 See Orders in Pending Cases, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604, Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders%5C011712zor.pdf (granting NFIB's motion to add additional individual petitioners and respondents to the litigation); Jess Bravin & Emily Maltby, Health-Law Opponents Try to Add Plaintiffs to Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204331304577141072540030502.html.
11 See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 21-22, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (No. 11- 400) (U.S. Jan. 10, 2012), 2012 WL 105551, available at http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/States+brief+as+petitioner+%28Medicaid%29.pdf (summary of argument).
12 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (regarding disposal of radioactive waste); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (involving minimum drinking age).
13 One statutory role for states with respect to the individual mandate is tied to health insurance exchanges, which are required to certify individuals as exempt from the individual mandate. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(d)(4), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Accordingly, if states elect to operate their own exchanges, rather than leaving that task to the federal government, they would be required to perform that certification function.
14 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) (West 2012) (providing federal income tax penalty); id. § 5000A(g) (specifying federal enforcement).
15 See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012) (noting that “the question of the state plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the individual mandate is an interesting and difficult one, in the posture of this case, it is purely academic and one we need not confront today”).
16 Id. (noting that “[t]he law is abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim—as is the case here—we need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing” and citing cases); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (noting that only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit the Court to consider the petition for review).
17 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
18 See infra Part III (summarizing lower court decisions).
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1968).
20 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004).
21 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Id. at 560.
23 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
24 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
25 Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26 See FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989).
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
28 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see generally Scalia, Antonin, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983)Google Scholar (explaining that standing is an integral part of the separation of powers doctrine).
29 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.”).
30 Fletcher, William A., The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 233 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (noting that separation of powers principle “counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed… .’ We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul of that structural principle.”) (internal citation omitted); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 985 (citing sources).
32 See Allen, 486 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
33 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“Well before the creation of the modern administrative state, we recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”); see also Schapiro, supra note 1, at 986; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 390.
34 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (noting “effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States’ interests”); Wechsler, Herbert, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558 (1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“[T]he national political process in the United States—and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central government—is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.”); see also Choper, Jesse H., The Scope of National Powers Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that the national political system protects states’ interests in Congress and that the federal courts should focus on individual rights); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 983 (noting that “states may actively oppose national policy” through political means).
35 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 988; Woolhander & Collins, supra note 1, at 439-40; see supra note 34 (listing examples).
36 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012).
37 Id. § 4980H.
38 See Hall, Mark A., The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 40, 44–47 (2009)Google ScholarPubMed (considering individual rights claims); Moncrieff, Abigail R., Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the Extension of Structural Protection to Non-Fundamental Liberties, 64 Fla. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012)Google Scholar (manuscript at 4-5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919272 (explaining “that, in most scholars’ view, the individual mandate simply does not infringe liberty—at least not in any constitutionally meaningful way” and considering and dismissing various other arguments).
39 In fact, the risk-pooling objective of the individual mandate is served all the better if individuals purchase, but do not use, health insurance. The individual mandate aims to redistribute the cost of insurance among high-risk and low-risk individuals by requiring everyone to purchase a policy. Premiums paid by low-risk individuals who purchase insurance but do not use their coverage will subsidize high-risk individuals whose medical costs exceed their premium contributions.
40 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”).
41 See Chemerinsky, Erwin, A Defense of the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 618, 618 (2011)Google Scholar (“The Supreme Court has made it clear in terms of due process that the government can regulate the economy so long as it has a rational basis for doing so.”); Levy, Richard E., Escaping Lochner 's Shadow: Towards a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 329, 344-45 (1995)Google Scholar (noting that since 1937, the Court routinely applies “the deferential rational basis test” to economic liberty claims and that “[u]nder this test, the government need only show that a measure is reasonably related to some conceivable legitimate purpose”).
42 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117) (reasoning that Congress had a rational basis for the individual mandate).
43 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West 2012).
44 Id. § 300gg-1(a).
45 Id. § 300gg-2(b).
46 Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1244-48 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012) (summarizing congressional findings regarding healthcare and health insurance systems); Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 544-45 (citing congressional record and other sources).
47 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2358 (2011) (challenging conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 229, which forbids knowing possession or use, for nonpeaceful purposes, of a chemical that “can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans”).
48 Id. at 2364.
49 See Garrett Epps, U.S. v. Bond : Reexamining the Mysterious 10th Amendment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/02/us-v-bondreexamining-the-mysterious-10th-amendment/71436/ (suggesting that the case offers “oblique hints about how the Justices are thinking about the pending health-care challenge”); Frank Minter, Did the Supreme Court Tip Its Hand on ObamaCare?, AM. THINKER (June 23, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/06/did_the_supreme_court_tip_its_hand_on_obamacare.html (quoting Justice Kennedy's question during the Bond argument and suggesting it foreshadows “how he might rule on ObamaCare”). But see Liptak, Adam, Court Weighs the Power of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011Google Scholar, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/us/politics/23scotus.html (suggesting that unique facts of Bond “ offer[s] only limited guidance on the health care law's prospects”).
50 See Reed Amar, Akhil, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse 1983” in Context, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1229, 1244 (2004)Google Scholar (“[T]he federal Constitution … establishes a minimum baseline—a floor— that state judges must respect on penalty of reversal. But the floor need not become a ceiling.”).
51 Jost, Timothy S., Can the States Nullify Health Reform?, 362 New Eng. J. Med. 869, 870 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (describing “first-generation” nullification statutes and amendments, which were not aimed at actual federal legislation); see infra notes 94-95 (describing Virginia's and other states’ Health Care Freedom Acts). Before ACA, such laws would not be preempted and could have been intended to block state legislators from enacting a state-level individual health insurance mandate, such as Massachusetts did in 2006. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111M, § 2 (2010) (“Duty for certain adults to obtain and maintain creditable coverage.”).
52 See Gardner, James A., The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 771 (1991)Google Scholar.
53 Id.; see also Kahn, Paul W., Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147, 1147, 1159 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (noting that state constitutionalism should be free from that of the federal government); Linde, Hans A., First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 390-91 (1980)Google Scholar (noting the tendency for state law arguments to be undermined).
54 See, e.g., Balkin, Jack M. & Levinson, Sanford, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1052-54 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chemerinsky, Erwin, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 7, 7–8 (2001)Google Scholar; Hasen, Richard L., Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 177, 177 (2005)Google Scholar (“As part of [the new federalism] revolution, the Court has greatly restricted the ability of Congress to pass laws regulating the conduct of the states under its enforcement powers granted in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment … .”); Modisett, Jeffrey A., Discovering the Impact of the “New Federalism” on State Policy Makers: A State Attorney General's Perspective, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 141, 141 (1998)Google Scholar.
55 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Controlled Substances Act raised by users and growers of marijuana); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Violence Against Women Act raised by rape defendants); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act brought by criminal defendant); see also, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (alien sought review of deportation order, challenging Federal Immigration and Nationality Act on separation of powers grounds); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (fruit grower challenged Arizona intrastate packing and processing requirement on dormant Commerce Clause grounds); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (hearing father's suit to enjoin enforcement of federal child labor law as violating 10th Amendment), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 426-27, 432 (1871) (invalidating state sales tax on Commerce Clause grounds on individual's challenge).
56 See Smith, Peter J., Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1723, 1746 (2011)Google Scholar (discussing effect of allowing structural federalism challenge to individual mandate would “categorically preclude” Congress from taking certain actions intruding on individual liberty, whereas individual liberty claim would allow Congress to justify the intrusion with “compelling government interests”).
57 Id. at 1739-40, 1746 (observing that some collective action problems, such as the difficulty individuals with pre-existing conditions face obtaining insurance, may call for a national solution and that striking down the individual mandate on structural grounds would prevent Congress from addressing those problems, even if states are simply unable). But see Siegel, Neil S., Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 Const. Comment. 591, 607-09 (2011)Google Scholar (suggesting that congressional exercise of commerce power to mandate purchase of health insurance could be justified as a collective action problem).
58 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2012) (listing requirements for state plans to receive federal matching dollars, expanding Medicaid eligibility).
59 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(b) (West 2012) (mandating that “an applicable individual” maintain “minimum essential coverage” and providing penalties for noncompliance).
60 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923); see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 490-92.
61 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 479.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 480.
64 Id. at 482.
65 Id. at 486.
66 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (citing cases).
67 Id. at 600-02 (setting out categories of cases); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 989-93 (describing same).
68 See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (allowing one state to sue another state on its own behalf and as representative of consuming public over state law restricting natural gas pipelines); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 989 (describing states’ proprietary interests).
69 Snapp, 485 U.S. at 601 (regarding “maintenance and recognition of borders”); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 415-16 (summarizing cases).
70 Snapp, 485 U.S. at 601.
71 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also Schapiro, supra note 1, at 990.
72 See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1256-66 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
73 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 990; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 492-93.
74 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24.
75 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119-25 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4, and noting limited federal authority under 15th Amendment).
76 Alfred L. Snapp & Son. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 593.
79 Id.
80 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609.
81 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 609-10; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (allowing state standing in antitrust action on proprietary and parens patriae grounds).
84 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
85 Id. at 504.
86 Id. at 514-15 (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)).
87 Id. at 515 (quoting Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 66 (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
88 Id. at 522 (“Because the Commonwealth ‘owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal property,’ … it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.” (internal citation omitted)).
89 Id. (citing and quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
90 Id. at 520.
91 Id. at 521.
92 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 508-09 (urging that “courts should allow states standing to challenge federal legislation that regulates state administrative machinery directly” and citing cases, including New York v. United States). Unlike the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in Mellon, states challenging ACA's Medicaid provisions long ago agreed to participate in that cooperative program.
93 See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012); infra Part III (discussing state standing analysis in the case).
94 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-34301:1 (2010) (“No resident of this Commonwealth … shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual health insurance coverage.”). See generally THE TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., HEALTH CARE FREEDOM ACT, http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/nullification/health-care/.
95 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11- 420); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 998-1002 (discussing district court opinion and suggesting that state involvement facilitated justiciability of the claim).
96 The Court agreed to hear arguments on whether the individuals’ challenge to the individual mandate is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (No. 11-400), and whether the individual mandate, if unconstitutional, is severable from the rest of ACA, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 123 S. Ct. 604.
97 See supra note 10 (describing substitution of individual plaintiffs in the Florida lawsuit before the Supreme Court).
98 Cf. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (regarding whether individual Medicaid beneficiaries and providers can bring Supremacy Clause challenge to enjoin states’ compliance with federal medical requirements); see also Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, OYEZ (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_09_958.
99 See infra Appendix A.
100 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
101 Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603 (No. 11-393) (mem.); Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (No. 11-398) (mem.); Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (No. 11-400) (mem.).
102 See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2011).
103 Id. at 1272.
104 Id. at 1270-71; see also Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1144-48 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
105 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-71.
106 Id. at 1270.
107 Id. at 1271-72.
108 Id. at 1272.
109 Id. (quoting Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420). See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the Virginia standing decision, ultimately overruling Judge Hudson's opinion.
110 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
111 See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
116 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1243.
117 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117).
118 Id. at 549.
119 Id. at 533.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 536.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 537.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 538.
126 Id.
127 The court also held that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the plaintiffs’ challenge. Id. at 540.
128 Id. at 549.
129 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), petition for cert filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438).
130 This lawsuit was separate from the Commonwealth of Virginia's lawsuit challenging the individual mandate. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing Virginia's solo lawsuit).
131 See Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22, 626.
132 Id. at 621 n.6.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 621.
135 Id. at 622 n.7.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 623.
138 Id. at 622.
139 Id. at 622-23.
140 Id. at 626.
141 See Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438).
142 Id. at *14.
143 Id. at *4; see 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006) (providing that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person”).
144 See Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (granting review of question “[w]hether the suit brought by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)”).
145 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
146 Id. at 5.
147 See, e.g., Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2011), en banc denied sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar 17, 2011), aff’d, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 24 (agreeing with Judge Vinson that speculative changed circumstances before or in 2014 did not defeat standing).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 24-25 (citing Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
153 Id. at 26.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 33-35.
156 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 5 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679).
157 See id. at 21-54 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (dissenting as to jurisdiction and not deciding the merits).
158 Id. at 5-14.
159 Id. at 20. The plaintiffs have also sought Supreme Court review of this decision. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d 1 (No. 11-679), available at http://acalitigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Cert+petition+%2811.30.2011%29.pdf.
160 No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 4072875 (M.D. Pa. 2011); see also Goudy-Bachman v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
161 See Goudy-Bachman, 2011 WL 4072875, at *1.
162 Id. at *2.
163 Id. at *2 n.3 (citing trial court record); 764 F. Supp. 2d. at 690-91 (summarizing plaintiffs’ assertions).
164 Goudy-Bachman, 2011 WL 4072875, at *2; Goudy-Bachman, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
165 Goudy-Bachman, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
166 Id. at 692.
167 Goudy-Bachman, 2011 WL 4072875, at *1.
168 See infra Appendix B.
169 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
170 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-CV- 00030 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011).
171 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268. The Virginia HCFA provides: “No resident of this Commonwealth … shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual health insurance coverage … .” VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-34301:1 (2010).
172 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268.
173 AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, STATE LEGISLATURES GUIDE TO REPEALING OBAMACARE 12 (2011), available at http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/State_Leg_Guide_to_Repealing_ObamaCare.pdf.
174 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 266 (noting that “Virginia challenges one provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”).
175 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982)).
179 See id. at 604-05 (discussing TAIA); id. at 607-08 (discussing ripeness); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 999-1001 (noting that state's involvement overcame ripeness and TAIA obstacles).
180 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
181 Id. at 612.
182 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268.
183 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923); see supra Part II.B (discussing Mellon doctrine)
184 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269; see Stoltzfus Jost, Timothy & Hall, Mark A., Not So Fast—Jurisdictional Barriers to the ACA Litigation, 365 New Eng. J. Med. e34(1), e34(2) (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (noting Fourth Circuit's holding “invoking well-settled law that states may not sue to protect their citizens from federal law, since state citizens are also federal citizens”), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1111295.
185 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269.
186 Id. at 271.
187 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Oklahoma v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-CV-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://acalitigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/U.S.+motion+to+dismiss+%2803.28.11%29.pdf.
188 See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the Florida decision).
189 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
190 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117) (noting that individual plaintiffs demonstrated actual injury by showing that impending requirement to buy health insurance changed their spending and saving habits).
191 See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244 (concluding that “the state plaintiffs undeniably have standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions”).
192 654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011).
193 Id. at 880.
194 Id. at 879.
195 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 879-80.
201 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011).
202 Id. at 236; see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (a), (c)(2)(A) (defining “applicable large employer” as “an employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding calendar year”).
203 See N.J. Physicians, 653 F.3d at 236-37 (citing 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5000A, 4980H (West 2012)).
204 Id. at 239.
205 Id. at 240
206 Id. at 241.
207 Id.
208 446 Fed. Appx. 496 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1037 (2012), reh’g denied, No. 11- 7275, 2012 WL 538800 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 497-98.
211 Id. (quoting N.J. Physicians, 653 F.3d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2011)).
212 Id. (citing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)).
213 Id.
214 809 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss. 2011); Bryant v. Holder, 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 710693 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2011).
215 Bryant, 2011 WL 710693, at *2.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at *11.
220 Id. at *12.
221 Id. at *12 n.7.
222 Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D. Miss. 2011).
223 Id.
224 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
225 Bryant, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (citing Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 569.
229 1:10 CV 101 RWS, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011).
230 Id. at *2 (noting that Kinder initially indicated that he was suing in his individual capacity and “as an advocate for the elderly” but that his amended complaint did not appear to rely on being an advocate and that basis of standing was not considered).
231 Id. at *1.
232 Id. at *4-10.
233 Id. at *4.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)).
237 565 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
238 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *4 (quoting Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526).
239 Id.
240 Id. at *5.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.; see infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
246 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *6.
247 Id.
248 Id.; see 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e) (West 2012).
249 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *6.
250 Missouri Health Care Freedom Act, MO. ANN. STAT.§ 1.330(1) (West 2012) (“No law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system.”).
251 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *7.
252 Id.
253 Id. at *7-8.
254 Id. at *8-10.
255 1:10-CV-71, 2010 WL 4628177 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010).
256 Id. at *1-*3.
257 Id. at *4.
258 Id. at *3 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
259 Id. at *7.
260 No. 1:10-CV-165, 2011 WL 2470456 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2011).
261 Id. at *1.
262 Id. at *6.
263 Id. at *11.
264 Id. at *12.
265 Id. at *13.
266 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011).
267 Id. at 420.
268 Id. at 424.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 425.
272 Id. at 424-25.
273 Id. at 424.
274 Id. at 426.
275 Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012) (granting certiorari on the question of whether Congress had the power to enact the minimum coverage provision).
276 See supra Part II (describing individual rights claims).
277 See supra Part II (describing two ways in which structural federalism could be seen to protect individual rights).
278 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117).
279 See, e.g., Gaudy-Bauchman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684, 670-71 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (regarding decision not to purchase a new car, payments for which plaintiffs could afford absent the individual mandate); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 622-23 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), petition for cert filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438) (describing large employer's allegations).
280 See Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566-67 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (recognizing sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing).
281 Americans who already have health insurance that complies with the individual mandate may not have standing to challenge the individual mandate. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Sebelius, 654 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff failed to allege that he lacked health insurance presently and would not have it in 2014); Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011) (rejecting claim by Medicare beneficiary). But see Seven-Sky v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2011), hearing en banc denied sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar 17, 2011), aff’d, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679) (considering Medicare-eligible plaintiff's suggestion that she would refuse to enroll in Medicare); Bryant, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (alleging that ACA requires individuals not only to obtain, but also to maintain, health insurance).
282 According to recent polls, close to half of Americans oppose ACA. See KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2011), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8265-F.pdf (reporting forty-three percent unfavorable and forty-one percent favorable opinions on the federal health reform law).
283 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
284 See FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989).
285 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923).
286 Id.; Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420); see Vladeck, Stephen I., States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 Univ. Rich. L. Rev. 845, 872-74 (2012)Google Scholar (providing normative reasons for rejecting standing on the allegations in Virginia).
287 See Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (noting that public official asserting state sovereign interest would still have to show his own injury-in-fact); Kinder v. Geithner, No. 1:10-CV-101-RWS, 2011 WL 1576721, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011) (suggesting in dicta that a state might bring a Tenth Amendment challenge, although denying standing to individuals or public officials on that ground). Other opinions, not on standing, equivocate on the enforceability of the Tenth Amendment as a discrete limit on federal powers. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (urging the Court to extend Tenth Amendment limits on spending power, similar to commerce power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-78 (1992) (recognizing that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from compelling state governments to regulate pursuant to federal directive but allows Congress to regulate matters directly and preempt contrary state laws); South Carolina v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (declining to recognize general Tenth Amendment limit on federal spending power); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (admonishing Court for failing to give judicial enforcement to the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (concluding that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered”).
288 See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (threat of sanctions under federal law sufficed for injury-in-fact, allowing individual standing to challenge statute on Tenth Amendment grounds); Purpura v. Obama, 446 Fed. Appx. 496, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1037 (2012), reh’g denied, No. 11-7275, 2012 WL 538800 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (distinguishing Bond plaintiff from ACA plaintiffs because former challenged current incarceration, which would be redressed my favorable judicial decision).
289 My suggestion for state standing based on injury-in-fact respects Professor Vladeck's normative concerns about sovereign interest standing in the Virginia case, including allowing a conflict between state and federal laws to suffice for injury-in-fact, inviting an end-run around principles of judicial restraint through state nullification laws, and expanding state standing at the expense of individual standing. See Vladeck, supra note 286, at 872-73.
290 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *5.
291 Id.
292 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11- 420) (noting that the “mere existence of the lawfully-enacted statute is sufficient to trigger the duty of the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law and the associated sovereign power to enact it”); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2011), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted sub nom. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.), argued, No. 11-398 (Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.), argued, No. 11-400 (Mar. 28, 2012) (quoting Virginia, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 605-06, and agreeing with Judge Hudson's reasoning with respect to Idaho and Utah, two states that had enacted HCFAs); see Mims Crocker, Katherine, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 Va. L. Rev. 2051, 2094-95 (2011)Google Scholar (discussing the Virginia District Court opinion as an example of sovereign interest standing).
293 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272. The Eleventh Circuit did not have to decide the issue of state standing to challenge the individual mandate, including this asserted ground. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1243.
294 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 271. But see generally Cuccinelli, Kenneth T. et al., State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 89, 90 (2012)Google Scholar (Virginia's Attorney General “explain[ing] why those who question Virginia's standing are fundamentally incorrect”).
295 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (disallowing the state to challenge Federal Voting Rights Act on individual rights grounds while recognizing constitutionally protected sovereign interest in state control of voting qualifications).
296 Compare, for example, “trigger laws” that ban abortion within state borders and purport to take effect as soon as federal law permits. See Michael Treanor, William & Sperling, Gene B., Prospective Overruling and the Revival of “Unconstitutional” Statutes, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1902 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berns, Matthew, Note, Trigger Laws, 97 Geo. L.J. 1639 (2009)Google Scholar. Those laws have not and should not be interpreted as allowing states’ standing to challenge federal abortion policy.
297 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 508-09 (suggesting that “courts should allow states standing where states contest the application of federal regulatory burdens directly on states” and citing examples, such as wage-hour laws and pollution control).
298 See Haislmaier, Edmund & Blase, Brian, Obamacare: Impact on States, 2433 Backgrounder 1, 2 (2010)Google Scholar, available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2433.pdf.
299 Id.
300 See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012) (state plaintiffs alleged standing, in part, “because increased enrollment in Medicaid spurred by the individual mandate will cost the states millions of dollars in additional Medicaid funding”).
301 Id.
302 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11- 420).
303 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 514-15 (2007) (noting intervention of states and local governments, including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which, at least, had standing, even if individual plaintiffs’ injuries were not sufficiently particularized).
304 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 515.
305 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
306 See supra Part II (discussing individual plaintiffs’ factual allegations).
307 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 998 n.111 (citing scholarly commentary).
308 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.
309 Id. at 520 n.17.
310 Id. at 519.
311 Id. at 520.
312 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1005.
313 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
314 See Vladeck, supra note 286, at 870 (asserting that “there is no federal statute or constitutional provision that in any way creates or otherwise recognizes a distinct injury that Virginia will suffer as a state as a result of the ACA's minimum essential coverage provision”).
315 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11- 420).
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 See Walsh, Kevin C., The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 55, 73–75 (2012)Google ScholarPubMed (rejecting the Medicaid bootstrap argument for standing because any state injury is merely “indirect,” arising by virtue of private citizens’ reactions to the individual mandate by enrolling in Medicaid).
319 See, e.g., DIANE JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: NEW OPTIONS FOR MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, (2010), available at http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/LTSS_SCAN-FINAL-9-29-10.PDF (observing that “[s]tates have significant roles in implementing practically all aspects of the Affordable Care Act”); RACHEL MORGAN, THE 2011 STATE LEGISLATORS’ CHECK LIST FOR HEALTH REFORM IMPLEMENTATION, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/State_Legislators_Checkdec20.pdf (detailing each provision of ACA calling for state response, including many tied to the individual mandate).
320 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272-73 (reversing district court's standing decision).
321 Id. (citing Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 995 F.2d 510, 513 (4th Cir. 1993)).
322 See, e.g., Prakash, Saikrishna B. & Yoo, John C., The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1459, 1462 (2001)Google Scholar (arguing that process federalism does not adequately protect states’ interests and thus the federal courts must play an active role); Young, Ernest A., Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1815-44 (2005)Google Scholar (arguing that the federal courts have a primary role to play in questions of federalism doctrine).
323 Federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006) (providing that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person”).
324 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (recognizing individual's standing to challenge indictment under federal statute on Tenth Amendment grounds).