The relationship between human rights and humanitarian law is one of the most contentious topics in the history of international law. Most scholars studying their foundations argue that these two fields of law developed separately until the 1960s. This article, by contrast, reveals a much earlier cross-fertilization between these disciplines. It shows how “human rights thinking” played a critical generative role in transforming humanitarian law, thereby creating important legacies for today's understandings of international law in armed conflict.

This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins the goals of fairness, efficiency, and peace that are attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choices should respond to the different contexts that states face.

This article argues that a form of legal regulation is embodied in decisions at the UN Security Council that condone but do not formally authorize specific military operations. Such decisions sometimes inflect or go beyond what the jus ad bellum permits through its general standards—that is, under the prohibition of cross-border force and small handful of exceptions. Recognizing that this form of regulation is both part of the law and different in kind from regulation through the general standards should change how we think about the jus ad bellum.

The article offers an alternative account of the evolution, formation, and function of customary international law (CIL) from a third world perspective. It argues that there is an intimate link between the rise, consolidation, and expansion of capitalism in Europe since the nineteenth century and the development of CIL that is concealed by the supposed distinction between “formal” and “material” sources of CIL. In fact, both “traditional” and “modern” CIL sustain the short-term and systemic interests of global capitalism. It proposes a “postmodern” conception of CIL that would contribute to the global common good.

This article evaluates acceptance of the Tallinn Rules by states on the basis of eleven case studies involving cyberoperations, all occurring after the first Tallinn Manual was published in 2013. Our principal findings are that (1) it is unclear whether states are ready to accept the Tallinn Rules; (2) states show uneven interest in promoting legal certainty in cyberspace; and (3) a growing need for coordinated response to cyberattacks may induce states to consider more favorably the Tallinn Rules.

Although the United States has relied on the ICJ's doctrine of specially-affected states to claim that it and other powerful states in the Global North play a privileged role in the formation of customary international law, the doctrine itself has never been systematically developed by the ICJ or by legal scholars. This article fills that lacuna by addressing two questions: (1) what makes a state “specially affected”?; and (2) what is the importance of a state qualifying as “specially affected” for the formation of custom? It concludes that a theoretically coherent understanding of the doctrine would give states in the Global South significant power over custom formation.

In Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer introduce comparative institutional analysis to evaluate alternative processes for resolving investment disputes. The impetus for this article is clear: many states view investor-state arbitration as akin to a horse that has bolted from the barn. Wishing to close the stable door, a wide range of states are considering the merits of various reform proposals. Puig and Shaffer's comprehensive and balanced framework for assessing the tradeoffs involved in making different choices is thus a welcome and timely intervention in these (often highly polarized) debates.

The orthodox view of the Specially-Affected States Doctrine (SASD), grounded in the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) 1969 judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, is that practice leading to the emergence of a customary rule must include that of states “whose interests were specially affected.” The framing of this passage of the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment seems to imply both a positive and a negative importance for the practice of specially-affected states. Such practice is a requirement for the emergence of a new rule of customary international law. Acceptance by specially-affected states is, in other words, necessary but not sufficient for a rule of custom to emerge. Whether practice of specially-affected states can be sufficient to form a general custom is not resolved by this formulation, although it seems reasonable to infer that the ICJ had in mind that the combined involvement of specially-affected and other states was needed for the formation of such a rule of customary international law concerning basic principles of continental shelf delimitation. Conversely, the absence of rule-supporting practice by specially-affected states would have a negating effect on the emergence of a rule of customary international law, despite rule-affirming practice of states not specially affected. On this view, practice of only such states could not crystalize into a custom. One commentator has suggested that the negative construction does not mean that a single specially-affected state necessarily holds veto power over the formation of a new rule of customary international law, but asserted that “[i]f several ‘states whose interests are specially affected’ object to the formation of a custom, no custom can emerge.” Unsurprisingly, given this level of abstraction, such formulations do not themselves provide specificity as to how many (or which) specially-affected states would be sufficient to prevent the formation of a custom in a particular situation.

Alongside now-controversial investment treaties, many states also maintain domestic investment statutes. Although these laws offer protections similar to investment treaties and are increasingly applied in investor-state arbitration, they have—unlike the treaties—attracted limited scholarly scrutiny. This article argues that investment statutes can plausibly be characterized either as unilateral acts in international law or as domestic law. The article examines the significant consequences that follow from these characterizations, providing the first comprehensive analysis of these hybrid statutes.

Collective action problems with public good characteristics such as climate change have important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in public goods games, can contribute to our understanding of how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with global public goods and common pool resources. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation.

Few in Spain would have imagined two years ago that so much attention would be paid to questions such as the allocation of powers to hold referenda or the constitutional tools to enforce compliance with the 1978 Constitution (Constitution). But since the celebration of a “referendum” on October 1, 2017, and the subsequent declaration of independence and immediate suspension thereof by the president of Catalonia, numerous international voices have taken a stance on Catalonia's right to unilateral secession.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.

In 2017 the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) made only procedural decisions, one on preliminary objections, one on counterclaims, and two on provisional measures. Three other new applications were made to the Court, all linked to earlier cases: Malaysia applied for the revision, and interpretation, of the judgment in the Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh case; and Costa Rica brought a case against Nicaragua concerning their land boundary in the area of Los Portillos, the latest in a long line of cases between the two states. Judges Ronny Abraham (France), Dalveer Bhandari (India), Antonio Cançado Trindade (Brazil), and Abdulqawi Yusuf (Somalia) were reelected to the Court, and one new judge, Nawaf Salam (Lebanon) was elected. The UK failed to secure the reelection of its judge, Christopher Greenwood. For the first time since the establishment of the ICJ, the UK will have no judge on the Court. This failure may be taken as an indication of its declining influence in international relations, arguably attributable in part to Brexit, and it marks the end of the convention that each permanent member of the Security Council will have a judge of its nationality on the Court. Nor was the UK able to prevent a request by the UN General Assembly (passed by ninety-four in favor to fifteen against, with sixty-five abstentions) for an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965—a sensitive issue for the UK, and one that has already been the subject of much litigation.

On November 15, 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) rendered a historic advisory opinion (Advisory Opinion) on the relationship between human rights and the environment. The opinion was a response to a request from Colombia regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction of state parties to the American Convention, in particular their obligations under the rights to life and personal integrity, arising from the construction and operation of large-scale infrastructure projects in the Greater Caribbean region. Colombia's concern was that, due to their dimensions and permanence, such projects could cause significant environmental harm, that goes beyond national borders, and, as a consequence, adversely affect the inhabitants of the whole region and the enjoyment of their rights under the Convention (para. 2). One of the most important aspects of the Advisory Opinion is the Court's finding that in relation to large-scale transboundary infrastructure projects, state parties to the Convention can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain circumstances and thus be responsible for the human rights of the people in the affected area. Another significant finding of the Court is that Article 26 of the American Convention, which provides for the progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, includes an autonomous right to a healthy environment—a right fundamental for the existence of humankind. Finally, the Court directly linked the rights to life and personal integrity with general principles of international environmental under a due diligence obligation. The Court's extensive use of international environmental law instruments, case law, and reasoning could pave the way for greater interconnection and integration between human rights and international environment law obligations.

In its landmark November 24, 2017 judgment in Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. The Republic of Rwanda, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) or Court) held that certain aspects of the right to a fair trial (presumption of innocence and illegal searches) and the right to freedom of expression under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) had been violated by the Republic of Rwanda (Respondent State). In its final orders, however, the Court rejected the applicant's prayer for immediate release and deferred its decision on other forms of reparation. The judgment has broad implications on how African states protect and respect the rights to a fair trial and freedom of expression. The case also offers some vital lessons on state backlash towards human rights litigation and African states’ compliance with decisions of international courts (ICs).

The charm of maritime delimitation and its enigmatic lessons hardly surprise us, yet the reasoning behind them sometimes seems seductively elusive. On September 23, 2017, a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued its decision in Ghana v. Ivory Coast. The glamour of maritime delimitation is reason enough to note the judgment, but the case also addresses the equidistance principle for maritime delimitation, the standard for the acceptance of a tacit agreement, and international responsibility under Article 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

In Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber or Court) released a landmark opinion with broad implications for how states must respect the individual rights of migrants. In the judgment, issued on December 15, 2016, the Court held that Italy's treatment of migrants after the Arab Spring violated the requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that migrants receive procedural guarantees that enable them to challenge their detention and expulsion. The Court also held that Italy's treatment of migrants in detention centers did not violate the ECHR's prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment, in part due to the emergency circumstances involved. The Court further held that Italy's return of migrants to Tunisia did not violate the prohibition on collective expulsion in Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR. Enforcement of the judgment would require many European states to provide a clear basis in domestic law for the detention of migrants and asylum-seekers. Given the global diffusion of state practices involving migrants, and other states’ desires to restrict migration, this case has broad implications for delineating the obligations of states to migrants and the rights of migrants within receiving countries.