The problem of recognition of states and governments has neither in theory nor in practice been solved satisfactorily. Hardly any other question is more controversial, or leads in the practice of states to such paradoxical situations.The reason for this lies in the fact that the term recognition points to twoentirely different acts, not clearly separated either in theory or in practice. A codificationof the norms of general (common) international law concerning recognition must above all furnish a clear distinction between the two functions known as recognition.

In the dedication of his great work, De Jure Belli ac Pads, to Louis XIII of France, Grotius addresses the king as “ everywhere known by the name Just no less than that of Louis. . . . Just, when you call back to life laws that are on the verge of burial, and with all your strength set yourself against the trend of an age which is rushing headlong to destruction; . . . when you offer no violence to souls that hold views different from your own in matter of religion; . . . when by the exercise of your authority you lighten the burden of oppressed peoples.”

The American Society of International Law celebrated last April its thirty-fifth anniversary. It can, therefore, scarce claim the prestige of an ancient and time-honored institution. Notwithstanding this fact, however, in the thirty-five years of its existence theinternational law which it was founded to promote, to expound and to develop, has hadanextraordinarily dramatic existence. Let us look at some of the high lights on this lawduring its historic years from 1906 to the present time.

Events occurring during its nineteenth year created grave problems for the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the Court survived the year with uncertain prospects for the future.

The Court held a series of meetings at The Hague from February 19 to February 26, and an order in the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria between Belgium and Bulgaria was handed down on February 26, 1940.

Two subjects of high importance have recently claimed general attention. Thirty years ago everyone would have said they were settled. Now they are again in the melting-pot. And both concern that all-important matter the freedom of the sea. Both are in dire confusion because assertion has been mistaken for proof.

The Inter-American Neutrality Committee now in session at Rio de Janeiro owes its creation to the spirit of “ continental solidarity” which has developed among the 21 American Republics during recent years. At the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires in 1936, the 21 American Republics adopted a Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reëstablishment of Peace, in which it was provided that in the event that the peace of the American Republics should be menaced, there should be consultation for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful coöperation; and it was further provided that, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation should also take place to determine in what way the American Republics might cooperate in order to preserve the peace of the American continents.

The above question has been raised in the present European conflict, particularly in connection with the use of parachute troops. At the time of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries, many of the German parachute troops who landed behind the Allied lines in those countries and there proceeded to destroy important military objectives or to seize and hold them until joined by reinforcements, allegedly wore Belgian or Netherland uniforms.

At Havana on March 27, 1941, Attorney General Jackson delivered an address designed to prove that as a matter of law the United States was now obliged to render to England (and presumably others) all aid “ short of war,” while “ at the same time it is the declared determination of the government to avoid entry into the war as a belligerent.” Apparently convinced that United States military aid to one belligerent alone cannot be justified by the traditional international law, the Attorney General feels obliged first to explode as obsolete the international law conceptions of war and neutrality of the past two centuries, culminating in The Hague Conventions, and to maintain that a new international law has now been revealed in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, the Budapest “ Articles of Interpretation” of 1934, and the Argentine Anti-War Treaty of 1933, all of which are alleged to make discrimination the new way of life for neutrals. The legislation of Congress requiring impartiality is not accorded even honorable mention. The “ new international law” is thus found in the vague and illusory monuments to the myth called “ collective security,” which crumbled under the impact of the first European crisis. It should be no surprise to the Attorney General that many international lawyers do not share his views on international law or how international law is created, or follow his unique construction of documents.