Early in 1961, the President of Liberia, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, and the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone decided to act as joint sponsors of a conference of the leaders of all the independent African states for the purpose of promoting inter-African co-operation. Liberia, as the the oldest of the three sponsoring states, graciously offered to play host. The idea was that all the African states that were independent at that time were ipso facto eligible for membership of the conference. This conference would include the small group of independent African states, usually referred to as the Casablanca bloc, consisting of the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco. This group had signed the Casablanca Charter which was a brief document setting out the aims and purposes of the organization, among which were schemes of economic and social co-operation and the establishment of an African High Command for the purpose of self-defense of its members as well as for that of ridding the continent of Africa of all forms of colonialism. When, therefore, the decision was taken by the three sponsoring states to call a Pan-African conference, it was envisaged that all the then independent states in Africa, including the so-called Casablanca bloc states, would attend and take a full part in its deliberations.

In the prewar period the principle appeared widely accepted that a new state is not bound by any treaty of its predecessor with the possible exception of a treaty locally connected with its territory. In view of the practice which seems to have changed since then, the appropriateness of this principle as a statement of the general rule is open to question. Some authoritative studies on the practice of several international organizations in relation to state succession indicate a recent tendency to recognize that it is desirable to make provision for the stability and continuity of relationships under general multilateral treaties when new states are formed. A body of the practice of GATT not yet covered by such studies seems to merit special attention mainly for two reasons: first, GATT has developed certain devices whereby both the community interest in maintaining the continuity of multilateral treaty relations and the particular interest of new states in asserting and exercising their freedom as to treaty relations should well be accommodated; and secondly, these devices seem to be susceptible of adoption by other international organizations. The present study seeks to examine how these devices have evolved through the practice of GATT, and attempts an evaluation by pointing out their imperfections as well as notable utility.