Any examination of self-determination runs promptly into the difficulty that while the concept lends itself to simple formulation in words which have a ring of universal applicability and perhaps of revolutionary slogans, when the time comes to put it into operation it turns out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and caveats. In a different turn of phrase, what is stated in big print—as in the reiterated United Nations injunction: All peoples have the right to self-determination—is drastically modified by what follows in small print. Indeed, once the major original exercise of self-determination has been undertaken, the small print takes over and becomes the big print which establishes the new and far more restrictive guidelines.

A quarter of a century has now elapsed since the end of World War II. During that time concerted efforts have been made to bring to justice those responsible for the appalling atrocities committed in the name of the Nazi forces. While many of the principal authors of war crimes have been punished, some of them are known to be still at large. Either by managing to escape detection or by fleeing to a country of haven, they have successfully avoided prosecution and punishment. In other cases 1 judicial proceedings have not yet been completed against persons suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Whether or not we agree with the statement that international law is nothing but “international public morality” or, what amounts to the same thing, that international law is “primitive law” as compared with its municipal counterpart, we are more likely to agree on the question that Soviet doctrinal international law1 is nothing but a mirror reflection of official Soviet governmental and party policies. It is essentially a “fighting international law” 2 which has often proved a valuable weapon in the armory of Soviet foreign policy-makers. The zig-zag development of the Soviet doctrinal approach to the question of international personality in general, and in particular to the international legal status of international organizations, vividly demonstrates this fact. We propose to examine in greater detail just one aspect of the Soviet doctrine of international law—the concept of secondary subjects of international law.