Recent research has shown that state reporting to human rights monitoring bodies is associated with improvements in rights practices, calling into question earlier claims that self-reporting is inconsequential. Yet little work has been done to explore the theoretical mechanisms that plausibly account for this association. This Article systematically documents—across treaties, countries, and years—four mechanisms through which reporting can contribute to human rights improvements: elite socialization, learning and capacity building, domestic mobilization, and law development. These mechanisms have implications for the future of human rights treaty monitoring.

In November 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC or Convention) and its three protocols on human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms. These instruments are the product of three years of diplomatic negotiations, and they represent a substantial contribution to international lawmaking in the area of transnational criminal law. UNTOC has attracted almost universal participation, with 190 states parties at present. Nearly two decades after the adoption of these instruments, however, remarkably little is known about whether states parties have implemented UNTOC and its protocols in their national legislation, whether they enforce such legislation, and whether they make use of UNTOC's provisions concerning international cooperation (e.g., extradition and mutual legal assistance). In other words, the influence of these instruments in practice remains largely unknown.

This dispute, brought by Ukraine against Russia, provides the first discussion in a World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel or Appellate Body Report of the security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). Unusually for a WTO dispute, the Panel (chaired by former WTO Appellate Body Member Georges Abi-Saab) found that Russia had not acted inconsistently with any of the claimed obligations under the GATT or Russia's Accession Protocol. Central to that conclusion was the Panel's understanding of the GATT security exception and the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the challenged measures, which related to trade in transit by road and rail through Russian territory. The Panel found that, since 2014, an emergency in international relations existed between Russia and Ukraine within the meaning of GATT Article XXI(b)(iii) and that the challenged measures fell within this exception. If the exception had not applied, according to the Panel, Ukraine would have established a prima facie case of violation of the provisions on freedom of transit in GATT Article V:2 and equivalent provisions in Russia's Accession Protocol. The decision, which neither party chose to appeal, has significant implications for other disputes in which the security exception has been invoked.

In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepped into uncharted waters as it issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state, then President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir. Following the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC, Al-Bashir was charged by the Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and in 2010, he was also charged with genocide. As a consequence, all of the states parties to the Rome Statute had a duty to arrest Al-Bashir. Several states have nonetheless failed to arrest him during country visits, allowing Al-Bashir to evade the ICC. This has given rise to a number of cases before the ICC Chambers, including this Appeals Chamber judgment regarding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

In Vedanta v. Lungowe, the United Kingdom Supreme Court determined that civil claims for negligence brought by Zambian claimants against an English parent company (Vedanta) and its Zambian subsidiary (Konkola Copper Mines plc (KCM)) for damages experienced in Zambia can proceed in English courts. While framed as a domestic tort law case, the decision is significant for international efforts aimed at holding businesses accountable for their “negative impacts” on human rights. Writing for a unanimous Court, Lord Briggs's judgment hinged narrowly on the right of victims to access substantial justice. More broadly, Lord Briggs suggested that parent companies that hold themselves out in public disclosures as overseeing the human rights, environmental, social, or labor standards employed by their subsidiaries assume a duty of care to those harmed by the subsidiary. This suggestion has the potential to transform current corporate approaches to human rights due diligence and accountability.

In the MV “Norstar” Case (Norstar Case), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) produced two reasoned decisions. In the first, the Tribunal established jurisdiction over the relevant dispute and the admissibility of Panama's claims. In the second, it found that Italy had violated Panama's right to freedom of navigation on the high seas. In the latter decision, the Tribunal relied on an expansive understanding of flag state jurisdiction—prompting a vociferous joint dissent by seven of its twenty-three judges. The majority's understanding of the jurisdictional exclusivity of the flag state as extending to prescriptive as well as enforcement jurisdiction is a significant expansion of flag state rights—and will have a corresponding impact on the way that shipping is regulated internationally.

On October 3, 2019, the United States and the United Kingdom reached a bilateral agreement to facilitate more efficient data access between the two countries for law enforcement purposes. The Agreement on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime (U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement) was signed by U.S. Attorney General William Barr and UK Home Secretary Priti Patel. This is the first such agreement made by the United States after the passage of the 2018 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which authorizes and structures future bilateral agreements on data sharing. Pursuant to the CLOUD Act, Congress has 180 days following receipt of a notification regarding the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement to block its entry into force via a joint resolution, which would require a majority vote in both houses of Congress and either presidential signature or a subsequent congressional override of a presidential veto.

On September 25, 2019, the Third Extraordinary Congress of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) adopted a proposal on terminal dues rates—a decision that led the United States to remain a member state. The United States had given its one-year notice of withdrawal from the UPU eleven months earlier, citing concerns that the existing system unfairly advantaged certain developing nations, including China. Following the UPU's decision, the United States rescinded its notice of withdrawal. Under the new system, the United States can begin self-posting terminal dues rates in July 2020.

On November 4, 2019, the Trump administration notified the United Nations that the United States was withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, prompting expressions of regret from a number of countries. Although President Trump had announced in June 2017 that the United States intended to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, its terms had prevented the United States from giving formal notice of withdrawal until November 4, 2019. The withdrawal will take effect on November 4, 2020. Domestically, the governors of many U.S. states responded to the withdrawal by reaffirming their commitment to the goals of the Paris Agreement, consistent with recurring tensions between the Trump administration and progressive states with respect to climate. In another major manifestation of these tensions, on October 23, 2019, the United States sued California over the state's cap-and-trade agreement with Quebec, Canada, alleging that this agreement is an unconstitutional exercise of foreign affairs powers.

In the fall of 2019, the Trump administration reached several trade arrangements, some of them tentative, with important U.S. trade partners. On October 11, 2019, China and the United States announced a preliminary trade deal subject to finalization—one that came after more than a year of escalating tariffs. Just a week earlier, the United States had signed two trade agreements with Japan, one regarding tariff reductions and the other regarding digital trade. None of these deals appear to require subsequent congressional approval in the eyes of the executive branch, unlike the earlier United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA), which was signed in November 2018 and whose fate in Congress appears promising as of mid-December of 2019. In addition to these trade arrangements, the fall of 2019 saw several developments in trade relations between the United States and the European Union tied to the long-running trade disputes.

Political instability and violence escalated in northeastern Syria in October 2019, following President Trump's decision to withdraw most U.S. troops from the country. Trump's decision left U.S.-backed Kurdish forces vulnerable to attacks by Turkey, intensifying an already dire humanitarian situation. Soon thereafter, Kurdish leaders negotiated an agreement with the Russian-backed Syrian government to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal. By late October, the president of Turkey agreed to a ceasefire in response to diplomatic and economic pressure from the United States and to the arrival of Russian and Syrian troops into northeastern Syria. Shortly thereafter, U.S. forces carried out a raid in northwestern Syria that resulted in the death of the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—a raid that relied in part on intelligence gathered earlier by Kurdish allies.

This review essay examines four edited volumes released in 2018 that address questions concerning the “legitimacy,” “authority,” and “performance” of international courts and tribunals (ICs). Each of the four volumes has a somewhat different focus.