In theory, we may envisage five principal types of national arms policy,reflecting as many policy objectives:

(1) Arming to obtain the greatest possible weapons preponderance on the assumption that armed conflict is imminent. This policy of amassing military forces without regard for its effect on the other side results in an unrestrained arms race.

(2) Arming to deter. The idea of deterrence is familiar to lawyers since it figures so prominently in criminal law. According to Schelling, deterrence as a strategic concept “is concerned with influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave.” Deterrence “requires that there be both conflict and common interest between the parties involved; it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as it is to the case of pure and complete common interest.”

(3) Arms control. This policy envisages measures that aim at reducing the danger of war and at slowing down the arms race. Such measures may or may not involve actual restrictions upon military activities or reduction of armaments.

(4) Comprehensive, reciprocal disarmament (“general and complete disarmament”), usually seen as a scheme “embodied in a single grand treaty leading by stages from less to more drastic and radical measures.” In the final stage, the capabilities of national forces are reduced to those required for internal security only and a centralized international machinery is charged with peacekeeping.

(5) Unilateral disarmament, a concept that is self-explanatory.

In an era of expanding interest in international environmental problems,1 it is essential to examine the rapidly developing state practice concerning man's startling capability, through the use of technology without any hostile intent, adversely to alter not just the immediate environment of his neighbor but common resources shared by all. The present discussion does not attempt to deal with the practice of all states, but rather considers the extent to which legally relevant expectations of restraint, are being shaped by United States practice concerning the use of novel technology in the res communis? The focus on United States practice reflects the belief that, within the confines of a law journal article, considerable light may be shed on world community expectations by an examination of the practice of a state which has a major interest in the field and which is a significant participant in the international law-creating process.

The following inquiry into the internal conflict in East Pakistan suggests that under special circumstances a claim to self-determination, even in a non–colonial setting, may be valid under international law. Although the inherent difficulty is realized in (1) defining self-determination and (2) laying down the precise guidelines for a decision-maker to determine “special” nature of the circumstances, nonetheless it is submitted that a contextual analysis of the East Pakistani conflict, which follows here, demonstrates that at this stage a tentative set of criteria can and should be developed to resolve the conflicting claims revolving around the principles of “territorial integrity,” “self-determination,” and “non-intervention.”

The Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), contains a veritable tour d’horizon of contemporary international law and of the law of international organizations. It ranges over provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and over many articles of the Charter of the United Nations.