For centuries the law of the sea operated efficiently on the basis of customs that had developed through uniform and consistent state practice and that were considered, in most instances, to be obligatory. It was not until the late 19th century that the evolution of the international community suggested the wisdom of codifying the existing and emerging customary norms. Although the early codification efforts were conducted by learned societies established for such purposes, the resulting studies eventually led to several multilateral treaty negotiations, including the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 and the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea. The fruits of this evolution from the predominance of custom towards universal treaty law are found principally in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and, more recently, in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.

How adequate is functionalism as a comprehensive theory of international politics and law? In its classic version, functionalism posits that, as economic and technological interdependence grows, diplomacy and the elaboration of international legal rules will be shaped increasingly by functional concerns and less and less by ideology and “high politics.” While such a trend is evident in some areas of international relations, such as the European Community, it is less so in others. In many negotiations and disputes around the globe, even though the issues may be amenable to a functional approach and resolution, states continue to give great weight to ideological and political considerations in their diplomacy and legal stances. Proponents of functionalism have assumed that the growing tide of functional links and relationships eventually will dominate international relations and render political and ideological conflicts less significant, if not mostly irrelevant. But in many cases, the reverse has happened. International organizations set up for functional purposes have been inundated by political and ideological rivalries, and international legal issues of a functional character have been seized upon by states to advance their ideological and political objectives. Cuba’s policy towards the law of the sea serves as a case study of this problem.

Words mean whatever I say they mean, Humpty-Dumpty rather grandly explained shortly before his accident. Similarly, statutes, perforce, mean whatever those who implement them say they mean.

Three decisions on maritime boundaries in a period of 9 months during 1984-1985 have doubled the body of case law on the delimitation of ocean space. The cases decided by international tribunals prior to 1984 applied only to the continental shelf. The waters overlying the shelf were either part of the high seas or, if subject to coastal state jurisdiction, were left undivided as between neighboring coastal states. However, two of the decisions rendered last year—the decision by a Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Maine case and the one by an ad hoc arbitral tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case—constituted the first judicial determinations of boundaries that divide jurisdiction over both the continental shelf and the water column beyond the territorial sea. The decision by the International Court of Justice in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case represented the fourth in a line of cases delimiting the continental shelf alone.