Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T07:28:46.148Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Was There an Ultimatum Before Pearl Harbor?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2017

Norman Hill
Norman Hill*
Affiliation:
University of Nebraska
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The word ultimatum is used repeatedly in the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and in the testimony given to the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster. In the former it is asserted that the Japanese regarded the “Ten Points” submitted to their government on November 26, 1941, as an ultimatum, and the testimony of Ambassador Grew is cited in support of the statement.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , April 1948 , pp. 355 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1948

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Ch. III , C. 2 and 3, and Ch. IV.

2 Admiral Nagano has stated that the Japanese fleet left Tankan Bay before Secretary Hull’s note of November 26 was received. See The New York Times, Oct. 25, 1941. Rear Admiral T. B. Inglis testified before the Joint Congressional Committee on Nov. 17, 1945, that captured Japanese documents showed that the fleet was ordered on Nov. 25, 1941, to leave port early the next morning.

3 Secretary Hull’s testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee may be found in The New York Times, Nov. 24, 1945. See repetition of this view in Mr. Hull’s Memoirs as quoted in The New York Times, Feb. 21, 1948, p. —.

4 Oppenheim, L., International Law (1906), Vol. II, pp. 30–31. See also the definition of ultimatum in Dictionnaire Diplomatique, Académie Diplomatique Internationale, Vol. II, pp. 999–1000, which reads as follows: On entend par ultimatum un acte émanant d’un Etat ou de certains de ses organes compétents, rédigé en termes péremptoires, envoyé à un autre Etat dans le out d’obtenir de ce dernier certaines satisfactions, consistant généralement soit en des actes à exécuter, soit en des abstentions. Si l’Etat auquel il est adressé refuse de l’exécuter, il pent devenir une déclaration de guerre. Il s’accompagne généralement d’un délai dans lequel il est à exécuter, avant que soient mises en vigueur les sanctions projetées. A l’expiration, du délai, l’Etat qui n’a point obtenu les satisfactions réclamiés est censé étre autorisé à commencer l’exécution des sanctions indiquées ou les operations de guerre.

5 Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs, 1924, p. 221.

6 The China Year Book, 1929–1930, p. 1225. Also Clyde, P., A History of the Far East, p. 650.

7 Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference of 1907.Scott, J. B. ed., Vol. III , p. 42 Google Scholar

8 The States which had ratified or adhered to the Convention were: Austriar–Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Guatemala, Haiti, Japan, Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

9 Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Serbia (Yugoslavia) were not party to the convention.

10 Practice regarding the use of a declaration or an ultimatum in the commencement of war during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not uniform; during the latter half of the nineteenth century only a few wars were begun without the dispatch of such a document, but on the whole Hague Convention III must be looked upon as legislation somewhat in advance of the prevailing usage.

11 For instance in the United States it is Congress that declares war, and therefore an ultimatum submitted by the president would be followed by a formal declaration, unless the ultimatum is dispatched with Congressional authorization and specifically names war as the alternative to the acceptance of demands.

12 Annwire de l’Institut de Droit International, 1906, p. 34.

13 Westlake, J., International Law, Part I (1907), p. 26.

14 Documents Concerning German–Polish Relations, and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. London, 1939, p. 175.

15 Same, p. 179.

16 Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, Scott, J. B. ed., Vol. III , p. 42.Google Scholar

17 Hyde, C. C, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Vol. II, pp. 196–197, asserts that “The Power issuing such a warning may not, however, deem failure to comply with its demands as automatically productive of war, butrather as justifying its own initiative thereof.” It is of course true that the implications of this second type of an ultimatum threatening war are quite as grave as those with a conditional declaration. The warning of war may be equally clear too. The difference between the two types is mainly one of procedure. In this respect it may be noted that the Institute of International Law, meeting at Ghent in 1906, required in the first draft of its resolution that war “be preceded by a declaration pure and simple, or conditional and under the form of an ultimatum,” but in the final draft left out the word “conditional”:Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, 1906, p. 54.

18 Hyde, as cited p. 197.

19 Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, Vol. VII, p. 170.Google Scholar

20 Text in this Journal, Vol. 6, Supplement, p. 11.

21 For the texts of these documents see International Law Documents, Naval College, 1917, as follows: Austria’Hungary to Serbia, July 22, 1914, p. 38; Germany to Russia, July 31, 1914, p. 100; Germany to Belgium, Aug. 2, 1914, p. 101; Germany to France, July 31, 1914, p. 103; Great Britain to Germany, Aug. 4, 1914, p. 116; Russia to Bulgaria, Oct. 3, 1915, p. 208; Japan to Germany, Aug. 15, 1914, p. 175; Italy to Turkey, Aug. 3, 1915, p. 170.

22 It has already been shown, however, that under somewhat similar circumstances Italy placed a time limit in her ultimatum to Turkey in 1911.

23 In the German ultimatum to France, the latter was given eighteen hours to state that it would remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia, but Germany did not state what she would do if the French refused. In the Austro–Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia “demands” were made, but there was no statement as to the action to be taken in case the demands were rejected.

24 International Law Documents, as cited, pp. 49, 100, 102, 103, 117, 170, 176, 209. Although the Austro–Hungarian note to Serbia was described by the Imperial and Royal Government as a “démarche with a time limit attached” (see British, White Book, Cd. 7467, No. 14) it accomplished the purpose of an ultimatum in every respect.

25 The New York Times, Oct. 29, 1940, p. 4.

26 Text in Facts in Review, Apr. 15, 1940.

27 White Paper, issued by the Norwegian Government, April 14, 1940. Text in Facts in Review, May 20, 1940.

28 The Italian ultimatum to Greece was submitted at 3 A.M. on October 28, 1940. It expired at 6 A.M. on the same day. Ihe Italian invasion of Greece began before the expiry of the time limit. See The New York Times, Oct. 29, 1940, p. 4, and Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 371, col. 733.

29 Foreign Relations of U. S., Peace and War, U. S. foreign Policy, 1931–1941, p. 124.

30 The text of the two notes may be found in this Journal, Vol. 36 (1942), Supplement, pp. 43–47.

31 Text of the note in this Journal, Vol. 36 (1942), Supplement, p. 44

32 Text of the address is given in same, of Official Documents, p. 22.

33 Letter of Sept. 28, 1944, to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, quoted in Report, Chapter III, C.

34 The New York Times, Nov. 24, 1945, pp. 1 and 3. He referred to Japanese statements that his note was an ultimatum as “in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts.” Mr. Hull stated further that his note was “essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country’s foreign policy.”

35 Mr. Stimson’s diary, quoted in the Report, Chapter III, C, quotes Mr. Hull as saying to the Secretary of War, “I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and the Navy.”

36 For instance the following account is given in Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, p. 138: “On November 25 and November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull recognized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; . . . The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously. . . . ”

37 On November 17, 1945, Admiral T. B. Inglis testified before the Joint Congressional Committee that captured enemy documents had revealed that the Japanese fleet left Tankan Bay early on the morning of November 26, in accordance with instructions issued on November 25. This statement has been confirmed by Admiral Nagano. See The New York Times, Oct. 25, 1941.

38 Grew, J. C., Ten Years in Japan, pp. 485–486.Google Scholar

39 The New York Times, Nov. 24, 1945, pp. 1 and 3.

40 The same; see also Foreign Relations of U. S., 1931–1941, p. 761 (here Nov. 24 is given as the date fixed for the termination of negotiations), and Secretary Stimson’s statement in Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, p. 59, that the War Department had “information available Nov. 17 and 22 that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by Nov. 25, 1941, later extended to Nov. 29, 1941.”

41 The New York Times, Nov. 24, p. 3.